


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
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Leaders

Dr Ivor Kenny



Dr Ivor Kenny

Leaders usually have a vision. Vision is an overblown word. It should be simply a description of a future state that is measurably better than the present one. What gets measured gets done. Getting done involves continuous change.

People don't resist change. They resist loss. They resist insecurity and they resist threats to their positions of power.

Reflecting on 25 studies of international companies over 25 years, there is a single outstanding lesson.

It is that the greatest barrier to change is *lack of cohesion in the top team*. This can be outright bolshy disagreement or, more subtly, job protection, the latter a powerful, frequently rationalised, motivation.

Recent international studies strongly support this. We have the chilling fact that two-thirds of the people in leadership positions in the Western world will fail.¹ They will then be fired, demoted or kicked upstairs. The most common reason for their failure is *their inability to build or to maintain a team*.

I have seen chief executives afraid to push their barons too hard lest they lose their allegiance, or, alternatively, trying to stun their barons into submission. Either way, what the leader then gets is pernicious: acquiescence, more stultifying than bolshy disagreement.

When people lose sight of their work, when they become insecure as a result of poor leadership, or when they are asked to do what they are not capable of doing and must endure the humiliation of poor performance, they turn to politics. The lesson they learn is how to be manipulative and devious.

In managing change, the job of the leader is to keep politics out and substance in. That takes talent, and talent must focus primarily on substance. The fundamental purpose of business is unchanging: to create, and keep creating, customers. That requires continuous market-driven innovation.

The main reason why teams don't get built is that the CEO does not really know what's going on inside his managers' heads. This is a fact of life. Truth is inhibited by the dependency (boss/subordinate) relationships that are pervasive in every organisation.

¹ Enoch Powell is often misquoted as saying "All politics end in failure". What he actually said was, "All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure, because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs". Effective leaders don't hang around. They know when to let go.

3

We know that, for every level through which information passes, it can lose up to half its meaning. Weinshall and Kyriasis have worked out the implications of this loss in a simple mathematical model:

In a five-level hierarchy, with four gaps among the levels, the amount of the innermost truth of the lowest level reaching the upper level of the CEO is one-third (of the "truth") at the power of four (gaps), $1/81$, a little more than one per cent. The same is true when the communication flows downwards. Thus in a hierarchy of five levels under the same assumptions, only somewhat more than one per cent of what the CEO really thinks and feels is reaching the first line of managers.

Theodore D. Weinshall and Harry C. Kyriasis (1986).

A leader is someone who has willing followers. Without followers, there can be no leaders. Leadership is a combination of character (who you are) and competence (what you do). Leaders are the people who carry the ultimate responsibility. They are personally accountable for results, not for the elegance of their arguments.

Most managers operate within existing ways of thinking. Leaders challenge those ways – they are happiest when they are changing things. They are seldom content. They never arrive.

And they are all different. Among the most effective leaders I have worked with over 40 years, some were gregarious, enjoying people and parties; others were solitary, preferring the sanctuary of their families. Some were nice guys; others were affectionately known as right bastards. Some were impulsive and moved too quickly; others took ages to decide. Some were warm and welcoming; others were distant. Some were vain and sought publicity; for others publicity was pointless – the chairman and CEO of one major Irish company would not go to the AGM. Some were austere – a decent suit and a modest car – others were ostentatious to the point of vulgarity. Some sought adulation; others would be embarrassed by and suspicious of it. Some were introvert and, having listened to advice, would work things out inside their heads; others were extrovert, thinking out loud and changing their minds as the discussion progressed. The one thing several of them did not have was charisma.

I have come to the conclusion that charisma does not matter a damn. If you have it, it can be helpful for getting attention but it can also be showbiz, self-indulgent and overpowering, inhibiting genuine communication.

I'm almost minded to start an Anti-Charismatic Movement. I am not suggesting that business schools should run courses on How to be Dull

and Boring – we can manage that without help – but there is a certain obsession with celebrity and charisma. The line between fame and notoriety is unclear. We are confronted with a jumble of celebrities: the talented and untalented, heroes and villains, people of accomplishment and those who have accomplished nothing at all. The criteria for their celebrity are that their images give enough of the appearance of leadership – wealth, success, glamour – to feed our fantasies. A lack of concern in questioning the qualifications of people to be celebrated is perverse. We are who we celebrate.

The charismatic leader's style can be superficially attractive. But charismatic leaders are inconstant. You do not know until the final act what their real purposes are. Perhaps they do not know themselves. I revisited *Brideshead* recently and came across this: "Charm is the great English blight. It does not exist outside these damp islands. It spots and kills anything it touches. It kills love, it kills art." Charisma and charm are near-synonyms. Substitute charisma for charm and Irish for English and you will see what I mean.

For as long as I can remember we have faced a crisis of leadership. (We seem also to be always at a crossroads.) The more our political leaders clamour to expose themselves in the media, the more their frailties become apparent, especially to the young. Our current leaders may well be no worse than their predecessors, but they seem worse, which amounts to the same thing. Scepticism about authority, an old and worthy tradition, is healthy. Cynicism and its bedfellow, apathy, are dangerous. We have, however, no business blaming those of modest ability who rise above their proper level of capability. They simply fill a vacuum created by the indifference of abler people.

A cynic might say to me there are only two questions I need ask of the managers when I enter an organisation: "How long have you been here?" And "What harm has it done you?" Leaders and their organisations can do bad things to people.

A better question to ask is, "How many bosses have you had in your working life?" Some managers turn out to have had many. Then I ask, "Which ones do you recall with gratitude and affection as really good?" The most I ever get is one or two; at any rate, a tiny minority of the whole. Last, I ask them to describe those good bosses.

By far the most common description is "Tough but fair". This is not a scientific formulation. The important thing is that everybody seems to recognise it. Nobody says, "Fair but tough" or even, "Tough and fair". Tough comes first, expressed as a necessity, then fair. You have to be tough but the toughness is OK if it is fair as well. People who are remembered as "good" bosses have a certain kind of intelligence, a particular way of thinking that makes them memorable. Their virtue is that they do not consciously exercise charismatic influence. They simply

keep their eye on the ball, with a certain humility, but nonetheless grow in the fullness of time to have *earned* respect and influence.

Effective leaders are as *available* as is physically possible. They communicate to death. They wander around, talking with and listening to everybody and anybody. The last thing they do is lock themselves in an office.

If challenged, the ineffective leader will fall back on his inherent autocracy, further alienating his subordinates and, most importantly, inhibiting teamwork. He creates his own well of loneliness.

6

Andrew Carnegie wanted to have on his tombstone, "Here lies a man who attracted better people into his service than he was himself".

Better people – teams – need guidelines: chalk lines on the ground, not brick walls. Within those guidelines they need maximum freedom. Without freedom you get no commitment. If good managers can't build their own stake in the future of the enterprise, they will soon move on.

Leadership is a quality of character and intellect, not a condition or empty honour. The ingredients are the ability to sense the future, to understand the needs of followers, to see the limits of possibilities and to select the lines of advance which hold the most likely promise of success.

Leaders are judged not by tactical nimbleness but by the robustness of their strategic designs. Good designs will be new, because they must contend with new circumstances. Any successful organisation is a monument to old problems successfully solved. Its very existence is proof of a good design in the past. But nostalgic behaviour in rapidly changing conditions can cause a leader to look like a tree on a windswept heath. Those who can't change their minds, can't change anything. Hard-headed men who have made their perilous ascents to leadership have unbounded faith in their own beliefs, but those of them who change things penetrate the surface of events and cut through the sediment of old habits. Leaders barren of ideas are caretakers. Ideas uncoupled to the will, passion and skills of leaders are toys.

We do not know it all and we never can. The race between increasing demands to act now and our own ignorance calls for a mingled curiosity and faith in what is known as "learning". It is hard enough for an individual, but when we are told that organisations must learn, we are carried beyond common sense. Organisations are created by humans. A learning organisation means that the individuals who give allegiance to it grow in knowledge and skill under the guidance of enlightened leaders.

How do managers learn? Managers learn from other managers trying to solve problems. It always comes back to teamwork.


We do know enough to answer the increasingly silly question: are leaders born or made?

Leaders are not born full-blown. Neither are they made like instant coffee. They are slow brewed in the circumstances of the time.

Walter Winchell said, "Nothing recedes like success". One bit of experience essential to becoming a leader is failure. That is where there is real learning. The sign hanging in Joe McHugh's pub in Liscannor says, "Experience is what you get when you didn't get what you wanted."

Boiling it down, what should you look for in a leader? Track record, not rhetoric. Leaders are people who *do*, not who talk about doing.

7





Margaret Nugent

Perspectives on Organisation Culture

Inspector Margaret Nugent

Corporate culture is a topic of great interest to managers in all organisations. It is unusual to hear discussions about leadership and performance without reference to culture. Every organisation has its own unique culture, even though it may not have been created consciously. Culture influences the behaviour of all employees and affects leadership and management styles, influences how decisions are made, and shapes interpersonal and inter-group relations. Despite its importance, there is little agreement on how to define culture which remains a vague and elusive concept.

8

Every organisation has subcultures where the ‘beliefs, values and assumptions may be competing with the dominant culture’ (Brown, 1998). Some of the sub cultures within An Garda Síochána are easily recognized through identifiable groupings such as rank, role, gender, location, and whether attached to uniform or detective branch. This diversity may indicate that there is no single and dominant culture in An Garda Síochána, and arguably the culture may exist from a mix of smaller sub cultures. Moreover, some of the values and attitudes people hold have been formed before joining the organisation, while others have developed since they became members, which makes deciphering the common culture a more difficult and less reliable process.

This article examines some aspects of the Garda culture. Given the elusive nature of this phenomenon, and the lack of clarity in relation to how it can be measured, this article should be seen as an interpretation and not a definitive statement of fact. It explores the culture through the Garda organisation’s history, symbols, stories, and structure. It also discusses the dominant culture type through the use of the Goffee and Jones (1996) framework.

WHAT IS THE CULTURE OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

Culture

Handy (1985) argues that culture is something that is perceived and hence, cannot be precisely defined. Deal and Kennedy (1982) define organisation culture as ‘the way we do things around here’. This is a broad definition and appears to over simplify the concept. Cullen and Farrelly (2005) suggest that it is useful to think of culture in terms not only of ‘how things are done around here’ but also ‘how things are not done around here’. This suggests that culture both enables and prevents behaviour, and thus can be a stumbling block to achieving certain outcomes. Any manager’s or employee’s action or inaction is subject to cultural influences.

The Past

Corporate culture is the product of long term social learning and reflects what has worked in the past (Schein, 1985). The culture of An Garda Síochána can probably only be fully understood in the context of the organisation's evolution from a colonial police force to a police service that was set up to police the new Irish State. Most likely the culture of An Garda Síochána would have been formed, based on the values of our first Commissioner Michael Staines who endeavoured to promote a much closer identity between the police and the Irish public. A primary ingredient was the fact that An Garda Síochána was unarmed and owed its allegiance to the Irish Government. When speaking about the new police service, Commissioner Staines said 'The Garda Síochána will succeed, not by force of arms or numbers, but by their moral authority as servants of the people'. Since its foundation An Garda Síochána has endeavoured to uphold this ethos and this has become a proud tradition within the organisation. Mc Niffe (1997) suggests that 'disarming the emerging force was perhaps the most significant contribution to ensuring that it became a civilian rather than a semi military body'.

According to Brady (1974) there was a time when Ireland was leading Europe and indeed the world, in the development of a positive and coherent policing philosophy. 'In the 1920's and the 1930's, the Garda Síochána, an unarmed civil police force restored peace and tranquillity to a country which had come to live by the gun and which held respect for no other law. The success of that policy was no mere accident, rather it was the result of hard and painful effort by a body of 8,000 ordinary Irishmen, motivated by the ideal of the people's peace and preservation' (Brady 1974). The Gardaí at that time built up very close relationships with the community through their close links with the Gaelic Athletic Association and their involvement in local community affairs, which is as strong today as it was in the early days.

Symbols

Ouchi (1981) regards culture as symbols, ceremonies and myths that communicate an organisation's underlying values and beliefs to its employees. An Garda Síochána is full of symbolism. Some of the official symbols are reflected in artifacts such as the uniform, the Long Service Medal and the Scott Medal for Valour. The uniform denotes power and authority, as the insignia is different for all ranks while the Long Service Medal, presented to members on completion of 22 years service, is indicative of the value placed on service, loyalty and experience in An Garda Síochána. The Scott Medal for Valour is awarded to members who,

in the opinion of the Commissioner, performed acts of valour of a high order. These are normally presented to members of the Force who have displayed enormous courage and have put their lives in immediate danger, in the execution of their duties.

Stories

Peters and Waterman (1982) suggest culture is a dominant and coherent set of shared values conveyed by symbolic means such as stories, myths, legends, and anecdotes. An Garda Síochána is full of symbolism, stories and myths that have a significant meaning for members of the Force. According to Weick (1985) 'A system that values stories and story telling is potentially more reliable because people know more about their system, know more of the potential errors that might occur, and are more confident that they can handle those errors that do occur because they know that other people have already handled similar errors'.


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Some of the stories that are told in An Garda Síochána relate to the 'chase' and 'good catches' and emphasise the importance of police work and the determination to succeed. There are other stories told about Gardaí who made significant contributions to the Force. These are members who 'put the public first', 'solved crime', and 'saved lives'. They are regarded as the real police men and women of An Garda Síochána who have taken pride in the uniform and delivered high standards of policing. Then there are stories told about the small number of members that have had a negative effect and damaged the reputation of the organisation. These are regarded as the 'blackguards' the 'mé féiners' (slang word used for those who act out of self interest) and 'the guys who do very little'. These are the 'deviants' and the people who 'put themselves first'. They are not considered to be representative of the proud traditions of policing in this country.

DOMINANT CULTURE TYPE

Goffee and Jones (1996) provide a framework for assessing the dominant culture type of an organisation, through the use of a survey. The various high/low facets of sociability or solidarity produce four different types of culture including Networked, Fragmented, Communal and Mercenary as outlined in Figure 1. All cultural types have both positive and negative elements.

Figure 1 – Two Dimensions, Four Cultures



Adapted from Goffee and Jones 1996:134



Goffee and Jones (1996) define sociability as a ‘measure of sincere friendliness’ among members of a community and solidarity is a ‘measure of a community’s ability to pursue shared objectives quickly and effectively, regardless of personal ties’. Findings of a survey, conducted on a small cross section of members of An Garda Síochána, reveal that An Garda Síochána is a communal organisation, both high on sociability and high on solidarity. This suggests that many members of An Garda Síochána possess a high and sometimes exaggerated, consciousness of the organisation identity and membership and sometimes individuals may even link their sense of self with the identity of the force.

Solidarity shows itself clearly in An Garda Síochána when it comes to the organisation goals. The results of a different survey conducted on 2,668 members of all ranks revealed that 93% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I support the goals of An Garda Síochána’. (Change Assessment Report 1997). Also, the vast majority of members believe in the mission and unconsciously live the values of An Garda Síochána, in their daily lives. Some evidence for this can be found through our customer satisfaction levels which are at 83% for 2005 (Garda Public Attitude Survey 2005).

Building and maintaining friendships is important in a culture that is high on sociability. There are strong bonds of friendship within An Garda Síochána, and having a good network within the organisation is all important. This is facilitated by various clubs and associations, funded by members including golf courses and a wide range of sports and social clubs.

The downside to this cohesive culture is that friends are not inclined to disagree or criticise each other, which can lead to performance problems that

affect decision making capabilities or what Janis (1972) describes as ‘group think’. This is a dynamic where members engage in consensus seeking and close out divergent opinion, or where they see themselves as part of an in-group working against an out-group opposed to their goals.

The negative side of a strongly cohesive culture emerged in some evidence given to the Morris Tribunal, when there were reasons put forward as to why some Gardaí withheld information from the Carty inquiry. It was said ‘it is the nature of the Gardaí, we don’t name the names – we don’t want to get anybody into trouble in the Garda Síochána internal matters... We try our best to make sure – we are not going to be hanging our people’ (Morris Tribunal of Inquiry Report 2004).

12

It is a well recognised phenomena that there is a bond of loyalty among police officers, which helps police to remain committed to the ideals of the force and the proud traditions of policing. An organisation wide survey revealed that members of An Garda Síochána feel a great deal of loyalty to the organisation as 91% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I feel a great deal of loyalty toward An Garda Síochána’ (Change Assessment Report 1997). Loyalty involves commitment and making sacrifices for the institution of policing and helps people to act collectively rather than out of self interest. This is necessary for individual and collective performance, but it is important that such loyalties are in tune with the interests of fairness, justice and service to the community. Evidence exists that these general ideals are adhered to, as evidenced by the cases where Gardaí have arrested and brought other Gardaí before the courts for wrongdoing and for violating the values of the organisation.

A communal culture also leads to high levels of tacit knowledge being developed and shared. This is the knowledge that helps Gardaí to avoid pitfalls, however, this knowledge can sometimes be used to label people or things. For example, sometimes Gardaí use what Aronson (2004) describes as judgemental and representative heuristics (mental short cuts) to sort people into ‘rough’ or ‘decent’ elements based on scant detail such as how they look, where they live or who they socialise with. These labels can help to warn a Garda of danger but they can also lead to prejudice and stereotypes, which can have a debilitating effect on the people concerned. This is where police managers must continually audit how members of the force make sense of their environment, how they conduct themselves with members of the public, and how they make decisions to ensure that no form of bias is tolerated.

STRUCTURE

An Garda Síochána is a hierarchical structure with a very narrow managerial apex. Some writers including Handy (1985) see the organisation structure as determining its culture. This is a very interesting observation, and seems to imply that if the structure of an organisation changes, the culture will also change. Handy described four organisational cultures called power, role, task and person culture. The power orientation (Handy, 1985) attempts to dominate its environment and those who are powerful within the organisation strive to maintain absolute control over subordinates.

There are some aspects of the ‘power’ orientation in An Garda Síochána, possibly exemplified through a thin management layer, within which almost all important administrative and strategic decisions are made. This can sometimes lead to a high use of power to get things done. However in the operational arena, Gardaí have individual freedom and discretion to make some major decisions that can have an enormous impact on the visibility of the organisation in the eyes of the public.

Cummings (2001) suggests that the structure of an organisation is a visible symbol of a deeper level of culture. Storey (1998) suggests that ‘structures are important because they can underpin and support effective processes or conversely, they can impede and subvert these processes’. One of the processes that is impacted by the structure of An Garda Síochána is the promotion process. According to the results of a number of surveys members perceive dissatisfaction with the promotion system in the force. 83% of members of the force feel that the promotion system is unfair (An Garda Síochána Staff Attitude Survey, ESRI, 2000) 64% of members believe the promotion system to be unfair because it is based on who you know rather than on what you know (An Garda Síochána Staff Attitude Survey, ESRI, 2000).

In order to gain a greater insight, it is necessary firstly to consider the impact of the structure on the promotion system and secondly to consider this from the perspective of attribution theory. The structure of An Garda Síochána shows that the Force is a hierarchical structure, with a very narrow managerial apex comprising less than 2% of Officer rank. This essentially means that 98% of the Force are non Officer Corps and are below the rank of Superintendent. While not everyone is qualified to go forward for promotion, nevertheless the limited numbers of promotional opportunities that are available at each rank create a culture of disappointment and a perceived lack of recognition within the Force. This disappointment expresses itself in the culture, where attributions are made in relation to the

promotion selection process. Some of the comments made by the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors suggest that 'for too long many members of the Force have had the perception that it was necessary to be aligned to some Officer who was 'in the loop' in order to get promoted' (AGSI, 2005).

In order to explore people's negative perceptions in relation to the promotion system, one must consider attribution theory, which is 'concerned with what people identify as the apparent reason or cause for behaviour' (Bowditch, 2001). Attribution theory argues that when people succeed they usually attribute their success to themselves, however when they fail, they usually attribute their failure to the situation, which in this case, is the promotion process of An Garda Síochána.

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The new Garda Síochána Act 2005 contains provisions in this regard, with the introduction of revised appointment boards containing increased civilian representation. However, changing the selection process from a predominantly Garda to civilian board in isolation, will not necessarily address the negative perceptions associated with the promotion process, and instead may only re-enforce negative attributes and a culture of disappointment with the system.

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Deal and Kennedy (1982) suggests that the external "environment is the single greatest influence in shaping a corporate culture". This is very evident in An Garda Síochána as the 'task environment' (Thomson, 1967) is very complex, involving a wide range of stakeholders, who have an enormous influence on the culture, including suppliers, regulatory groups, clients and competitors.

A major supplier to An Garda Síochána is the Government, who pay for the human resources, physical accommodation, technology and equipment; all of which are necessary for contributing to a high performance culture. Among the regulatory groups are the Government and Government Departments, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Data Protection Commissioner, the Courts, the Garda Complaints Board, the media, the Garda staff associations and the Civil and Public Service Union; all of which are essential to regulate the behaviour of An Garda Síochána. The actions of these groups can impact in multiple ways on the culture of the Force.

Clients of the organisation could be described as victims of crime, members of the public seeking help and guidance, voluntary organisations who work

closely with the Gardaí, foreign police forces and the Government; all of whom demand a customer service culture. Competitors in the adversarial sense include law breakers, vigilantes, subversive organisations and criminals seeking refuge in the community. Competitors in the non adversarial sense include security companies and other private organisations, who compete for work that the Gardaí currently perform. All of these groups consciously or unconsciously help shape and re-shape the culture of An Garda Síochána. The new Garda Síochána Act 2005 is a prime example of the effects of stakeholders on the culture of An Garda Síochána and is an issue worthy of further research.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, what emerges from the author's examination of the culture of An Garda Síochána is an organisation with a rich history of achievement and strong values related to the preservation of peace and closeness to the community. The Garda organisation has a strong culture, with all the benefits that this brings including camaraderie, loyalty and unity of purpose. There are times, however, when individuals act in ways that are not aligned to the organisation's goal. This is not an uncommon feature of major, large scale organisations. The corporate world has resonated for some time now with fall out from deviations from expected cultural norms. The challenge for An Garda Síochána is to maintain and enhance the positives that impact on the culture of the organisation and to challenge those aspects that require remedial alterations. This whole area is a fertile domain for further research and study.

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The concept of Risk Management within An Garda Síochána in the policing of Large-Scale Outdoor Events.



Patrick G. Mangan

Superintendent Patrick G. Mangan

INTRODUCTION

"No one should underestimate the complexity of the changes in the internal and external environment in which policing will operate in the years ahead. We operate and manage within an environment where many important features are not under our direct control or influence. We have, therefore, to collaborate with public and private organisations to achieve our stated objectives (Byrne, 2004)".

The concept of Risk Management suggests that a public facing organisation such as An Garda Síochána should assess the hazards associated with major events from a strategic, operational, financial and reputational perspective. This article proposes to examine how this concept applies to An Garda Síochána.

BACKGROUND

Arising from the economic boom of the 1990s our population has access to greater disposable income, which as a consequence allows for greater social activity. A wide range of social settings is both available and utilised by the current generation. Arising from the greater level of disposable income we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the participation at outdoor/indoor events such as concerts, sporting occasions, exhibitions, conferences and other general social activities. Professionalism has almost taken over in all types of sport within the State where payment in one format or another is made to players and managers of teams. We have also seen an increased level of outdoor music venues with Slane, Punchestown, Lansdowne Road and Phoenix Park being developed as locations to provide facilities suitable for the entertainment of large numbers of people.

Private promoters have identified a niche in the market place to fulfil the social requirements of the population and as a result an increase in the numbers of outdoor/indoor events in this country has occurred. This has resulted in lucrative income generation for private promoters. It has also however resulted in considerable financial burden being placed on the public purse. It has impacted significantly on the budgetary requirements of An Garda Síochána, as the primary organisation in the Republic of Ireland with responsibility for the security, traffic management and operational readiness for policing these events.

In the foreseeable future, the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána will become the Accounting Officer (Garda Síochána Act, 2005) for the organisation. As a holder of public office he is answerable to the Public Accounts Committee regarding the expenditure of public finances allocated to the organisation. Section 43 (2)(c) of the Garda Síochána Act, 2005, imposes a legitimate responsibility on the Garda Commissioner to ensure that An Garda Síochána employs systems, procedures and practices

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C E N T R E

Some Contemporary Perspectives

"If the going is tough and the pressure is on; if reserves of strength have been drained and the summit is still not in sight; then the quality to seek in a person is neither great strength nor quickness of hand, but rather a resolute mind firmly set on its purpose that refuses to let its body slacken or rest." (Sir Edmund Hillary). Could this be the essence of leadership?

What is leadership? This enduring question has troubled philosophers, educators, practitioners and academics for some considerable period of time. Peter Drucker has stated that "the only definition of a leader is someone who has followers." He remarked that an individual can achieve very little alone but significant achievements are realisable working together (Hesselbein, 1999). Historically, the subject of leadership can be traced back to the philosophising of Plato, Heraclitus, Odysseys, Aristotle, and much later to Machiavelli (Augier and Teece, 2005).

Leadership is an increasingly consistent subject in business school curricula, a regular theme in business practice books, and an enduring topic for academic and practitioner research. Indeed leadership research has blossomed exponentially and

in fact now forms the central focus of several management journals (Doh, 2003). Yet despite this endless accumulation of empirical data, study and research, an integrated understanding of leadership remains elusive. Augier and Teece (2005), argue that while the amount of "research" on leadership has developed significantly, the business world is nowhere near a complete "theory" or even a coherent understanding of the phenomenon of leadership. Others would argue this contention, but this "Centrepoint" article does not allow enough time or space to develop this.

While the debate over whether leadership is a skill, trait, or innate behaviour, whether it can be learned or whether leaders are born, has raged for some considerable time, most management educators and academics now agree that leadership is both a skill and a behaviour and that they can certainly be taught.

Leadership remains a compelling, yet elusive topic. It is one of the most important topics in management science and is also fundamental for the practice of management. Leaders play a critical role in building businesses and organisations and in leading organisations to create and capture value



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Leadership

P O I N T

pectives on Leadership

from its capabilities (Grint, 2000). Leaders construct the circumstances that engender followership among those that believe in them and indeed regularly among those that don't.

There must always be a basis for leadership and this regularly comes in two formats; common assent or legitimacy. Common assent is taken to mean the existence of consensus that a certain individual is considered fit to lead an organisation, team, club or body. Legitimacy is a somewhat different concept and involves considerations of entitlement such as birthright, educational background, repute or expertise. Overall the role of the leader is multi-dimensional, highly demanding and extremely taxing.

Successful organisations demand leaders with vision. This means managers who are passionately committed to achieving corporate goals through and with the help of others. Leaders are visionary (Kenny, 2006) and are able to gain the long-term commitment from those around them. Playing the short-term numbers game is not a sustainable strategy for leaders.

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Editor.



Liaison



Organisation Culture

for evaluating the effectiveness of its operations. This level of accountability was stipulated in the recommendations of the Mullarkey Report (Mullarkey, 2002) published by the Department of Finance, which focused on the accountability of Secretaries General, and Accounting Officers in the wider public sector.

The Mullarkey report further stated that corporate governance concerns the systems and procedures by which organisations are managed, directed and controlled. Risk Management is a tool by which An Garda Síochána can assess the particular hazards involved in the policing of large-scale concerts/events from a strategic, financial, operational and reputational perspective as identified in the Mullarkey Report and suggests best practice in formulating a risk management strategy.

LEGISLATION AND POLICY

The legislation dealing with the policing of outdoor events is primarily based on the Common Law which imposes a duty on the Gardaí to "preserve life and property and to maintain the good order and peace at all times" (Byrne, 2001). In 1989, the Government of the day, tasked Judge Hamilton, to chair a 'Committee on Public Safety and Crowd Control' (Hamilton, 1990) whose terms of reference included:

"To examine and report to the Government on the adequacy of all existing provisions, including legislative provisions, relating to public safety and crowd control at major events and music festivals and concerts and to make such recommendations as seem to them appropriate".

Arising from the Hamilton Report, 1990, interim recommendations were put in place which recommended 'A Code of Practice to Deal with Outdoor Pop Concerts and Sports Grounds'. The report identified the risks involved for all agencies in the planning and managing of events and more particularly identified key issues relevant to the policing of outdoor events such as:

- a) *Statutory powers to be given to Gardaí to deal with crowd and traffic control, including powers of search and confiscation.*
- b) *Crowd capacity for major events should be agreed on a voluntary basis between the promoter and the Chief Superintendent for the area concerned.*
- c) *Should the anticipated attendance at major events exceed 70% of the agreed capacity; the event should be 'all ticket' if considered necessary by the Garda Authorities.*
- d) *The report also identified the issue of the need for training of Garda Personnel in charge of Major Events in crowd control and the necessity for them to have a thorough knowledge of the event site.*
- e) *Also identified was the impact on the Garda budget that placed an onus on*

the promoter of outdoor events to provide payments at a non-public rate for Garda personnel employed in the policing of events inside the grounds.

The Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994 grants legislative powers to a member of An Garda Síochána, not below the rank of Superintendent, to perform certain functions regarding the preservation of order in the interests of public safety. These powers permit the erection of a barrier or a series of barriers on any road/street; the control and diverting of traffic by means of traffic signs by a member of An Garda Síochána in uniform and the permission of access to the event site only by those persons who are the holders of tickets authorising such access.

The Planning and Development Act, 2000, provides a legislative definition of an event as, *'a public performance which takes place wholly or mainly in the open air or in a structure with no roof or a partial, temporary or retractable roof, a tent or similar temporary structure and which is comprised of music, dancing, displays of public entertainment or any activity of like kind, and any other event as prescribed by the Minister under Section 241 of this Act.'*

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Judge Hamilton, in his report stated that security and public order arrangements outside the grounds of major events are operational policing matters. His report further stated that the responsibility for the orderly control of crowds and public safety within the grounds rest with the organisers of the event. Lord Justice Taylor in his report on the Hillsborough Disaster (Taylor, 1989) held similar views.

RISK MANAGEMENT

Aligning the theory of risk management to the practicalities of the legislation and the commissioned reports, both in Ireland and the UK, must take cognisance of the full implications of risk to all organisations involved in policing or promoting events including An Garda Síochána. There are a variety of ways organisational risk can be defined but it primarily relates to the threat that is posed by an unforeseen event occurring and the way it may adversely affect the organisation in its ability to achieve its objectives and to successfully execute its strategies.

'Risk is a characteristic of our world that is present when certainty is absent. Objectively, risk is the variability of outcomes around an expectation; while subjectively, risk is our attitude towards or perception of risk – which is influenced by uncertainty, personal, social, cultural factor, and the risk's relationship to the larger environment.' (Fone, 2000)

As a consequence, risk brings with it an element of uncertainty. Past experiences will reduce the level of risk to which an organisation may find itself exposed, only if the organisation has learned from these experiences. Exposure of risk looks at the combination of the probability of risk and its subsequent impact on the organisation. This is displayed on the Risk

Management Matrix (Crowe, 2004) displayed in *Figure 1*.

Figure 1: The Risk Management Matrix.

Risk Management Matrix		Materiality		
		Low	Medium	High
Likelihood	High	Treatable Risk	Significant Risk	Significant Risk
	Medium	Tolerable Risk	Treatable Risk	Significant Risk
	Low	Tolerable Risk	Tolerable Risk	Treatable Risk

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Risk is about uncertainty and the doubt that surrounds our ability to respond. In the planning and policing of large-scale outdoor events there are high levels of uncertainty for each and every one of the participants. The promoter is confronted with the possible financial risk or the risk of casualties in the event of something going wrong on site. The Licensing Authority is exposed, if it fails to recognise issues of public/private concerns that may later impact on the local political landscape. Similarly, An Garda Síochána will experience risks from the strategic, operational, financial and reputational perspectives. To protect An Garda Síochána from these risks, a robust internal risk management control environment and risk management strategies are required.

With reference to *Figure 1*, deciding on how the organisation responds to the actual risk in terms of how the risk is treated is dependent on how much risk An Garda Síochána is prepared to accept before action is required. For example, should An Garda Síochána tolerate the exposure to the risk, then this risk can be categorised as a tolerable risk. If An Garda Síochána has a plan/process in place to minimise the risk to the organisation, then the risk can be described as being treatable.

Significant Risks (those that cannot be either transferred to another agency or terminated) should be categorised as ‘Treatable Risks’ in that if the likelihood and the materiality of an event occurring presents a significant risk to the organisation then the treatment of this risk is paramount.

For an organisation such as An Garda Síochána, the development of a Corporate Risk Management Strategy is necessary in line with the

requirements of Mullarkey and Section 45 (2)(c)(iv) of the Garda Síochána Act of 2005. Mullarkey provides the guiding principles for risk management in all government departments and the four specific perspectives of strategy, operations, finance and reputation further provide the necessary focus on which to develop a **Corporate Risk Register (CRR)**. This is a document that identifies and assesses risks inherent within our corporate strategy documents.

As already stated, risks can be categorised into many different varieties and those that particularly refer to An Garda Síochána would appear to include the four specific risk categories (Lernihan, 2005), which are generally agreed as the standard risk identification areas in most public and private sector bodies and are set out as follows:

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- **Strategic Risk:** *‘Those that may be external to the organisation such as demographics and also can include social issues as well as political, economic and environmental factors.’* As a result of large-scale outdoor events taking place in a locality, policing strategies are required to cater for these events.
- **Operational Risk:** *‘The risks relating to the procedures and methodologies employed to achieve particular objectives including the internal workings of the organisation and the adequacy of information received, the use of technology, planning and the management of events/operations as well as innovation.’* The level of resources to be deployed to particular large-scale outdoor events is a matter of operational judgement, having regard to an assessment of the inherent risk and the requirements of safety to both the general public and Garda personnel.
- **Financial Risk:** *‘This relates to the accounting procedures and systems employed to ensure that the organisation is not exposed to monetary and asset loss as well as factors including budget management, liability, fraud etc.’* An Garda Síochána in the policing of large-scale events is confronted with the possibility of financial losses from civil litigation in the event of something going wrong. The depletion of Regional/Divisional funds allocated from the Garda budget is also an issue of concern, in instances where a considerable numbers of members are required and where payment for the cost of the service cannot be recouped from the promoter.
- **Reputational Risk:** *‘The risks relating to the public reputation of the organisation and its ability to perform effectively.’* The reputation of An Garda Síochána is very much reliant upon the attitude of the community that is served by the organisation.

CONCLUSION.

The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána in his Annual Policing Plan of 2005 makes reference to the Garda Síochána Corporate Strategy as a commitment to achieving "*A Safer Ireland through Policing Excellence*" and to realise this requires the achievement of the twin imperatives of '*public confidence and public safety throughout this country*'.

By adhering to the guiding principles of risk management, an organisation like An Garda Síochána can benefit significantly in terms of having an ability to be better planners and service deliverers to all stakeholders. The impact of the Mullarkey Report and the Garda Síochána Act, 2005 as well as legislation such as the Planning & Development Act and the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994 have made the embedding of risk management into an organisation such as An Garda Síochána an easier but essential task.

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Liaison between An Garda Síochána and the Families of Murder Victims



John O'Mahoney

Detective Superintendent John O'Mahoney

'For the family members of murder victims the grieving process takes on a cruel dimension. The entire experience becomes a seemingly never-ending battle with anger, hopelessness, frustration and grief. Professionals must be aware and deal specifically with the issues that may arise and further complicate the grieving process' (Sprang, 1989).

INTRODUCTION

The above quote aptly describes the devastation experienced by relatives following the murder of a significant other and highlights just one of the reasons as to why the investigation of murder is the most difficult and demanding task to be undertaken by any police force.

Additionally, Catherine Cleary in her book *'Life Sentence Murder Victims and their Families'* (Cleary, 2004) offers a rare insight into the effects a murder can have on the lives of those left behind. She outlines how the families of murder victims are often put through unbearable ordeals in the aftermath of a murder and during the quest for justice including how the State dictates what happens to a murder victim's body; the length of time it takes for a case to come to Court; and how the Court and subsequent Inquest reveals the traumatic and sometimes gruesome detail of violent deaths.

In cases of murder, the victim's family will want to know everything that is going on in the investigation, and it is vital that this information is delivered in a timely and professional manner. Hence the use of liaison between the police and the families can be very beneficial to the overall investigation as well as providing support and assistance to the victim's family.

THE STRATEGIC APPROACH

It is against this backdrop that the need for a strategic approach by An Garda Síochána to the management of the liaison between An Garda Síochána and the families of murder victims is considered. Identifying the complex role of the liaison officer and how that liaison is managed, the development of best practice in the selection and training of liaison officers, the use of a timeframe for family liaison officer interaction and their welfare considerations are just some of the issues that should be addressed.

The role of the Family Liaison Officer (FLO) in a number of Police Services in the United Kingdom has been identified, as being one of the most important issues a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) will have to address throughout the course of a murder investigation (Scottish Police College, 2004).

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The strategies as set out in the Scottish Police College Manual with regard to Family Liaison Officers centre on:

- *The role of the Family Liaison Officer;*
- *The selection of Family Liaison Officers;*
- *Post Investigation support.*

In the Scottish Police College Manual, the above three strategies are articulated to ensure that *'good practice'* in family liaison is adhered to and implemented in all circumstances.

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The South Wales Police in its *'Family Liaison Document'* clearly sets out that the provision of support to the families of deceased persons is of the utmost importance in investigations and the actions of everybody from the Chief Constable to the Operator who takes the first call must reflect this policy.

CURRENT PRACTICE IN AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

In 1996, An Garda Síochána commissioned the Economic and Social Research Institute to carry out a survey on its behalf with a view to gaining an insight into the pattern of crime in Ireland and informing policy on services to crime victims. The results published in a book titled *'Victims of Recorded Crime in Ireland'* (Watson, 2000) included the following findings:

- *The clear need to provide follow-up information to victims on the progress and outcome of a case,*
- *The provision of support for victims during the court procedure,*
- *The need for a review of services for victims of assault,*
- *The need to help victims, especially victims of violent crime to cope with the emotional trauma associated with the incident.*

Since the results of the above survey, An Garda Síochána has committed itself to improving the service it provides to victims of crime in particular by working closely, in a multidisciplinary way with victim support organisations.

Garda HQ Directives (21/98, 142/99 and 195/01) set out clearly the procedures to be adopted when dealing with victims of crime. The Garda policy is to refer all victims of certain categories of crime to victim support organisations unless the victim specifically declines such a referral. The referral system operates in respect of crimes in which physical injury and/or psychological trauma is likely to have occurred.

In respect of murder victims, the Directive puts the responsibility on District Officers for appointing Family Liaison Officers to the family of the murder victim, so as to provide support and feedback on the progress of the investigation. It also sets out the Family Liaison Officers responsibility to offer the services of victim support to the family and to forward the names and addresses of those who require the services to the District Officer who will in turn ensure that the victim support organisation is notified.

Since 2003, a partnership agreement between An Garda Síochána and victim support agencies was signed with all organisations agreeing to commit themselves to work together in every practical way, to achieve best support for victims of crime.

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The An Garda Síochána Policing Plan 2004 set out a number of goals aimed at improving the service to victims of crime and at developing a closer working arrangement with victim support groups. The Annual Policing Plan for 2005 reinforces the aim of implementing the Victims Charter and ensuring the privacy of victims.

An Garda Síochána's Corporate Strategy 2005/7 lists as part of Strategic Goal No. 2 - *Reducing the Incidence of Organised and Serious Crime* - its intention to implement the partnership agreement agreed in 2003 with victim organisations. As such, Garda Management realise the importance of displaying humanity and kindness to the families of victims of a violent death, thus Garda Policy in this respect relies heavily on a joint approach with victim support organisations.

In the last 12 months, the Government has established the '*Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime*' chaired by former Assistant Garda Commissioner James McHugh. This group has overall responsibility for the provision of government funding to victim support groups. In light of the above changes, An Garda Síochána is reviewing its policies in dealing with victim support organisations and a new policy document outlining An Garda Síochána's role will be developed in the near future.

RESEARCH

As part fulfilment of a Bachelor Degree in Police Management at the Garda Síochána College in 2004, the author completed a dissertation (O'Mahoney, 2005) on the development of a best practice guide for An Garda Síochána in liaising with family victims of murder. The research element of the dissertation centred on a study of the responses of three distinct groups – Gardaí, Families of Murder Victims & the Legal Profession/Victim Support - on the role of An Garda Síochána in this area.

The research element conducted by way of semi-structured interviews with thirty respondents provided the following key findings:

Table 1: Research Findings

An Garda Síochána	Families of Victims	Legal/Victim Support
90% state that Garda Training is insufficient and 80% of respondents were in favour of developing a Family Liaison Policy.	80% responded that Gardaí were very supportive of them during the investigation process.	Feeling that liaison between An Garda Síochána and victim's families was quite good at pre-trial and trial stages but were critical of post-trial liaison.
100% believed that the families were afforded too little opportunity in the Criminal Justice System	90% of families felt that they were afforded too little opportunity within the Criminal Justice System.	All respondents agreed that families need a greater say in the process with the legal respondents stating that there is a greater need for communication between themselves and victim's families.
70% believed that State Counsel should provide more support for victim's families	80% felt that they should have separate legal representation during proceedings	While the above was seen as important, the legal respondents felt that there was a balance to be struck between increased communication and the integrity of the legal process.
A majority feeling was that Gardaí could devote more time to victims during the investigation if liaison structures were formally in place.	Respondents were most critical of the following: - the initial response being slow; too little feedback; lack of awareness on their part of investigative/legal procedures and the need for more communication during the process.	Respondents in this grouping as with the other groups felt a clear sense of need to ensure a multi-agency approach is adopted to 'Family Liaison'.

CONCLUSION

The issue of family liaison between An Garda Síochána and families of murder victims is in need of dynamic change. The author recommends that An Garda Síochána should embrace strategic responsibility for the formulation and development of a family liaison policy during the investigation of murder, to include the selection (physical, psychological and competency) and training of Senior Investigating Officers and Family Liaison Officers.

Family Liaison Officers should be dedicated primarily if not exclusively to that task. Senior Investigating Officers and Family Liaison Officers are made aware that one of their primary duties will be the satisfactory

management of family liaison together with the provision to a victim's family of all possible information about the crime and its investigation.

There is also a clear need for An Garda Síochána in conjunction with the Court Service and victims support organisations to develop guidelines for the benefit of victims and witnesses. In this context An Garda Síochána should review its victim support referral policies.

The author further states that the policy adopted should as well as setting out the qualities necessary for a Family Liaison Officer cater for the welfare of active Family Liaison Officers and develop a clear and balanced timeframe for the withdrawal of Family Liaison Officer intervention after the conclusion of proceedings.

Finally, as part of a debrief process; Garda management should seek the views of family members on the effectiveness of family liaison with a view to enhancing the liaison between An Garda Síochána and the families of murder victims.

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Small Area Population Statistics

Garda Jack Swan



Jack Swan

"Effective crime prevention is synonymous with a stable society. It is a core police activity, whose object is the preservation of lawful freedoms, through the creation of safer, less fearful communities... In a climate where demands on police resources are continually increasing, crime prevention is the most satisfactory way of meeting the needs of potential victims"

ACPO 1996 'Towards 2000: A crime prevention strategy for the millennium'

INTRODUCTION

This article outlines how Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS) may be utilised by An Garda Síochána in the prevention and detection of crime. SAPS are extracted from the information collected by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in the national census. SAPS 2002 contains 1,161 variables ranging from basic gender to types of water supply. The census population data relates to De Facto population.¹

The figures therefore, include visitors present on the census night as well as those in residence, while usual residents absent from the area are excluded from the census count.

A limited number of questions, relating mainly to demographic characteristics, were asked in respect of usual residents who were temporarily absent from their households on census night. The responses to these questions enable a more precise picture to be built up on families and households, by excluding visitors present on census night and including residents who were temporarily absent.

The Organisation Development Unit worked in close association with the Central Statistics Office to produce SAPS at District level for use within An Garda Síochána. The correlation of the SAPS to Garda Districts necessitated the identification and allocation of every townland, street and island in the State to the correct Garda District. The in-depth information collected in the census was then assigned to each District, giving a demographic and socio-economic profile known as SAPS.

THE APPLICATION OF SAPS IN POLICING

The application of demographic data in crime prevention involves examining the make-up of society and identifying those variables that are most relative to different crimes. Changes in the economic environment, such as a recession or increasing unemployment can also be compared with crime levels.

¹ The population recorded for each area represents the total of all persons present within its boundaries on the night of the census.

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Demographics have been recognised as one of the strongest indicators of crime rates and have been key to predictions in relation to crime. In particular, the prime demographic variable that most influences crime is the size and age of the male population. The dominant crime committing age group is in the 15-25 year old age group. Areas with a large proportion of young males have the highest crime rate. Table 1 sets out the findings of a study titled "*Crime in the United States*"².

<i>Table 1 Persons Arrested for Crime</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adults (those over age of 18) made up 83.7 percent of total arrestees. • Persons under the age of 25 made up 46.3 percent of all arrestees, and nearly a third of arrestees were under 21 years of age. • In 2003, 76.8 percent of arrestees in the USA were male. • Males made up 82.2 percent of violent crime and 69.2 percent of property crime arrestees. • Juveniles accounted for 16.3 percent of violent crimes and 29.7 percent of arrestees for property crime.

The demographic data generated in the 2002 census also indicates that there will be a significant rise in the age of the population in Ireland. An older population will result in a decrease in the number of offenders and it can also indicate a greater number of potential victims. It has not been established if the current offending age group (15 – 25 years) will continue with their criminal ways as they get older.

There is a new demographic variable that has become increasingly important in Ireland. There are a large number of immigrants entering the country annually. These changes are altering the demographic map of Ireland through increased birth rates, marital status etc. In the 2002 Census, approximately 170,000 persons stated that they were not of Irish or British nationality. Approximately 80,000 of these live in the Dublin area.

Social factors other than simple demographics have also been used as indicators to crime. Community composition has a strong influence on the levels of crime. Community composition refers to the categories of people that live in a community. Unmarried or divorced adult males, teenage males, non-working adults, economically deprived persons, persons with criminal histories and single parents have all been identified as the categories of people whose presence is associated with crime. Kanter (1977) discovered that entire communities change when a proportion of one category of person goes beyond a tipping point³.

² FBI Uniform Report, Crime in the United States, Section IV; Persons Arrested, 2003, pp 268-270.

³ The concept is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then a further small change "tips" the system and a large effect is observed.

Independently of the categories of people who live in a community, the way in which they interact may affect the risk of crime. For example, children of a single parent family may not necessarily be involved in crime. However, if there are a number of similar families in the one area, the interaction and lack of supervision may result in increased levels of delinquency. The increased difficulty involved in supervising single parent young males can be multiplied if there are a large number of these individuals in a community.

The American psychologists Loeber and Dishion (1983) intensively studied the predictors of male crime. They had already established that males committed the majority of crime and the most important predictors to males committing crime were:

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1. Poor parental child management techniques
2. Childhood antisocial behaviour
3. Offending by parents and siblings
4. Low intelligence and educational attainment
5. Separation from a parent

THE BENEFITS OF SAPS TO AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

Small Area Population Statistics can be used by An Garda Síochána in the profiling of Garda Districts. SAPS, when combined with readily available environmental information i.e. number of public houses, night clubs, types of local authority housing (high rise or low level), after school activities etc., can be used to identify potential crime hotspots. This information, demographic, socio-economic and environmental, will assist in the creation of a three dimensional model of the District. With the knowledge now available at a District level, management will be in the position to allocate and deploy resources to match the perceived needs of the District.

The information contained in the SAPS will enable Garda management to more accurately identify the present and future resource requirements of each District. For example, a simple increase in population will not automatically result in an increase in crime. If a population increase is made up of 60+ years of age; it is unlikely that they will contribute to increased crime. However, if the population increase is males in the 15-25 year old age group, it is likely there will be an increase in crime. SAPS information will give an in-depth picture of the changes that are occurring in each District.

Knowledge of the demographic breakdown of a certain area will allow An Garda Síochána to proactively share information with local authorities.

This shared information can be utilised in local authority housing schemes (designing out crime), youth centres and other community based initiatives.

SAPS INFORMATION SHEET

Garda H.Q. Directive 1/06 introduced the SAPS information sheet (see appendix 1). The ODU, in order to streamline the benefits of the SAPS to An Garda Síochána, have extracted key variables (which include District code and Headquarters) relevant to every Garda District from the SAPS. These variables were identified as being most beneficial to operational policing.

These variables are categorised as follows:

1. Those variables that provide a broad demographic overview of a District.
 - District code and Headquarters.
 - De Facto Population Figure: The number of persons in each District on the night of the Census.
 - Actual population Figure: The actual number of persons that reside in the District on the night of the Census, but may not have been in the District at the time.
 - A breakdown of the De Facto population by Gender.
 - The number of dwellings in the District.
2. Those variables that provide amore detailed demographic and socio-economic profile of a District.
 - The age profile of the District by four year divides to the age of 30 i.e. 0-4, 5-9 etc. These figures will enable An Garda Síochána to estimate the current age profile of an area and to also predict the future profile of the District. It can be used to identify the nature of policing that will be necessary, e.g. a strong JLO presence, Community policing etc.
 - Age of persons living alone from the age of 65 to 85 plus. This will enable local Garda to identify those persons who are more susceptible to crime and therefore will need greater Garda attention.
 - Dwelling Type. This will enable management to identify the proportion of each type of dwelling in their District i.e. House, Flats/Apartments, Temporary Households. Plans can then be developed to devise the most appropriate manner to allocate resources and identify the specific policing requirements of each District.

- Nature of Occupancy (Persons) and Nature of Occupancy (Dwellings). Both of these variables identify the social makeup of the occupiers of each dwelling. This enables Garda Management to assess the social and economic makeup of a District and allocate resources using the information.
- Number of Cars per Private Household. This variable indicates the number of vehicles in the District. This information can assist in the design of road traffic plans. It can also be used as an economic indicator for a District.
- Number of Persons aged 15 plus who are unemployed. This enables management to identify the percentage of the population that is most likely to be involved in crime. An Garda Síochána can, in cooperation with other public bodies, develop schemes to reduce crime involvement.
- Number of ethnic and cultural minorities. This information (due to be expanded for the 2006 Census) enables An Garda Síochána to identify the cultural and ethnic variables that reside in each District. This information will in turn assist in the development of facilities and services for each minority.

CONCLUSION

SAPS information primarily paint a picture of the demographic and socio-economic landscape of an area, which in An Garda Síochána, is each District and if required each Sub-District in Ireland. This information can be combined with available environmental information to compile a three dimensional model, in which management can identify those areas that can attract crime and the persons that are most likely to commit this crime. The information made available from SAPS can also assist in the planning of resources for a District and how these resources should be deployed to gain best value for money. The information can be shared with other public bodies and used in joint plans to benefit the community.

The Small Area Population Statistics will be updated on a four year basis. The next census is due to be undertaken in April 2006, and information on Small Area Population Statistics will be available in 2007. These figures will give an updated picture of the communities served by An Garda Síochána. Ireland is a rapidly changing island with varying and diverse needs and expectations. Small Area Population Statistics can help An Garda Síochána anticipate these expectations and needs when devising models of policing that are proactive in providing the highest achievable level of Personal Protection, Community Commitment and State Security to the people that we serve.

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