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Planning in An Garda Síochána

Superintendent Eamon Lynch

Superintendent Eamon Lynch

INTRODUCTION

Planning is the primary management function. This function precedes and is the foundation for the organising, influencing, and controlling functions of managers. Only after managers and leaders have developed their plans can they determine how they want to structure their organisation, place their people, and establish organisational controls.

FIG. 1: PLANNING: FOUNDATION OF ORGANISING, INFLUENCING, CONTROLLING AND ACHIEVING RESULTS

The most important thing about the plan is not what's in it, but what is done with it — and how it connects to the lives of those it affects. This is a leadership challenge at all levels in An Garda Síochána. Someone once said that if you don't know where you are going, then don't be surprised if you don't know when you've reached your destination. Most of us would not think of trying to drive to a new place, in a direction we had not previously travelled, without using a road map. On holiday, sometimes we don't mind ambling along from place to place. When on a business trip, however, with limited time and a tight budget, it would be extremely rare for anyone to set off on a journey knowing neither the destination nor the route.

Planning gets us where we want to be, when we want to be there. Full consultation with stakeholders, particularly citizens and customers in the case of An Garda Síochána, is essential so that the services we deliver match the needs of the community we serve. There are many planning models and this one (Certo, 1994) (Fitzgerald, 1999) has eight movements. They are interlocking because the process is not step by step but rather overlapping and reiterative, changing in the light of new information and changes in the policing environment. The elements of the planning process are the eight movements in Figure 2

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FIGURE 2: EIGHT MOVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS



These stages are important because they respond to changes in the policing environment as they happen. For example, in public attitude surveys, the number one policing priority of the public in 1999 was drugs enforcement. Response to emergencies was number one in 2001 and this changed again in 2002 when crime investigation was given the highest priority. We work in a fast-changing policing environment and this is why annual plans must respond to national changes and local policing plans must respond to local changes. For effective planning, time must be given to each of these stages at the right time.

DO YOU HAVE TO PLAN IN THE IRISH PUBLIC SERVICE?

Section 5 of the Public Service Management Act 1997 introduced a legal requirement to prepare strategic statements for scheduled offices and branches of the public service seeking:

a) The key objectives, outputs and related strategies (including use of resources) of the Department of State or Scheduled Office concerned.
b) Be prepared in a form and manner in accordance with any directions issued from time to time by the Government, and
c) Be submitted to and approved by the relevant Minister of the Government with or without amendment.

An Garda Síochána was not scheduled, nor did it need to be. An Garda Síochána had prepared, presented and published its first Corporate Strategy Document – and evaluated it each year – as early as 1993, one of the first in the Irish public service to do so. In the UK, Section 6A of the Police Act 1996 as amended by Section 92 of the Police Reform Act, 2002 requires three-year strategic plans from each police service.

UNCERTAIN THE SERVICE WILL IMPROVE?

Unfortunately it is the case that in some organisations, despite the best intentions of the people associated with the organisation, there are no maps to steer by. Such groups are often characterised by a sense of malaise,

of being overwhelmed with so much to do that they don't know where to start. Frequently they don't. These groups often appear either to have lost their way or to have no sense of direction. Planning would be of great benefit, giving them a focus and mechanisms by which to achieve their goals. This is generally not the case when we examine UK police planning. UK police services generally achieve respectable ratings but, for one, a recent H. M. Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) Report illustrates how improvement must be better planned.

It noted a lack of consistency, that plans varied greatly in detail, timeframes varied from one year to five years, and they contained duplication of force documentation without clear links between service unit business plans and the overall aims and objectives of the force. The absence of a corporate business plan did not assist the planning process. Of the plans that adopted a three to five year timeframe, there was little evidence of a rolling programme of review. It was considered impossible therefore to track the progress and performance of the service unit against its plan and some unit managers said it was an annual process where the plans were shelved and dusted down when required.

The HMIC report concluded (their emphasis):
"In the case of the strategic planning review we conclude within our first judgement that it is a FAIR service. Secondly, we believe that as a result of Best Value Review inactivity that it is UNCERTAIN that the service will improve. More detail concerning these judgements is contained within the main body of this report." [1]

The Audit Commission has identified 26 essential elements associated with planning that achieve effective results in the London Metropolitan Authority. These are shown at Table 1.

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[1] "When the review activity commenced in earnest, it was identified that the Force needed a strategic plan to provide a "route map" for service unit managers to align their functions to achieve the overall aims and objectives of the Force. The review found that the process of strategic planning was seen as an annual exercise, involving disparate processes, which did not provide a cohesive framework for strategic planning. It was found that the process was bureaucratic and did not provide a mechanism to monitor the Force's process against the strategic plan. it also said "There was a clear need identified to develop a strategic direction and mechanism to provide the Force with a framework to streamline its planning process, enable the strategic direction of the Force to be reviewed and ensure service unit plans are developed with a clear link to strategic Force aims. Her Majesty's Inspector was, however, concerned that there had been a significant delay, approximately sixteen months, between the completion of this review and the time of the Inspection at which time implementation was minimal, with many of the recommendations being subsumed in the major change programme."

TABLE 1: REVIEW OF CORPORATE PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS: METROPOLITAN POLICE AUTHORITY

1. CORPORATE FRAMEWORK

A1 Has the authority established key overall aims and objectives?
A2 Are the objectives set out in a formal, corporate plan, committee report, or other distinctive document?
A3 How long has this been in place?
A4 Is there a sense of ownership by members?
A5 Is the authority's approach to developing corporate objectives and policies underpinned by a set of agreed core values?
A6 What period exists for the aims and objectives?
A7 How is this approach seen to fit with Best Value?

2. PLANNING FRAMEWORK

A8 Does the authority have a process to set corporate priorities?
A9 How far do the authority's priorities reflect cons sultation with the local community?
A10 To what extent do contacts and discussions with actual and potential partners inform the setting of corporate priorities?
A11 Is the setting of corporate priorities a process in which staff are involved?
A12 From a corporate perspective, in what ways do corporate aims and priorities inform annual action plans for service or project areas?
A13 What evidence is there that the authority is redirecting resources to address corporate priorities?

AT THEIR SIMPLEST, PLANS SET PRIORITIES AND IDENTIFY SEQUENCES OF EVENTS AND RESOURCES THAT MAY BE USED TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES.

3. PERFORMANCE MONITORING

A14 How does the authority monitor, measure and report on performance against corporate aims and priorities?
A15 What operational targets and performance indicators are produced against which performance may be measured?
A16 To what extent is performance audited to provide evidence that achievements are genuine?
A17 What evidence is there of performance review feeding back into reconsideration of corporate priorities and reallocation of resources?
A18 Has the authority put in place a system of performance management linking individual performance targets through operational and service plans to overall corporate priorities?

4. REVENUE BUDGETING

B1 Does the authority have in place mechanisms for longer term financial planning?
B2 Is there demonstrable evidence that financial decision-making has improved as a result of developing a longer-term financial plan?
B3 Is the base budget kept under regular review to identify resources, which could be redistributed to better effect?
B4 How does the financial plan explain where resources are to be used to provide services in compliance with stated objectives?
B5 To what extent is the current annual budget process incremental, based on last year's budget rather than on corporate and service priorities?
B6 How far do the authority's arrangements for consultation include specific information on the costs of possible options and the impact on the budget?

5. CAPITAL BUDGETING

B7 Does the authority have a longer-term capital budget?
B8 Does the capital budget have clear links to corporate objectives and priorities?

An Garda Síochána, each year, provides Implementation Guidelines to assist local police planning and the local plans have to reflect both local needs and national police planning priorities identified in public attitude surveys - and from a consultation process with government, partner agencies and local communities.

An examination of the Met standards at Table 1, point-by-point, shows that our planning effort matches this standard. There are aspects, such as our public attitude surveys, that improve on it. Where we do not yet match up is in our ability to activity-cost police operations. This would enable us to reallocate resources more effectively in a shorter time to match fast-changing policing priorities. The Director of Finance is working on activity costing and the future financial framework will include this.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

A strategic plan outlines the organisation's long-term aspirations and goals. Without this plan, it is easy to concentrate on short-term objectives, and consequently might constrain future development options. Strategic plans have defined time-frames, identified major goals, and the staging of processes for their achievement. They may cover several years, but most are for 3 or 5 years. They should not be inflexible and should be reviewed regularly to take into account achieved goals and to consider changes in the operating environment. This is done quarterly in An Garda Síochána and each annual policing plan updates the Garda Corporate Strategy Plan 2000-2004.

Strategic plans must present a broad overview and be holistic in scope. All aspects of the organisation and its business and its operational environment must be considered. Different strategic plans vary greatly in their complexity. At its simplest, the strategic plan should include a list of strategic objectives, a summary of the key resources required to achieve them, and a staged time-line for their achievement. It should be entirely consistent with the organisation's mission statement, values, strategy, purpose and behaviour standards. Strategic planning walks on two legs, one emergent and one deliberate. The main point is that strategy is both planned and evolves from our response to new developments; therefore it is everybody's business. (Lynch, 2000)

What models exist to help Garda planning? Many frameworks exist, and we have already looked at Certo's. Another describes the planning process (Kotler, 1993) while Bates (1995) provides a planning framework.

FIGURE 3 PLANNING PROCESS (KOTLER, 1993)

This is a minimalist model. There is considerable extra complexity in planning for public sector stakeholders, to ensure that transparency, accountability, equality[2] are delivered – and seen to be delivered – in a balanced and effective way within available resources in a manner that connects to the lives of those it effects.

Bates planning framework at Figure 4 is more suitable for complex public sector service delivery but less complete than the earlier Certo/Fitzgerald model at Figure 1.

FIGURE 4 PLANNING FRAMEWORK (BATES, 1995)

These are only models, representations of reality, but they act as reminders not to forget important aspects.

DIVISIONAL (AND GARDA SECTIONAL) POLICING PLANS

Service plans should be kept simple. Describing and analysing existing service, looking at the external and internal environment, describing the budget, defining the information needs, setting performance targets and priorities and how to measure them, planning action on key issues identified, listing personnel charged with achieving results, including

[2] Democracy presupposes three essential elements: transparency, accountability and equality. Transparency denotes free access to governmental political and economic activities and decisions. Accountability entails a state being held responsible, by both its people and its elected bodies, for its choices and actions. The concept of equality includes citizens being treated equally under the law, as well as some degree of equal political participation among them in their own governance.

review dates, and specifying a reporting date are all essential elements of each divisional policing plan. Those charged with Divisional Police Planning in Ireland should start with a wide consultation process, and download the *Implementation Strategy* from srmstaff@iol.ie. An excellent reference and framework is *An Garda Síochána DMR South Central Policing Plan 2003*. This can be obtained from the same email source.

The real world policed by Gardaí is complex. Each division should look at a wide range of factors because each has unique policing needs. Topics such as planned abandonment also need attention. Divisions can, and have, achieved more and better with existing resources used as effectively as possible, but resources are finite in an era of demands for free, perfect and now. Inevitably some initiatives of earlier years will have to be abandoned. Making and breaking teams is a key top leadership responsibility, together with the setting of strategic direction and reviewing results and adjusting strategy appropriately.

Operational business plans are smaller-scale and are usually more detailed than strategic plans. They usually cover a period of one year. They should consist of realistic, achievable and measurable objectives—lists of things that can and will be achieved. Business plans detail the resources that will be committed to achieving objectives. They should encompass ongoing activities or programmes as well as fixed-term activities or projects, which in their operational plan must be consistent with the strategic plan and the mission statement. Local and operational plans should be based on, and consistent with, clear annual budgets. This is a key aim of devolved budgeting and the Garda Financial Framework for Garda Divisions.

These plans should be set and reviewed annually, with a focus on the achievement—or otherwise—of objectives. This review process provides an indication of progress toward the achievement of longer-term goals outlined in the strategic plan. At the same time the realisation of objectives achieved is a source of satisfaction, with obvious implications for morale and future activities. The review process may also provide early warnings—changes in the operational environment, for instance. These should be noted and contingency plans formulated. Amended objectives may be necessary.

More transparency and accountability is needed in how police give feedback to, and seek guidance from, the community we serve. The Garda Website and other avenues must be maximised when we seek views and input from local communities on what they see as their local policing priorities in the year ahead. We already post on our website our annual plans, and an evaluation of how our results match what we planned. We

must now go further and post local policing plans and local evaluations. When we do this, we can say that the level of democratic legitimacy, and our level of transparency and accountability in delivery of policing services, is not bettered anywhere in the world.

DEFINITION OF POLICE PLANNING

Police planning can be defined as being a professional response to challenges. Planning is a process which can be learned by all members of an organisation and used to great effect. Plans try to anticipate opportunities and obstructions along the route, and attempt to provide a defined and trouble-free path which is still able to cope with the unexpected.

WHY PLAN?

If you don't, you'll go wrong. Worse, you will go wrong without knowing it. Why should An Garda Síochána prepare a strategy document and Garda Divisions prepare policing plans? Policing plans are essential building blocks in preventing organisational drift, where barely noticed changes in the environment in which we operate, over time, bring us in a substantially different direction to that which most benefits our citizens, customers and our mission.

EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF PLANNING IN POLICE SERVICES

It is difficult to answer the question, "What sorts of plans are used in police services, and how detailed should they be"? For example Ireland and the UK use the annual business plans and longer term strategic plans which are commonplace throughout Europe, while the NYPD depend on Compstat as an operational planning tool. Not every minor, routine police activity warrants formal planning; clearly those activities which are complex in terms of personnel, resources, and the scale or time involved require careful planning.

Plans vary in scale and comprehensiveness. They can range from those required for an individual activity or function to a comprehensive plan for the whole organisation or a master plan integrating complex components of a major project.

Examples of plans include:

- longer-term strategic plans;
- annual operational or business plans; we call them policing plans;
- project plans—often entailing a feasibility study component;
- master plans;
- financial plans;
- conservation plans;
- safety and security plans;

- risk management plans;
- disaster plans; and
- information management plans.

Garda IT, Telecommunications, Change Management, HRM, Training Strategy and Services, Finance and many more sections have all produced some of these plans. Planning is not a perfect science and the budgets to fund plans rarely flow as smoothly as planned. Divergence in some plans therefore have pushed the timescales out. Nontheless the net benefit to An Garda Síochána of recent planning means that, in Dublin in 2002, we could cope with a 22 per cent increase in the number of incidents responded to. Any other organisation would have been brought to its knees. This massive 22 per cent increase over 2001compares to an average increase of seven per cent yearly up to then. Good planning, fast operational thinking, innovative policies and thousands of committed Gardai made it possible to cope with an increase of this magnitude.

PLANNING CYCLES

Regardless of whether major new projects are under consideration, it is worthwhile undertaking organisational-level planning in regular cycles based on two, sometimes three, time-scales. Longer-term planning for the general directions and major thrusts that an organisation sets out to achieve over an extended period is best covered by a strategic plan. Shorter-term organisation of projects and programs is best described using an operational plan, a business plan, that usually covers one year. A series of operational business plans effectively acts as a subset for the achievement of the broader strategic goals.

Both types of plan must be monitored and reassessed by reference to the goals and objectives; and both should be subject to regular review. Goals can be said to be the endpoint for which we aim, and objectives are the list of measurable achievements that provide milestones along the way. When all the objectives have been achieved, we know the goals have been reached. The need to identify clearly defined and measurable objectives cannot be over-emphasised. Without milestones it is all too easy to lose one's way and not know whether a goal has been reached!

PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING AND MANAGING CHANGE

Any change will present difficulties and the number of aspects that require attention, sometimes consultation, sometimes co-operation, sometimes mastery, is far more numerous than foreseen at the outset. The 101 principles listed at Appendix One, though overly detailed for daily use are a collection of golden nuggets gleaned from hard rock-face of change management planning. They will be ignored at peril.

CONCLUSION

Planning is an attempt to control the future. Some people just settle for anything the future happens to bring them — 'Whatever will be, will be'. They simply react to it. A manager is paid to do otherwise, to be *proactive*, and to think ahead and consider:

1. how you want things to turn out;
2. how they might turn out if you take no action, and
3. what you need to do to make the future as much like how you want things to be as possible.

In short, you need to plan.

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Senior managers in an organisation may be planning several years ahead – thinking, for instance, of new services, of the new community and policing environment, of new ways of obtaining resources, and of new ways of structuring the organisation. They must also plan on and implement several timescales, and timing is a key skill in this process. Most of us, however, have a shorter 'time horizon'. Our managerial planning is usually concerned with the next few months or, at most, one or two years into the future. And we usually have to plan within the constraints of objectives, staffing, time, budgets, etc. that arise from the plans of more senior managers.

Planning is largely a matter of applied common sense. Much the same thought processes and consultation skills are required in planning how to introduce a computer system or move to new offices as in planning a family holiday or an extension to your house. A plan has three major aspects:

1. *Objectives:* what are the goals, targets, outcomes, or results you intend to accomplish?
2. *Implementation:* how are people and resources to be combined, in what activities over what time period, to accomplish the objectives?
3. *Evaluation:* how is the progress of the implementation to be continuously monitored so that amendments to 1 and 2 can be made if things are not working out as they should?

An Garda Síochána has been doing this well since 1993. How can it be done better? After preparation with the help of local consultation, each Divisional and District Plan should be posted on the Garda Website and local comment should be encouraged and sought to help improve the next year's plan. An evaluation should also be posted at the end of each year.

At their simplest, plans set priorities and identify sequences of events and resources that may be used to achieve objectives, objectives that will meet the needs of the communities we serve most effectively, within our resources. End.

APPENDIX ONE: PLANNING AND MANAGING CHANGE: 101 PRINCIPLES

(A) UNDERSTANDING CHANGE

1. Write down any changes you would like - and plan for them.
2. If you find you are resisting change, ask yourself why.
3. Seek out people who welcome change, and become their ally.
4. Think before following the same policy of everyone else.
5. Respond positively to uncertainty rather than avoiding change.
6. Cultivate curiosity: try to become the best informed person you know.
7. Master and use new information technology – do not hide from it.
8. Bear in mind that technology is changing more and more quickly.
9. Welcome change initiatives from all sources.
10. Always respond positively to changes outside your organisation.
11. Encourage subordinates to suggest ideas for change projects.
12. Consider the combined effects of different types of change.
13. When analysing change, look at both short and long-term contexts.
14. Learn from crises, to prevent them from recurring.
15. Aim to equal or surpass the best examples you find.
16. Be different and better than the competition if you want to be the winner.

(B) PLANNING CHANGE

17. Realistically assess your organisations' strengths and weaknesses.
18. Keep your vision statements to one or two short sentences.
19. Change corporate culture through individuals, not vice-versa.
20. Strive to satisfy the needs of both employees and citizens/customers.
21. Cherish customers who complain: they tell you what you want to change.
22. Remember that quality of product depends on quality of process.
23. Use objective measures of customer response.
24. Prioritise change in key areas, then focus attention more widely.
25. Be clear about the purpose of any change you plan to make.
26. Concentrate on a few processes that really count.
27. Plan a fluid integrated change programme.
28. Ask of every change, 'How will this affect all those involved ?'.
29. Try proposing changes on a small scale first.
30. If it takes complex reasoning to justify change, abandon it.
31. Use critical path analysis to help plan tasks.
32. Always get your people policies right when planning changes.
33. Use training as a deliberate tool to involve people in change.
34. Apologise and explain if people feel ill-informed.
35. Involve everybody in the planning of at least one change project.
36. Give all teams some autonomy in setting their own targets.
37. Commit any consultants to a clear brief and short timescale.

38. If you make promises about change, keep them.
39. Imitate good sports coaches – encourage people to progress.
40. Avoid being ruled by financial years: they are purely arbitrary.
41. Aim to introduce one new idea every week.
42. Encourage people to find new ideas for quick-fix changes.
43. To make change easier to accept, plan to introduce it in stages.
44. Ensure that people's views are given full consideration.
45. As circumstances change, adjust plans – radically if necessary.
46. Make sure that your action plan is properly presented.
47. Become proficient in any planning technique you decide to use.
48. Go over your check-sheets at least once a week, updating them.
49. Always check schedules with those affected to ensure practicality.
50. Look for big improvements from change projects.
51. Include the prospect of individual and team rewards and recognition in a change plan.
52. Never take people's support for action plans for granted.
53. Avoid the temptation to bribe people to change.
54. Monitor morale closely, and act if it begins to deteriorate.
55. Avoid feeling sentimental over inevitable job losses/changes.
56. Watch out if no resistance is evident: it may be hidden.
57. Find allies who will help you to counter critics and conservatives.
58. Always be frank about the possible adverse effects of change.
59. Test your plans with experiments in every possible context.
60. Allow for variable factors when reviewing pilot scheme results.
61. Analyse shortfalls in performance and find all the reasons for them.
62. Thank people for putting forward useful objections and criticisms.

(C) IMPLEMENTING CHANGE

63. Remember that honesty is not the best policy: it is the only policy.
64. Display concise vision statements to reinforce the change message.
65. Make training for all the centre-piece of any change programme.
66. Speak about change plans to as many people individually as you can.
67. Be hopeful, but utterly realistic, when promising benefits.
68. Blame the message, not the messenger or the audience, for bad reactions.
69. Put change agents in place before launching a change programme.
70. Make sure that those leading change support it thoroughly.
71. Challenge any need for secrecy: avoid keeping information secret unless it is essential to do so.
72. Remind people that change is for everyone, not just a few.
73. Use your own commitment to change as an example for others.
74. Use regular progress meetings to highlight achievements.
75. Generate a feel-good factor by redecorating the workplace.
76. Err on the side of excess when celebrating a major success.

77. Always attend if celebrations have been arranged.
78. Let teams decide how to share financial rewards.
79. Make people feel their own roles are strategically important.
80. Treat people gently if morale is low during the change cycle.
81. Take all resistance seriously however far-fetched it seems, and deal with it effectively.
82. Set up a special suggestion box devoted to the change project.
83. Be sure to investigate silence thoroughly – it is rarely golden.
84. Persuade people that change will always mean opportunity.

(D) CONSOLIDATING CHANGE

85. Only study or produce measures that clearly show progress or results.
86. If performance lags, look first at how it is targeted and measured.
87. Find the few key measures that best judge success.
88. Continually check a project's relevance to the changing environment.
89. Do not abandon failing projects: reorient, revise, and reinforce them.
90. Avoid change overload: it can ruin the effect of individual projects.
91. Never assume that you know what people think – always ask them.
92. Keep setting stretching targets to move change forward.
93. Ensure that revised objectives are communicated clearly to everyone.
94. Make the most of people who have played a key role in the success of change programmes.
95. Agree people's development objectives, and write them down.
96. Use self-help guides to enhance your development and performance.
97. Set training targets for everybody, including yourself.
98. Make sure that every change programme continues to improve results and maintain and enhance organisational reputation.
99. Use strict and rigorous standards when appraising team performance.
100. Promote only people dedicated to change.
101. To be successful, plan, implement, revise, update, and build on change.

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The Role of the First-line Supervisor in An Garda Síochána

Superintendent Gerard Dillane

AN GARDA SIOCHANA MANAGEMENT JOURNAL communique

Introduction

Traditionally, supervisors did not participate in the completion of work tasks, but directed the work of others, and were responsible for ensuring that work was done. In more recent times supervisors are required to participate in the work, while still being responsible for the performance and work of others. This confers a first-line management role on supervisors. A brief overview of the concept of supervisory practice will be provided here, with a discussion of how the role of the supervisor can contribute to organisational effectiveness. Supervisory roles and skills are reviewed, using police leadership competency models to determine, from a supervisory perspective, the most effective role of the first-line supervisor in An Garda Síochána and the key competencies needed. This review suggests strongly that problem-solving is a key competence.

Supervisory Practice

Not all organisations use the term 'supervisor'. Many prefer to use the title of foreman, junior or assistant manager, superintendent, or junior operative, etc. Regardless of terminology, these people all perform a supervisory function of some capacity. This, generally speaking, means having responsibility for the work of others. This responsibility typically includes planning, directing and controlling the work of individuals or groups, though not necessarily carrying out the work itself.

According to Harvey (1994) a supervisor may be defined as "anyone at the first level of management who has responsibility for the work of others". This broad, if brief, definition merits consideration as it uses the term 'responsibility for', rather than, say, 'authority over', and it also recognises that the supervisory function is changing. The changing role of the supervisor is a recurring theme of Harvey who stresses that the supervisor is becoming less a person who gives orders and more one who leads and motivates workers. Harvey's definition also recognises that, even within organisations, there may be many different types of supervisors.

The Supervisor in the Organisational Context

Beer et. al. (1984) and, more recently, Peters (2000) emphasised the importance of the line manager in the process of managing people towards the mission goals of the organisation – thus pushing responsibility down the hierarchy pyramid as far as possible. Peters pointed to front-line supervisors as one of the few remaining underused reservoirs of increased output, effectiveness and growth.

Storey (1993) emphasised the importance of line managers in ensuring effective performance in the workplace. According to Sisson, this has proved successful through the line managers donning the role of "enabler", "empowerer" and "facilitator". Kilmann et. al. (1985) suggest that the line manager, who is local on the ground, can use his/her "conditional power" especially to get through to the "belief" concept of the operating core to focus "the collective will" of the consciousness of the organisation of the operating core. What they suggest, effectively, is that the line manager who, with hands-on walk-about style, ensures that the goals are met by the operating core, with whom they have personal interaction, will take on board the corporate strategy of the apex core management. The line manager, in this context, is involved with the work team, managing change, building team spirit, professionalism, commitment, and performance measurement, in the delivery of the best possible service.

In the organisational context, it is clear that the traditional supervisory expectations placed on first line supervisors are changing. It is no longer sufficient for supervisors to be solely concerned with ensuring that subordinates follow procedures and engage in behaviour consistent with organisational regulations – they must also assume the responsibilities of maintaining, transmitting and enabling the achievement of organisational visions and values.

SUPERVISORY ROLES AND SKILLS

The role of a supervisor is frequently described as that of ‘coach’. This is somewhat ligitimate in so far as the tasks are similar; trying to get a group of individuals to coherently function together to accomplish specified tasks to achieve a goal. On closer analysis, however, the role of supervisor is more broad. As Iannone (1994) points out, "Supervisors need not become highly skilled in every technical aspect of the job they supervise to be effective. To do so would impose an impossible burden upon them; but they should have a good working knowledge of the principal aspects of the job for which they are responsible". He goes on to state that the supervisor should "prepare for the position by gaining a knowledge and understanding of the policies, rules, procedures, practices, functions, and objectives of their organisation.

Moorhead and Griffin (1998) provide a useful framework for exploring the skills required for supervisory practice. They list the core supervisory skills as technical, human, conceptual and diagnostic skills. They may be summarised as follows.

1. TECHNICAL SKILLS

Technical skills include the ability to use knowledge, methods, techniques, and equipment necessary for the performance of specific tasks acquired from experience, education and training. In the context of the Sergeants' role, they are expected to be able to "advise subordinates on the action that they should take to deal with particular problems and provide the technical knowledge required if the checking of reports and actions by [sergeants] is to have any real meaning." (Bunyard, 1978)

2. HUMAN SKILLS

These skills include the ability and capacity for judgment in working with and through people, including an understanding of motivation and an application of effective leadership principles and practices.

3. CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

Conceptual skills focus on the ability to understand the complexities of the workings of the organisation and where one's own operation contributes to organisational effectiveness and efficiency. This knowledge permits one to act according to the organisation's objectives rather than only the basic goals and needs of one's own immediate group. (Hershey and Blanchard, 1982).

4. DIAGNOSTIC SKILLS

Diagnostic skills incorporate primarily the ability to understand cause-and-effect relationship and to recognise the optimal solutions to problems.

FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL, DIAGNOSTIC, HUMAN AND TECHNICAL SKILLS REQUIRED AT DIFFERENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS



Source: Moorhead and Griffin,1998.

In the organisational context, most managers need technical, interpersonal, conceptual and diagnostic skills, but the importance of these skills varies by level in the organisation. As illustrated in the diagram, above, conceptual and diagnostic skills are usually more important for top managers in organisations, whereas technical and interpersonal skills may be more important for the first-line manager or spervisor.

ROLE AND SKILL TRAINING FOR SUPERVISORS IN POLICE ORGANISATIONS

A review of Sergeants training in many police services, including An Garda Síochána, shows an emphasis on the human and technical skills, whereas the visions and values of management are to a much lesser degree being impressed upon the Sergeant. The traditional methods of policing, in recent years, are migrating to the position that enforcement agencies worldwide must re-evaluate the way in which administrators supervise line-level personnel. According to Birzer (1986) "They must become leaders with a vision for pulling their organisations forward." This would suggest that the roles of the Sergeant is firstly to arm himself/herself with the requisite skills, secondly, be provided with a clear vision of the organisation's expectations, and then go forward into the operational environment to lead his/her team to accomplish the tasks and missions on hand.

POLICE LEADERSHIP COMPETENCY MODELS

Whilst successful policing depends on a range of factors, internal and external to the service, effective leadership is an essential component at all levels within a police organisation. Leadership can be seen as a dynamic sequence of cause and effect, which starts with an input (leader behaviour) and finishes with an outcome (successful outcomes). In 1996 the Sussex Police in England carried out research into leader behaviour. A scrutiny of first and second line supervision was conducted over a three-month period. The Sussex Police Leadership Model, and the competencies they identified, emerged for this following a literature review, questionnaires, group discussion, personal interviews, observing work procedures and consultation.

There are a number of other well recognised police competency models such as one used by the U.K. Home Office for their police services, including the P.S.N.I., and another called the Landy-Jacob Model, used by twenty police services across the United States. In May 1999 the Garda Promotion Methods Review Group presented a report that included, among other contents, a range of competencies for promotions to the rank of Sergeant in An Garda Síochána identified by Saville and Holdsworth Ltd.

Most of the competencies identified in all four models outlined are generic leadership competencies which would apply to leaders in any organisation. These competencies will be found on most modern leadership job description sheets and can be summarised as in Table 1 below. The models and competencies were developed specifically because of problems evident in how first line management performed and produced improvable results.

TABLE 1: FOUR COMPETENCY MODELS

SUSSEX POLICE LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES	GARDA SAVILLE AND HOLDSWORTH MODEL
Professional and ethical standards	Organising and Co-ordinating implementation
Self-motivation	Investigation and analysis skills
Leadership	Sound and Timely decision-making
	Team Leading and standard setting
Managing and developing people	People handling skills
Communication Relationships with others	Effective two-way communication skills
Practical application of knowledge and experience	Commitment and resilience
Strategic awareness	Personal drive and commitment (including self-development)
Decision-making and problem-solving	Procedural and functional Policing knowledge
Planning and organising	
Creativity and innovation	

LANDY-JACOB COMPETENCY MODEL	UK HOME OFFICE COMPETENCY MODEL (INCLUDES PSNI)
Planning and Organising	Operational Planning Strategic Thinking
Resource Management	Managing and Developing Others
Information Analysis	Decision-making
Judgment and Decision-making	Leadership
Interpersonal Relations	Communication
Oral Expression	Professional and Ethical Standards Self Motivation
	Creativity and Innovation

A comparison of the competencies presented in Table 1 with the competencies aligned with promotion to the rank of Sergeant in An Garda Síochána reveals that while there are commonalities across the competency areas, problem-solving is not included in the Garda competency set. It is identified by the various police forces as decision-making and problem solving (Sussex Police Model), sound / timely decision-making (Saville and Holdsworth) decision-making (UK model) and judgment and decision-making (Landy-Jacob model). This omission may be significant as a major part of police work worldwide consists of dealing with the problems presented in day-to-day police work, both internally within the organisation, and through the provision of a police service to an increasingly complex and diverse community.

The more complex the policing environment becomes, the more valuable will be the problem-solving ability of first-line supervisors. Recent US research reported by Law Enforcement News (2003) validates this view. Moreover, it also concludes that the best performers amongst police supervisors all had a higher problem-solving ability. It follows that one way of selecting high performing supervisors is to test their problem solving ability.

CONCLUSION

The role of the first line-supervisor in An Garda Síochána, from a supervisory perspective, is primarily to manage and lead the members under their supervision. This management and leadership role has many functions, depending on the issues under scrutiny, but generally include responsibility for planning, organising, controlling, staffing and directing resources at an operational level. Of all of these functions perhaps the most important are organising and directing. Organising basically entails scheduling and allocating work. Directing refers to motivating and leading workers - in blunt terms, getting workers to do what they are employed to do. The human skills described earlier are therefore central to effective supervisory practice. At the interactions level, there is also the role of influencing a continuous improvement in the quality of service delivered.

Returning briefly to the competencies for promotion to the rank of Sergeant, the definition of the competency of decision-making and problem solving must be clearly set out to strengthen the Sergeants selection process to identify and select the most suitable personnel available. Decision-making and problem solving competencies must also be included in the sergeant's induction training and all subsequent Sergeant development courses. To support this competency development, the more senior management personnel must refine the expectations of

Sergeants and clearly communicate the key issues, values, or tasks on which to focus to ensure a continuously improving quality service to the community.

Finally, the examination of organisational role descriptions reveals that the Sergeant as a first-line supervisor is expected to use knowledge, methods, techniques and equipment in the performance of routine and critical tasks, while spending an additional inordinate amount of time performing administrative duties. They are expected to accomplish missions by working with and through people, applying motivation and effective leadership to Gardai under their responsibility. They must also possess the conceptual skills to understand the complexities of the overall organisation, where their operation fits into organisational and corporate objectives and to have the ability to stretch sometimes limited resources to respond to immediate service needs. A problem-solving ability will improve service delivery and maximize resource use.

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Superintendent's Management Course – A survey of some participating officers

Superintendent Richard Duggan

Superintendent Richard Duggan

"Those having torches will pass them on to others."
Plato.

INTRODUCTION

This article is concerned with improving the quality, performance, education and development of Garda Superintendents. It aims to ensure that future officers receive only the best training to equip them for their future roles as leaders and managers. Berry et al, (1995) defines training and development. "Training is maintaining and improving skills for job performance. Development aims to create skills for future roles". The Officers made suggestions and recommendations for future development. Superintendent Development Courses were assessed through a survey of the participants to ascertain if they developed the skills, knowledge and attributes necessary for the job.

METHODOLOGY

The main objective of the research was to explore what senior officers felt about their own training and how it could be improved. It also focused on the needs of the rank and the identification of gaps in the present system. This was achieved through a qualitative approach to the research. Semi-structured interviews were held with fifteen senior officers. Five had attained the rank of Assistant Commissioner, five were at Chief Superintendent level and five were senior Superintendents with at least five years standing in the rank. Deirdre McTeigue (1998 : 48)[3], noted in relation to representation in research, that "while not randomly selected, there is no reason to regard this particular group as being in any way unrepresentative. Therefore, I believe that, with some caution, the findings of this study are broadly generalisable". The findings of this study, too, are broadly generalisable.

Semi-structured interviews were also held with the key personnel, Garda and Civilian, involved in Superintendent and Management Training. There are advantages in using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Overall, it was felt that the qualitative method would be more beneficial and flexible.[4] Rather than receiving a cursory response to a distributed questionnaire there was likely to be more in-depth responses to the semi-structured interview questions. The investigative nature of this approach was also advantageous.

AN GARDA SIÚCHÁNA MANAGEMENT JOURNAL communique

C E N T R E

Garda Internal Audit Section.

ACHIEVEMENTS.

The Garda Internal Audit Section was established in July 2001 and commenced its role in 2002 of performing periodic and systematic audits of District and Specialist locations within An Garda Síochána as well as undertaking specific value-for-money type reviews within the organisation.

The threefold objective of the Garda Internal Audit Section is to ensure that An Garda Síochána

1. Receives and records all revenues to which it is entitled and that all assets are properly recorded and safeguarded as well as ensuring that all expenditure is properly authorised and that all liabilities are discharged within legal timeframes,
2. Is capable of providing the records that will form a reliable basis for the preparation of organisation wide statements and that any areas requiring attention will be identified.
3. Selects the appropriate strategies at District, Divisional, Regional, Specialist and Functional levels that address the needs of the organisation as well as the stakeholders.

In 2002, the Garda Internal Audit Section carried out fifty-five (55) Audits of various Districts and Specialist Sections within An Garda Síochána and reported their findings to Regional and Branch Commissioners and the Garda Audit Committee. In addition to the audits carried out, the Garda Internal Audit Section also reported on practices operative within An Garda Síochána that required amendment. The amendments needed were mainly owing to the passage of time and their relevance to modern management practices as displayed in public and private sector organisations. In carrying out the audit function the Garda Internal Audit Section follow a methodology to ensure that the Section is fulfiling its role in a consistent manner across the organisation. This methodology is displayed overleaf in Figure 1.

The Garda Internal Audit Section, throughout June, will conduct briefings all over the country for Superintendents and Inspectors to explain the methodology above, and, in particular to generate best practice in internal control, Superintendent's audits, and the role of the GIAS.

Peter Fitzgerald, Editor

Planning

Front-line supervision

Superintendent Development

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Editor

FIGURE 1: INTERNAL AUDIT METHODOLOGY AND STAGES

Alcohol and Crime

Garda/Hospital Road accident data

Photographs by Photography Section, Garda H.Q.

The Core Module of the 2001 class was used as a focus group. All had undertaken both the Superintendent's Promotion Development Course and the Police Management Degree Programme. Unstructured discussions took place with these Senior Officers to elicit the essential needs of the Superintendent and to establish their reaction to the training programmes received. Their recommendations, in the light of their experience, were a valuable insight into the requirements of an operational Superintendent.

INTERVIEWS

Prior to interview, all those surveyed completed a survey form. This indicated that those surveyed were:

1. Gender: 14 Male, 1 Female.
2. Age profile was between 43-59 years.
3. Service in the rank ranged from 5 years to 9 years.
4. Service in An Garda Síochána ranged from 21 years to 38 years.
5. Area of responsibility consisted of 12 with District/Divisional or Regional positions, and 3 attached to Specialist Units (All had per formed duty as District Officers at some stage in their career).
6 The highest education levels attained were as follows:
   Leaving Certificate: 7
   BA/Diploma: 4
   BA (Police): 3
   Masters: 1
7. International Experience: All had some international experience which ranged from one week to a year.

All the Officers were asked at least 31 questions. Their responses necessitated supplementary questions. There was no limitation on time and the vast majority of the respondents were very open and frank. Two declined to be interviewed on tape and gave monosyllabic answers despite having been given assurances that all interviews were confidential. Notes taken from other respondents, as a result of the interview, ranged from 12 pages to 5 pages.

AGE ON PROMOTION

The youngest age of promotion to Superintendent was 38 years. "I was delighted but frightened at the prospect". The most senior person "I was rewarded for exemplary service, before being put out to grass" was aged 55 years on promotion.

COURSES UNDERTAKEN PRIOR TO PROMOTION

Two had primary degrees at BA level prior to joining the Garda

Síochána. One completed a Masters degree, prior to promotion to Sergeant. One attained a BA degree at the rank of Sergeant. Two developed themselves through management courses. "I did an Effective Management Course, in the Open University by distance learning. It was very informative and it focused you in the general direction of the management aspect. It dealt with the management vein of things e.g. staff assessments, into dealing with problematics, grievance procedures, assessments for promotion, how you identify people". This was a very Senior Officer who had the foresight to develop in management long before it came into vogue.

Another Officer undertook an IPA Management course which " helped me to get the best out of people, including myself. P D + R (a management performance system) was being introduced in An Garda Síochána and I looked forward to becoming a real manager. But because of opposition by the representative bodies it never came to pass. No replacement system has been introduced. It is essential that a national system be introduced".

All had attained the Sergeants and Inspectors courses. In addition all had a wide range of experience which included the normal operational and in-house courses. Five had attended international courses and seminars at the rank of Inspector. Two attended drugs courses, one an international detectives course and two attended cultural exchange programmes.

STAGE SUPERINTENDENTS' DEVELOPMENT COURSE UNDERTAKEN

Two Officers never attended a development course. "Due to the political turmoil in the country, I was directed by the Commissioner to remain at my sensitive post". The second could not attend for "operational reasons". Both, however, did later attend management programmes with non-Garda agencies. One respondent attended the course prior to appointment. One attended the course years after appointment "long after I needed it". Three attended "within weeks" of promotion. Three attended "within months". The remainder attended "within six months" of promotion.

RATING OF THE COURSE

On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being Poor and 10 being Excellent, the course was rated between 4 and 8. Four rated it between 4 and 5. 11 rated it between 7and 8.

Scale :	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Rating under five:	4									
Rating over six:							11			

"I rated it fairly highly. A number of people gave lectures of a very high quality. It seemed to be a little bit low key. You could get a lot out of it but it was up to yourself", said one respondent.

With the exception of two interviewees, all rated the teaching methods very highly and the staff very competent and committed. This is in line with the assessment sheet submitted by participants at the end of their course. The purpose is to assess the content and reaction to teaching methods by the students.

The slips are known as "the happy sheets" by the management school because they are always complimentary. "There is rarely a critique or critical appraisal made to improve future courses" the Management School notes. There is a constant request for media, interview techniques, and court procedures. All the Officers find these courses the most beneficial. One Officer's reaction and contribution was that " there should be a swim or an exercise element daily". The two respondents who criticised the tutors were more concerned with the rank of the instructors rather than the message or content of the material.

SUBJECTS MOST BENEFICIAL

The most important subjects highlighted by all the Officers were:

1. Management.
2. Interview Techniques.
3. Media Studies.
4. Communications.
5. Legal Studies – Update on Legislation and Court Procedure.
6. Management of a Major Incident.
7. Discipline (Investigation to Tribunal aspect).
8. I.T. (Management Systems).

The management subjects were taught by non-Garda professional management academics and consultants. Officer No.2 found, "the management content by Bob Pattison, Limerick University, was excellent. I would have liked more of it. The time management, personal plans and performance management were first class. I only regret they were not followed-up on return to base. I also liked the leadership and motivation modules. People are our resource and we must use them properly".

"Interview Techniques by Mr. Paddy Ryan, ESB, was great, it showed that he had a lot of knowledge and experience. It stood me in good stead for years afterwards".

Another "loved the management subjects, interview techniques and of course media studies and communication".

"The Operational Commander's course was very important to me, even though I was one of the oldest Superintendent's to be appointed. I knew the necessity of it because every major incident that happens seems to take place in nice quiet rural districts". Four other Officers expressed the same sentiments.

AREAS FOUND TO BE OF LITTLE VALUE

The Superintendent who was the youngest promoted declared "the first thing I would have done is remove the firearms element in the Commander's course. Firing different weapons! Wasting time when we should be attending to financial management and personnel management".

Two found the lectures by Customs and Army "a myriad of facts, figures but no management content". Still another Senior Officer found "bringing down the Chief Executive of the Garda Complaints Board was not necessary. We knew that old act thoroughly. It was superfluous to our needs as was the lecture by the State Pathologist. What did we as a crowd of managers want to know about cutting-up bodies? It was none of our function and should not be part of the development course."

ASSIGNMENTS

Only two Officers were obliged to submit assignments. They found them hard work but very worthwhile. One completed an assignment on " Major Event Planning" and the other was on "Performance Management". Both were very important and subsequently used by the Commissioner. No Officer was obliged to submit an assignment before or after the course. Four Officers were given assignments at the end of their course but were not obliged to submit them. Given the escape clause they did not complete them.

Thirteen out of the fifteen were in favour of a project. Two rejected the notion because they were too busy.

"The dissertation always seemed to be a blockage especially in the culture where we come from. Some get out of it. Some were always late. Now it really needs to be dealt with. Give them six months to complete it on some vital management aspect of the job. If necessary they should be assigned a coach or mentor to ensure that it is completed on a phased basis".

ATTENDANCE AT MODULES

All the participants attended all the modules of their courses. However, they were aware of absenteeism, lack of commitment, "for operational reasons, contrived or otherwise" which prevented active participation by all.

Did the officers feel the course equipped them for their new role? "Certainly, it was of great assistance. But the important thing is the interaction, the exchange of views and opinions. There is such a range of experience and knowledge among these very senior people and it is all beneficial".

All were of the view that the course should be given prior to, or on appointment to, the new role. All believed that the rank was to a great extent sustained through a long apprenticeship gained in experiential learning.

" I think the course did equip me for my new role. It's like all courses, it depends what you put into it".

Five felt that the course did help them with their new role. Eight felt that it did not equip them. "When promoted to Inspector or Superintendent rank we then have to divest ourselves of the operational role and get into the management role. I think it did not really equip us to make that jump across the Rubicon, to take off the old clothes and put on the new".

COURSES ATTENDED AT THE RANK OF SUPERINTENDENT

All highlighted the lack of courses or in-service development for Superintendents. Three undertook the BA in Police Management. All were delighted with the regional seminars and briefings on Pulse and S.M.I. All identified the need for a regional In-Service Training system for all Officers.

One Superintendent undertook two promotion courses, one in Ireland and one in Scotland at Tulliallan Castle Police College. "The courses were poles apart and even though Tulliallan was only three weeks it was very intense. Our own course of six weeks lacked commitment and the essential strategic management subjects were given too little time. At Superintendent level there should be more emphasis on management skills than on basic policing skills". Prior to attending the Scottish course the student was given advance reading. He had to submit 3000 word articles on his own experiences as a police officer, his past history and on himself. During the course he had to submit a 3000 word

intervention on Human Resource Management. On termination he was given an assignment on a Police Strategic Management intervention of 10,000 words. These were assessed and the Director of the College gave personal "feedback or assessment on the candidate". The respondent worked from 7.00a.m. until 9.00p.m. every day, was exhausted but found the course of great value.

Three Officers attended a language course, up to threshold level, in French at the Garda College. Two visited a French Police College for two weeks on an exchange programme. Two were directed by the Commissioner to attend courses with the British Police on traffic related matters. Two attended short-term courses at Bramshill Police College on emergency planning. One attended an international Senior Officers course on drug enforcement, in America. One respondent attended a Senior International Officers course in Bramshill. All found the interaction with other police forces of great value. "Police the world over are the same, they speak the same language but mark my words we're as good as the best of them". Three Officers attended the international exchange programme between the RUC and Gardai held in America, the Garda College and in Northern Ireland. They found it "brought us closer together" and recommended further exchanges, liaison officers and joint training initiatives.

Those who undertook UN duty felt that the contribution made by the Gardaí was immense. They regarded their own training and experience as far greater than some of their colleagues. "The UN organisation seemed to recognise our quality by placing Garda Officers in very senior positions". " International courses are an important part of the development of the individual Officer going into the administrative ranks" — was the observation of a very high ranking Officer.

CONCLUSION

The current Superintendent's Development Course contains many strengths but it lacks high levels of commitment by the participants because there is no assessment criteria. Mere attendance is sufficient and there is a laxity as to when the course is undertaken. The time given to the core 'management subjects' could be extended. Members remain 'operational' during the modules which militates against dedication to study and participation. No pre-reading material is provided. No assignments are given. There is no follow up review prior to participants being appointed to the role of District Officer. Very often they gain appointments as district officers or take charge of a senior garda post prior to development training. Appointments should be given after completion of a one-year development programme. This would give

ample time to complete assignments and gain experience through the mentoring process.

The BA (Police Management) degree programme addresses the gaps in relation to commitment, assignments, management knowledge and certification of competency.
A combination of the Police Management BA degree programme subjects incorporated into superintendent development courses could address the need for future development – particularly the strategic management subjects.

The degree programme should remain voluntary with links to universities and business schools. Modules should be created for attendance at such institutions combined with a module at a business or industry. Certification at diploma or masters level should be through distance education. The diploma or degree should be awarded by academic institutions independent of An Garda Síochána.

There is a need for assessment review by the Training and Development Unit in conjunction with the Management School. They should devise a best practice method of assessment and review of future development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The initial development programme for Superintendents should be undertaken prior to appointment.
2. There must be release from the 'operational role' while attending modules of training. A reserve panel should be created to fill vacancies, where Officers are taken out of the operational arena, are being developed or where they are on international exchange programmes.
3. Assignments must be given for all modules, under the direction of the management school in consultation with Regional Commissioners.
4. There must be continuous assessment and feedback on all programmes. A standard as decided by the Garda College should be necessary prior to admission to more senior programmes.
5. The follow-up development to the Superintendents development course should be a "Strategic Command Course". Entry should be on the recommendation of a Regional Commissioner for suitably qualified Superintendents with at least three years in the rank. Qualification and assessment should be best practice as decided by the Garda College.
6. A system of coaching and mentoring should be employed.
7. A role as 'Duty Officer' at a Divisional Headquarters should be employed.

8. There should be courses at business schools and universities.
9. There should be modules with major companies and businesses.
10. Diploma and Degrees should be awarded by academic institutions and they should be voluntary in nature.
11. There should be an international exchange for all development programmes. One Officer should be sent yearly to the strategic command course at Bramshill. Other exchange programmes should be arranged with European and American colleges. Language courses could be developed by exchange courses. Posting of liaison officers, secondments and exchange of Officers should be developed with the PSNI and other police forces. All such exchanges and programmes should be decided by the Garda College.

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Sergeant
Noel Carolan

Linking hospital and police road accident data

Sergeant Noel Carolan

AN GARDA SIOCHANA MANAGEMENT JOURNAL communique

INTRODUCTION

The outcome of linking individual police road accident records to their corresponding hospital casualty records has been researched internationally. This article researches the same issue in Ireland. Detailed information on the circumstances of road accidents is provided in police data, but relatively little information on injury outcomes. Conversely, hospital data provides very detailed information on injury outcomes but relatively little regarding road accident circumstances.

Linkage and subsequent analysis of hospital and police data creates a new source of information which provides insight beyond that obtainable from analysis of un-linked police and hospital data sets. The article explores how trends in Irish hospital data may be compared to some recent trends in official road accident data. It summarises the findings of the first data linkage exercise in Ireland using in-patient road accident casualty records from two hospitals outside Dublin and official road accident data from several Garda Divisions. The exercise provides some insight into road accidents that are not included in the official data. Garda assessment of the type or extent of injury sustained in accidents included in official data can not always be accurate because Gardaí do not have medical diagnostic skills – even highly skilled medical staff get it wrong from time to time. These insights are not representative of the majority of national official road accident data, nevertheless they can be seen as useful starting points for further research.

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INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS

During the last two decades, international road accident researchers have used data linkage of police and hospital records to compensate for some of the weaknesses in police road accident data. Not surprisingly, the most problematic weakness in police data are under-reporting and inaccurate injury assessments. One of the earliest linkage research efforts in the United States took place in the middle 1980s.

Drawing on emergency treatment data from 42 hospitals in north-eastern Ohio it succeeded in matching 55 per cent of outpatient and 74 per cent of inpatient treatments with police accident reports (Barancik and Fife, 1985). Two years later, a New Zealand study reported on the proportions of hospital admissions that matched police records across a ten-year period. It found that the matched proportion fell from 66 per cent to 43 per cent over the ten years (Morrison and Kjellstrom, 1987). In 1996, a United Kingdom national study of hospital Accident and Emergency Departments and inpatient records found that just under half (46 per cent) of the traffic accident casualties attending hospital were recorded in police accident data (Simpson, 1996). Similar results have been found in other countries and they illustrate the potential of the data linkage approach: hospital data can provide a proxy measure for road accident reporting rates.

Data linkage research provides another important insight into the accuracy of injury assessments in official road accident statistics. Police assessments of injury have been found to correlate poorly with medical injury scales (James, 1991). The most serious level of injury – fatal injuries – might be expected to result in similar fatal accident injury counts in hospital and police data but the research points to considerable differences. Metzner (1992) used a linked data study in Germany to estimate that up to 5 per cent of fatalities could be missing from police data. French research indicated that 8 per cent of fatalities recorded in the Rhone trauma register could not be found in the police data (Laumon, et al, 1997). The experience in Western Australia was found to be a good deal better when Rosman and Knuiman (1994) found that the police recorded 97.8 per cent of fatalities in hospital inpatient data.

Police and hospital assessments of severity (assessed as serious and minor injury) agreed in 76 per cent of cases in the United Kingdom national study mentioned above (Simpson, 1996). Where the assessments differed, police were more likely to under-estimate than over-estimate severity. Severity was under-estimated in 15 per cent of cases and over-estimated in 9 per cent of cases. The injury severity of pedestrians, pedal cyclists and motor cyclists tended to be under-estimated whereas the

severity of vehicle occupants was more likely to be over-estimated. It also appeared that police had particular difficulty assessing the severity of certain injuries. Fractures and head injuries were commonly under-estimated.

IRISH ROAD ACCIDENT DATA

Gardaí complete detailed road accident reports that are subsequently forwarded to the National Roads Authority (NRA) for publication. The extent of the detail is ambitious by international standards. Garda/NRA accident data are classified into four accident categories: fatal, serious injury, minor injury and material damage. Briefly, they may be described as follows:

1. a fatal road accident occurs when at least one death results within 30 days of the accident taking place,
2. a serious injury accident excludes deaths but includes at least one person with an injury requiring in-patient hospitalisation or an injury involving one of eight specified injuries,
3. a minor injury accident excludes death and serious injury: the injury is of a minor nature such as a sprain or bruise, and
4. a material damage accident excludes death and injury but damage is caused to a vehicle or property.

Irish hospitals collect clinical and administrative data that is a rich, if sometimes complex, source of information for the road accident researcher. The distinction between in-patient and out-patient (mainly accident and emergency cases which do not result in admissions) treatments is all-important. Unfortunately, comprehensive national data is not available for accident and emergency treatments where casualties are not admitted as in-patients. The Hospital In-Patient Enquiry (HIPE) Scheme is used to compile a comprehensive set of national data for in-patient admissions. Each HIPE record represents one episode of treatment in hospital. It is possible to isolate each casualty's first HIPE record so that the number of road accident casualties in the HIPE and Garda/NRA data may be compared. Extensive coding systems are used to record injury diagnoses, treatment procedures and descriptions of accident casualties by road user type.

At this stage it is useful to note that all HIPE casualties have injuries that fulfil the definition of a serious injury. This relationship between HIPE and Garda/NRA records is illustrated in the model shown in Figure 1, overleaf.

Road accidents at the top of the pyramid are the most serious and least numerous (fatal accidents) while those at the base are the least serious

and most numerous (material damage accidents). The pyramid represents all traffic accidents: it is a model of the true road accident level. Although it is not drawn to scale, the model gives some indication of the road accidents that feature in hospital data (those within the grey boundary) and police data (those within the black boundary).

FIGURE 1 HIPE AND GARDA/NRA ROAD ACCIDENT DATA PYRAMID



The road accidents outside the black boundary are un-reported accidents – they are absent from official police based data but partially included in hospital data.The dotted area on the pyramid shows the HIPE data: it is a sulset of the hospital data representing impatient admissions where the patients live or died. The model may be used to see the relationship between HIPE and Garda/NRA records. HIPE records correspond to serious injuries or fatal injuries (i.e. where the casualty died after admission as an inpatient). The area marked *abcd* on the model represents HIPE patients who lived. The data linkage exercise divides them into two groups:- those included in the Garda/NRA data represented by area *abef* on the model and those not included in the Garda/NRA data represented by area *fecd*.

As the model demonstrates, all injury accidents are not included in hospital data but hospital data include more than their police counterparts. It is this extra dimension that yields much of the value of hospital data to the road accident researcher. The scope of this article does not permit a detailed treatment of the reasons for the lower rate known to the police but they include common reasons such as

- injured persons moved to hospital from the road collision location before the arrival of police

- single vehicle accidents where the injured road user does not report the accident to police for a variety of reasons including drunken driving and not having insurance and
- persons injured while driving stolen cars.

NATIONAL HIPE AND GARDA/NRA DATA COMPARED

Some important changes occurred in the Garda/NRA data recorded from 1996 to 2000 and, with some limitations, the comparison of national HIPE and Garda/NRA data helps in explaining these. During those years there has been a striking decrease in the volume of casualties recorded with serious injuries. Serious injuries decreased by 31 per cent while fatal and minor injuries were each down 8 per cent and 6 per cent.

Table 1 below shows national HIPE and Garda/NRA serious injury casualties by road user type from 1996 to 2000. HIPE and Garda/NRA serious injuries recorded decreases of 19 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively over the five-year period. There is a very strong positive correlation ($r = 0.96$) between the two statistics for the period. With the exception of motorcyclists the correlation is statistically significant ($r < 0.05$) for all the road user types.

TABLE 1: HIPE, GARDA/NRA SERIOUS INJURY CASUALTIES: ROAD USER: 1996 TO 2000

Year	Car Users		Motor Cyclists		Pedal Cyclists		Pedestrians		Others		TOTAL	
	NRA	HIPE	NRA	HIPE	NRA	HIPE	NRA	HIPE	NRA	HIPE	NRA	HIPE
1996	1,436	4,175	225	838	103	1,378	361	1,156	235	814	2,360	8,361
1997	1,352	4,259	235	865	88	1,260	316	1,155	191	760	2,182	8,299
1998	1,202	3,848	204	693	51	1,004	285	981	174	618	1,916	7,144
1999	1,288	3,946	168	632	44	995	224	879	143	628	1,867	7,080
2000	1,062	3,735	159	704	49	899	215	843	155	598	1,640	6,779
r	0.91		0.86		0.97		0.96		0.90		0.96	

(SOURCES: ESRI AND ROAD ACCIDENT FACTS 1996-2000)

Since HIPE data is limited to in-patient casualties it is not representative of all serious injuries in the Garda/NRA data. That said, the comparative analysis has encouraging results. The decrease in the Garda/NRA data is reflected in the HIPE data. However, further research is required to determine whether the same relationship between police and hospital data applies to the serious injury accidents treated in the accident and emergency setting.

First Steps in Irish Data Linkage

The first data linkage exercise in Ireland used a sample of 287 HIPE in-patient road accident casualty records from two hospitals outside Dublin. A total of 119 (41 per cent) hospital casualties had matching Garda/NRA records. The matching rate varied considerably by road user type: 41 per cent of the hospitalised motor vehicle drivers had matching records, pedestrians had a rate of 33 per cent while motor cyclists had 26 per cent. There was a statistically significant connection between road user type and matching records. This indicates a statistically significant bias ($r < 0.05$) in the official road accident data for that area. (The result is only representative of the catchment area served by these two hospitals: it can't be applied to the national data.)

Some 168 hospital casualties could not be located in the official road accident data. They had an average length of stay in hospital of seven days. The number that spent between one and seven days in hospital was 131 (78 per cent) but, at the other end of the scale, six casualties spent in excess of five weeks in hospital.

The matched sample was used to measure the accuracy of injury assessments in the Garda/NRA data. Although all 119 matched hospital casualties should have their injuries assessed as serious, some 54 (45 per cent) were recorded as minor injuries. (Many of these involved closed fracture injuries.)[3] It is important to note that injury assessments made by police are problematic in other countries, as described above. This should not be surprising for several reasons. Police officers lack medical expertise, may arrive at road accident scenes when casualties have been taken to hospital and some injuries may not be evident until some time after the report has been made.

Conclusion

The benefits of road accident data linkage have been established in the international setting. The first comparative analysis of national HIPE and Garda/NRA statistics has encouraging results: the reduction in serious injuries is reflected in both sets of data. That said, further research is required to explain differences between the volumes of serious injuries in the two sets of data. Garda serious injury assessments were found to be inaccurate in almost half of the sample of linked hospital and Garda/NRA records - to a simular extent as in research in other countries- but the sample was not representative of national data. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a useful starting point for the linkage of HIPE and Garda/NRA records.

[3] Hairline and other cracks, sometimes asymptomatic.

Finally, it should be noted that the Irish research took place before PULSE began recording Garda road accident data. It is reasonable to expect that PULSE should enhance the quality of road accident recorded by Gardaí and it should significantly improve insights into Irish road accidents.

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Links Between Alcohol and Crime

Chief Superintendent Al McHugh

Chief Superintendent Al McHugh

Drink! For you know not whence you came, nor why: Drink! For you know not why you go, nor where.
Edward Fitzgerald (1809-1883) The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám (1879)

Introduction

The extensive and far-reaching impacts of alcohol abuse on crime and public safety are now receiving widespread public policy attention. These effects are: a diminution of public safety, an increase in attention paid to guaranteeing personal safety, an increased level of injuries, an increased level of drunkenness, a loss of quality of life, and an increased level of incivility and fear of incivility. Drunkenness associated with antisocial behaviour places a considerable burden not only on society and Garda resources, but also on the health and criminal justice system, in both human and financial costs.

This article examines the link between crime and alcohol using a review of existing studies and a new survey of arrested offenders to determine the rate of alcohol-related crime. The views of experts in the field in Ireland were canvassed and their accumulated wisdom was assessed.

The work in this paper relates to the summer of 2002, and care should be taken in extrapolating the results to current links between alcohol and crime.

Review of existing studies

Millar et al (1997) found that alcohol played a large role in certain offences. Eighty-four percent of public order offences were related to alcohol intake. A further four percent were related to a combination of alcohol and drugs. Forty-six percent of criminal damage offences were alcohol-related while eight percent were related to both alcohol and drugs. Alcohol was a factor in forty eight percent of offences against the person.

Garda Commissioner Pat Byrne, speaking at a Graduation Ceremony at the Garda College pointed to alcohol as a factor in the rise in violence. The drug he had the greatest problem with was alcohol. O'Mahoney (2002) notes, 'It is true to say that Ireland has become a more violent society'. 'There's more violence-proneness now and then there are all the clichés about more drink, more money in peoples pockets and people living to excess. Both victims and Gardaí point to widespread misuse and abuse of alcohol as being a major underlying factor in street violence.'

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Clare (2002) gathering and using data which was deep and wide concluded,
'From the information available to date, it would appear that intoxication in public, threatening, insulting and abusive behaviour in public and failing to comply with the direction of a member of An Garda Síochána are the offences causing most problems on the streets'.

A 1996 report on homicide in Ireland found that at the time of the homicidal incident one or other party had a level of intoxication, in the proportions in Table I, above that which would render driving illegal.

TABLE 1: INTOXICATION AND HOMICIDE, IRELAND 1996

Party Intoxicated	Number of people	per cent*
Perpetrator	80	45.4
Victim	85	41.6
Both	63	30.7
Neither	93	39
Perpetrator only	17	8.3
Victim only	20	9.8

*These various categories may overlap and consequently the totals exceed 100 per cent.

Slightly under half (46%) of the perpetrators were intoxicated and somewhat fewer (42%) of the victims. In a third of cases both victim and perpetrator were intoxicated whereas in 39% of cases neither party was intoxicated. In 42 cases it was unknown whether the perpetrator was intoxicated at the time of the incident, and 20 cases regarding the victim.

UNDERSTANDING LINKS BETWEEN ALCOHOL AND CRIME

There has been a considerable amount of research undertaken on the link between alcohol and crime and it is generally acknowledged that the relationship is a complex one. Concerns about the relationship between alcohol and crime are not new, according to Lombroso (1911).

> 'Alcohol… is a cause of crime, first because many commit crime in order to obtain drinks, further, because men sometimes seek in drink the courage necessary to commit crime, or an excuse for their misdeeds; again, because it is by the aid of drink that young men are drawn into crime; and because the drink shop is the place for meeting of accomplices, where they not only plan their crimes but squander their gains…it appears that alcoholism occurred oftenest in the case of those charged with assaults, sexual offences

and insurrections. Next came assignations and homicide; and in the last those imprisoned for arson and theft, that is to say, crime against property'

SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

Convictions for offences of intoxication in a public place under Section 4 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 have increased dramatically since 1996 (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: 300% INCREASE IN CONVICTIONS FOR OFFENCES OF INTOXICATION IN A PUBLIC PLACE



SOURCE: AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA ANNUAL REPORTS 1996-2001

In 1996, 3,199 persons were convicted compared to 12,790 in 2001. The rate of increase in 2001 was the highest to date. The increase between 1996 and 2001 is 300 per cent. In addition, close to 2,000 persons are convicted of offences of disorderly conduct in public places each year, and the total increase between 1996 and 2001 is 10 per cent.

Dealing with public order problems as a result of drunkenness is a great burden on police resources. Criminal damage, urinating in the street, and public disorder, to some, may seem less significant compared to more serious crimes, but if left unchecked can lead to fear of crime in the community and a gradual acceleration of public disorder in an area – the "broken windows theory". (Kelling and Wilson, 1982)

Byrne (2001) examined the economic cost of alcohol-related problems in Ireland, covering a wide range of costs to employers, private and social costs, healthcare costs, insurance costs etc. In relation to the costs of alcohol related crime he states "it would not be unrealistic therefore to attribute 10 percent of all crime to alcohol and to extrapolate from this figure that 10 per cent of the total cost of the police services, the prison service and of court services can be attributed to alcohol. This

figure for 1999 was €100m (see Table 2) and this is only one of the cost factors when the bill society should chalk up against alcohol is totted up. The total bill is €2.4 billion.

TABLE 2: TOTAL COSTS OF ALCOHOL-RELATED PROBLEMS IN IRELAND

	Euro million
Healthcare costs	279
Costs of Road Accidents	315
Cost of alcohol-related crime	100
Loss of output due to alcohol-related absences from work	1,034
Alcohol-related transfer payments	404
Taxes not received on lost output	234
TOTAL	€2,366 million

SOURCE: BYRNE (2001)

Alcohol is associated with a wide range of criminal offences, and to offences of drink driving and drunkenness in which drinking or excessive drinking defines the offence. In the past decade Ireland has seen many changes which have influenced the context and nature of drinking, and alcohol-related crime. The economic boom, fueled by tax cuts which provided greater disposable income for many people, was most marked from 1994 onwards with yearly growth rates in GNP of between 7 percent and 10 per cent. There is more money available for people, especially young people, to buy alcohol. Between 1989 and 1999, alcohol consumption per capita in Ireland increased by 41 percent (Strategic Task Force on Alcohol, 2002). How, exactly, is this higher level of alcohol consumption related to crime? A Garda survey can tell us.

SURVEY FINDINGS

This survey was conducted, for this paper, amongst persons in custody in a city centre Garda station over a two week period during the summer of 2002. The total number of people arrested and detained over a two week period was 544. The arresting Garda believed that 276 prisoners had alcohol taken at the time of the offence. Just over 50 percent of all prisoners arrested had alcohol taken.

To average the results to a weekly basis, each week 272 prisoners were arrested, of which 138 had alcohol taken, again slightly over 50 percent.

Figure 2 highlights the weekly average number of persons arrested for

public order offences. On average, 113 people are arrested for public order offences including assault and simple drunkenness. In total, 98 of these are alcohol related. This accounts for 87 percent of the total. This finding is exactly in line with Millar et al who found in 1998 that 87 percent of all public order offences were alcohol related.

FIGURE 2: OF 113 PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES, 98 (87 PER CENT) WERE ALCOHOL-RELATED



Table 3 shows prisoner arrest by offence types during the average week. Public order offences – including simple drunkenness and assault – by far accounts for the highest proportion of alcohol-related arrests at 71 percent.

TABLE 3 ALCOHOL-RELATED PRISONER ARREST BY OFFENCE TYPES DURING THE AVERAGE WEEK.

Offences	Amount	%
Public Order	98	71%
Theft	12	8%
Criminal Damage	10	8%
Drug related	9	7%
U/T	5	3%
Other	4	3%
Totals	138	100%

This is the weekly arrest rate in respect of alcohol-related offences in only one Dublin station.

Figure 3 below highlights the general areas where prisoners with alcohol taken reside. North Central provided the single highest residency rate at 31 per cent. However, the majority of prisoners arrested live outside DMR North Central. The next single highest amount come from DMR Northern Division with 26 per cent.

FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ALCOHOL-RELATED CRIME ARRESTS BY ADDRESS OF OFFENDER IN EACH DUBLIN GARDA DIVISION



ADDRESS OF OFFENDERS	NO.
North Central	44
Northern	36
Western	14
Southern	6
Eastern	7
South Central	7
Outside Dublin	18
NFA	6
	138

The provision of an extended public transport service from the city centre to the north side of Dublin – the Northern Division provides the second highest number of offenders – would reduce alcohol-related crime and arrests in the city centre. This is one of the implications from Figure 3. Sixty-seven per cent of offenders came from outside the area they were arrested in, while 33 per cent were locals.

Figure 4 shows the place of arrest for those prisoners with alcohol taken. Eighty two per cent of those arrested were in the public street or road.

FIGURE 4: PLACE OF ARREST



PLACE OF ARREST: STREET OR BUILDING

Place of Arrest	No's	%
Inside building	25	18
Street/Road	113	82
	138	100%

Table 4 shows the average weekly alcohol-related arrests shown in two hourly slots to indicate the times when alcohol impacts most on crime and offending. The concentration of arrests increase at the weekend especially during the early hours of the morning. Interestingly, the average alcohol related arrests increase at 2pm daily peaking between midnight and 2am, and significantly falling after 6am.

TABLE 4 AVERAGE WEEKLY ALCOHOL-RELATED ARRESTS SHOWN IN TWO HOURLY SLOTS

Daily/hourly spread of alcohol related arrests

	12mn -2am	2am -4am	4am-6am 6am	6am- 8am	8am- 10am	10am-12md 12md	12md-2pm -2pm	2pm-4pm 4pm	4pm-6pm 6pm	6pm-8pm 8pm	8pm-10pm 10pm	10pm-12mn 12mn	
Mon	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	15
Tues	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	1	4	15
Wed	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	2	13
Thur	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	3	13
Fri	3	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	2	3	3	18
Sat	5	5	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	5	30
Sun	8 *	8 *	4	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	4	34
	27	21	8	3	1	2	4	10	11	13	14	24	138

* very significant

Saturday night/Sunday morning 10pm to 4am has the highest incidence, followed by Friday night/Saturday morning 12mn to 4am. Wednesday and Thursday have the lowest incidence. Monday and Tuesday have only half the week-end rate. Table 5 shows the age group of those arrested for alcohol related offences. The 21-25 age-group features in 23 per cent of arrests, two and a half times more than the 9% each of the 11 age-groups would have if the offending rate was the same for each group.

TABLE 5 AGE GROUPS OF THOSE ARRESTED FOR ALCOHOL-RELATED OFFENCES

Ages	15 under	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	60 over	
No's	3	27	32	19	15	13	10	5	3	9	2	138

In line with a range of other previous surveys, the two age groups between 16 to 25 are the highest, aggregating 43 per cent of the total number of arrests. For policymakers, it is important not to lose focus on the other 57 per cent. This is a problem that ranges far beyond the young. The spike in 56-60 year olds is at odds with the clearly downward trend after 25. Figure 5 shows the gender of those arrested for

alcohol related offences. Males accounted for 120 (87%) and females 18 (13%)

FIGURE 5 GENDER OF THOSE ARRESTED



SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EXPERT GROUP

A group of experts were asked for their views as part of the research for this paper. They are listed at Appendix One. Amongst the group of experts who contributed their collected wisdom to the research, respondents suggested that there is a need for more stringent legislation in relation to public order and liquor licensing offences. This legislation should be rigorous in relation to the sale of alcohol to juveniles and to persons under the influence of alcohol. The criminal justice system needs to be swift in dealing with offenders and the operation of night courts should be considered.

The most frequent response cited is integrated education programmes as the best policy initiative. Today's youth need to be more educated in relation to alcohol, and thereby will have an increased awareness of drink-related problems. Educational programmes need to aim at achieving a cultural change on attitudes towards alcohol. Society needs to address the existing social tolerance of excessive and binge drinking.

Respondents also suggested that a targeted approach needs to be implemented in relation to the enforcement of alcohol related offences (e.g. 'hot-spot' mapping of offences). Respondents felt that a ban should be placed on all alcohol advertising, and a similar approach to the effective campaigns used to reduce the sale of cigarettes could be adopted.

The majority of respondents stated that, in their opinion, physical and social planning is vital and greater consideration should be given to how design policies can positively impact on the reduction of public disorder problems. Some respondents felt that design policies need to be a cru-

cial component of national policies to curtail alcohol related problems. Crime prevention through environmental design has been a successful tool here and in other jurisdictions. Transportation from house to licensed premises also needs to be considered.

THE POLICE RESPONSE

A multi-agency response to any problem tends to be the most effective solution. As a result of the various research findings, and the survey taken, the conclusion is that having identified the problem, there is a need to target it. This is done in four ways



This is done through;

1. High Visibility Policing
2. CCTV
3. Interaction with the community at all levels, local and national, voluntary and statutory and most importantly the businesses, pubs, clubs, takeaways, taxi drivers and bus drivers.
4. Courts to consider how to restrict the movements of people convicted of alcohol-related crime from the area where they commit ted the crime.

CONCLUSION

To summarise, 544 prisoners were arrested over a two week period; of these 276 had alcohol taken at the time of arrest. This produced a weekly average which worked out at 272 prisoners arrested – out of which 113 were arrested for public order offences. Of those 113 prisoners, 98 had alcohol taken, therefore a total of 87 per cent of prisoners arrested for public order offences had alcohol taken. Fifty-seven per cent of offenders with alcohol taken resided either in north county Dublin or DMR North Central Division – not surprising since the station is in North Central. 82 percent of offenders were arrested in a public place. The highest concentration of persons arrested for alcohol related offences occurred on Friday night, Saturday night Sunday night and the early hours of those mornings. 42 percent of offenders were aged between 16 and 25 years of age, 57 per cent were not, and 87 per cent were males.

The research completed for this article confirmed the accuracy of Millar's work with a finding of 87 per cent of public order offences

related to alcohol intake. In conclusion, I believe that no single measure will alleviate alcohol-related crime. The drinking culture in Ireland is an important multi-factoral determinant, therefore the answer lies across a broad spectrum of government departments – Justice, Health and Education – who should work together to reduce the physical, psychological and social harms related to alcohol consumption. I conclude that the best solution is a societal, sectoral, parental, and police response using the insights and solution proposed by the expert group. The basic strength upon which the growth and dominance of human society is built is adaptiveness. In time, we will adapt positively to the problems of alcohol-related crime. The solutions put forward here aim to shorten that time.

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APPENDIX ONE

Expert views were received from

Dr. Mark Morgan, Head of Education, St. Patrick's College.
Mr. Frank Fell, Chief Executive of the Licensed Vintners Association.
Dr. Rosaleen Corcoran, Director of Public Health and Planning, North Eastern Health Board, Kells, Co. Meath.
Mr. Tom Coffey, CEO, Dublin City Centre Business Association
Mr. John Power, CEO, Irish Hotels Federation
Mr. Michael Ahern, Solicitor, Killorglin, Member Commission on Liquor Licensing
Gordon A. Holmes, Chairman, Commission on Liquor Licensing
Mr. Pat Plunkett, Consultant, A&E, St James Hospital
Superintendent Michael Feehan, Garda Community Relations.

MANAGEMENT TERMS SIMPLIFIED



CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY

"Democracy must not be confused with capitalism. The former is a political system while the later is an economic system. Although many capitalist countries are democracies, capitalism can exist without democracy"[1]

DEMOCRACY

Democracy minimally presupposes three essential elements: transparency, accountability, and equality.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability entails a state being held responsible, by both its people and its elected bodies, for its choices an actions.

TRANSPARENCY

Transparency denotes free access to governmental political and economic activities and decisions. Transparency and accountability are not independent and where the word accountability is used on its own it includes transparency.

EQUALITY

Equality includes citizens being treated equally under the law, as well as some degree of equal political participation among them in their own governance.

EU TRANSPARENCY

The EU Ombudsman, Mr Soderman, concluded that "many countries have adopted - and stuck to - high standards of transparency and openness in their public affairs. In the US, freedom of information has been the rule for more than 25 years. In Europe, a strong tradition of open government exists in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, while Ireland recently enacted a law on freedom of information." He criticised both the Santer and Prodi Commissions, the first for not living up to reasonable standards of transparency and the second for diluting those standards.

COMITOLOGY

The origins of the committee system of comitology date back to the beginning of the 1960s. What the early stages of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had already required at that time - i.e. extensive and detailed technical regulation - became a necessity as the singal internal market continued to develop. The Community institution lacked not only the relevant insight, but also the resources to respond to the needs of day-to-day policy management. Moreover, Member States did not wish to fully delegate the implementation of Community acts to a supra-national institution. They therefore retained some form of control over the European Commission by introducing what has been called the 'comitology procedure'. In their essence, committees have therefore been conceived to safeguard the interests of the Member States with respect to the exercise of the powers of the Commission.

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[1] Wilton Park paper 120, HMSO,1996.

Hence, the term 'comitology' refers to a system of committees that control and assist the Commission in its implementation duties. The use of committees was formalised in more or less its current form in 1986, following the Single European Act. Chaired by a representative of the Commission, and consisting of representative of the Member States, comitology committees have not only mere implementation responsibilities. In a quasi-legislative perspective, comitology may be used as an alternative method of decision-making to adapt Community regulation during the implementing phase of EU legislation.

SEPARATION OF POWERS: EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATURE, JUDICIARY.

The liberal democratic model of the separation of powers means that the executive (governments) initiate new laws, parliaments (legislatures) adopt, amend or reject them and then the executive sets out administrative orders which are implemented by the police, immigration, customs and internal security agencies. These agencies are accountable for their actions to the law and courts (Judiciaries) and are not, in theory, under the direct control of government. Looking at the role of the executive another way, first it is the initiator of legislation, then when it becomes law it passes back to the executive to put into practice. The executive, or in this context, Justice/Home/Interior Ministries, take the law and issue a series of instructions/manuals which collectively represent government policy. The officials, officers and agencies who act on these policies are answerable to the executive for the overall effect but they are responsible to the law and courts (or any complaints mechanism) for the way they carry out and interpret their instructions. In a democracy, in a wider sense, they are accountable too to the people for the way that they act in the streets, homes, police cells, prisons and border. The effects of executive policy may be reported in the media, taken up by campaigning or lobbying groups result in a parliamentary debate or inquiry before a parliamentary committee. The term "executive" thus has a wider meaning than just that of *initiator* of new laws at national level. Governments not only initiate legislation, once a law is passed they implement it. Rules, instructions and manuals set out how policies are to be put into practice and officials, officers and agencies *administer or enforce* them. While these officials, officers and agencies are responsible to government for the overall result they are accountable to the law for the way in which they conduct their duties. The courts, media and civil society will often take a view on the way operations and duties are conducted on the ground and this in turn may lead to questions or investigation by parliamentary committees leading to changes in the basic legislation.

DEVOLUTION.

Labour's 1997 election manifesto promised to introduce legislation to allow the people, region by region, to decide in referendum whether they want directly elected regional government. Devolution is deeply entrenched in Northern Ireland, although the suspension of the Assembly has disrupted progress. Scotland's speed of devolution has been surprising and may yet surprise more, and its parliament already has a strong performance record. Wales, increasingly, sees their Assembly as lacking primary legislative powers and many more now seek a parliment. Non-the-less, Wales record of policy divergence is impressive, particularly since they are stymied by Westminster so frequently in their efforts to get policies on to the statute books. The London Assembly's traffic management innovation is a major policy divergence. Labour's 1997 devolution offer reappeared in much the same form in the 2001 election. Thus far no English region has stepped forward on the referendum trial but Bogdanor (2003) amongst others see a number of regions with assemblies within three to five years. Many disagree with this projection, citing the Prime Minister's perceived lack of enthusiasm[2] for the process he started, and a range of factors including funding, Regional Chambers, local government constraints, and the unique sense of national identity in England. The results of the 2003 local government elections removed the concern, for now, that devolution might derail somewhat if Labour was out of power in Scotland or Wales. Devolution in the UK is seen as the greatest constitutional change since Cromwell.

[2] His present ambivalence to English devolution (Savage, Atkinson, 2001) reflects this, particularly when compared to his earlier enthusiasm.