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
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NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

SUPERINTENDENT P.V. MURPHY is attached to the Garda College, where he is responsible for Quality of Service and Senior Management Development. He is also head of the Garda Human Rights Working Group, having special responsibility for the development of the Garda Declaration of Professional Values and Ethical Standards. Superintendent Murphy is a graduate of the University of Sheffield and the University of Limerick. He is currently pursuing research in the field of public sector governance.

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT LOUIS HARKIN is attached to Change Management, Garda Headquarters. He joined An Garda Síochána in 1972 and served in Kevin Street, Cashel and Whitehall. As a Sergeant he served in Castlefin (1979-80), Store Street and Ballymun (1981-92). As an Inspector he served in Community Relations (1992-95). When he was promoted to Superintendent he served in the Garda College, Fitzgibbon Street and SMI (1995-2002). He holds a BA in Public Administration, an MBS in Strategic Human Resource Management and a BL.

MR. PAUL HICKEY is the Assistant Secretary in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform with responsibility for International Policy Division. Appointed to the post in April 2003 he was responsible for the overall coordination of the Department's input to the European Union Presidency as well as chairing the Article 36 Committee. Previous posts include the Security and Northern Ireland Division and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Secretariat as Principal Officer and Law Division and the Security Division as Assistant Principal. He also served on secondment from the Department with the European Commission between 1993 and 1994. He is a holder of a BA degree in History and Politics and an MA degree in Politics from University College Dublin and a Diploma in Legal Studies and Barrister of Law degree from the Kings Inn.

INSPECTOR ORLA MCPARTLIN joined An Garda Síochána in 1983. She spent fourteen years on uniform duty, first in Crumlin and then following promotion to Sergeant in 1990 in Monaghan, Tallaght and Ballinlough. She holds an honours BA in Public Management with the Institute of Public Administration and an MA in Criminal Justice from John Jay College, New York. Orla is currently attached to the International Coordination Unit following her promotion to Inspector at the Organisation Development Unit. She played a key role in preparing An Garda Síochána for the Irish Presidency of the EU.

DR. KIRAN SARMA was appointed as a Civilian Researcher in the Garda Research Unit at the Garda College, Templemore in 2002. Previous to his appointment as Civilian Researcher he lectured in Forensic Psychology at the Garda College. In August 2004 he took up a lecturing position in Mary Immaculate College/University of Limerick. He holds a PhD in Applied Psychology.

Implementing Corporate Strategy

How An Garda Síochána converts strategic plans into dynamic operational strategies, tactics and actions



Superintendent
P.V. Murphy

Superintendent P.V. Murphy

INTRODUCTION

An Garda Síochána, its leaders and staff have significant experience and competence in strategy making and strategy implementation. Such experience and competence has been building up over the years, to such an extent, that we tend to take it for granted. However, due to the challenging dynamics of our contemporary public policing environment, in terms of change, diversity and transparent accountability, reflections on strategy making, strategic choice and strategy implementation is imperative. Evaluation is now considered a critical imperative for Garda leaders at all levels. In this article, I posit that key Garda leaders at three critical organisational levels: - strategic leadership level (officers of Commissioner level rank), operational leadership level (officers of Chief Superintendent and Superintendent ranks) and service delivery level (members of Inspector and Sergeant ranks), are required to develop and display full competence in strategy development, implementation and evaluation.

In the June 2004 edition of *Communique*, Deputy Garda Commissioner T.P. Fitzgerald explored the process of strategy making with particular reference to An Garda Síochána, a core public service organisation. In that article Garda strategy making was depicted as adopting a contingent and blended approach – tentative rational plans, based on the best possible information, are brought forward by senior Garda leaders as a means for identifying and communicating the strategic imperatives and key strategic goals which senior planners consider necessary to ensure that An Garda Síochána develops the clarity, intent, capability and motivation to deliver on our public mission – *personal protection, community commitment and state security*. To supplement such rational plans, and to ensure that the strategy remains relevant and sensitive to emerging or unforeseen policing challenges, provision is made, through bottom-up processes, to incorporate emergent strategies and to develop resource capabilities that ensure such new strategies have the opportunity of becoming a reality. Here we see top down and bottom up information processes in dynamic engagement, contributing to learning enabled

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change, sharp operational tactics and citizen/client/customer sensitive services at lowest cost to the public purse.

The purpose of this article is to explore practical ways in which proposed corporate strategy might best be implemented, with a view to ensuring that the needs and expectations of key stakeholders – citizens, government, groups and individuals in civil society and staff – are achieved. Clearly, with such a dynamic and diverse constituency, communication and information flow will be a core strategy implementation process, if clarity of intent and clarity of action, is to be understood in this tension filled arena of public policing strategy implementation.


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It is through the pronouncements of management and the actions of staff that the public – whether they are motorists on our roads, crime victims in their homes, people of difference fearing for their safety in the streets, or young people attending large public events – come to experience the reality and outcomes of Garda strategy. Therefore, it makes real sense, when approaching the implementation of strategy to start with proposals which focus on how we might best communicate, agree and performance manage the implementation of corporate strategy while assuring that we retain a clearly understood control system which supports alignment and avoids unacceptable risk (Simons, 2000).

PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORKS

As noted above, organisational strategies are conceived, developed and tested by senior management in consultation with key internal and external stakeholders. Operational management and street level teams are responsible for the implementation of strategy. Consequently, a key responsibility, indeed imperative for senior management, is to ensure that such strategies and strategic goals are cascaded down the organisation for the information, learning and adoption by operational management teams. When operational management teams have mastered the intent and import of strategic plans and applied them to challenges and opportunities, which are relevant in their local domain of responsibilities, they must then communicate such applied and refined strategies to street level work teams for implementation. If operational staff and their supervisors lack clarity in relation to what is expected of them, then it is unlikely that they will be able to develop the necessary bundles of skills/competencies or engage in the critical actions and behaviours which are essential for effective and efficient strategy implementation.

At a macro level, the first practical implementation step in transposing the intent, strategic priorities and goals of corporate strategy to operational



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FIGURE 1

policing are in the agreement and publication of the annual policing plan. The annual policing plan identifies for senior operational management (at divisional and district levels) policing priorities at a national level. Following the contingent nature of Garda strategy which requires that Garda structures, plans, capabilities and resource allocations are honed to

cater for divisional and local priorities, each Divisional Management Team is required to bring forward local plans which reflect strategic national priorities on the one hand, and yet cater for local emerging needs on the other.

6 As noted above, implementation of strategy requires strong information and communication processes. It is essential that the strategic intent and strategic priorities of senior management are communicated to and understood by operational managers, operational work teams and individuals. To facilitate this, the strategic imperatives and goals of the organisation must be converted into measures and actions, which are relevant and meaningful for key personnel at all levels of the organisation. It is well understood in organisational life that what is valued and championed by leaders is also valued by operational teams: what is isolated for management and measurement by leaders, commands the attention and commitment of staff.

One of the primary purposes of performance measurement and control is to allow for *fact-based management* – that is management that moves from intuition and hunches to analysis based on hard data and facts. To help Garda managers and staff better understand the complexity of contemporary police management and performance, priorities for attention can be represented in a strategy map (Figure I). Based on the valuable insights pioneered by Kaplan and Norton (2001), the strategy map identifies essential cause/effect relationships in terms of - learning and innovation activities, staff management and behaviours, key internal Garda work processes which must be performed consistently to a high quality, and finally, the type of services which must be delivered to the public - if An Garda Síochána is to fulfill its public mission.

When the strategic goals of An Garda Síochána are juxtapositioned with the strategy map, integrated performance plans and measures can be developed for each strategic goal. Facilitated operational planning workshops are ideal for this type of performance planning. Operational managers can be confident that they have engaged essential capability building needs as well as key service delivery needs when they use the strategy map process as a guiding template for their management and measurement scorecard development. The outcomes of such performance management and measurement workshops is a set of key internal and external focused measures which managers have agreed are essential for the successful implementation of the relevant strategic goal.

However, the development of operational scorecards aimed at tracking success or otherwise in the pursuit of strategic goals is of little benefit

unless there is an unequivocal commitment at every level to its implementation. Active and dedicated implementation of such performance driving initiatives provides critical information to enable operational management teams and strategic managers in turn, to assess progress towards the successful implementation of the overall strategy.

While operational and strategic performance management is critical to the success of public policing, recent revelations from a variety of sources, including the first Report of the Morris Tribunal (2004) suggests that strategy implementation must incorporate control systems which protect the organisation, its staff and other stakeholders from unacceptable risk. Following Simons (1995; 2000), Fitzgerald (2004) emphasised the importance for Garda leaders, at all levels, to identify clearly the 'opportunity seeking space' for operational achievement. In essence, building boundaries and control systems, which demarcate our legitimate 'opportunity seeking space' helps Garda teams and their leaders to ensure that they avoid unacceptable risks and unethical approaches and behaviours. The message here is that when building and operating performance plans and strategies, the imperatives of open and transparent public accountability must be incorporated as a critical performance variable.



STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: IMPLICATIONS

So what does all this mean for Garda managers and staff (at operational level) who are charged with the duties and responsibilities associated with developing and delivering day to day Garda services? The emerging strategic plan for An Garda Síochána identifies six key strategic goals – *national and international security, serious crime and drugs, road safety, public safety, stakeholder confidence, and ethnic and cultural diversity*. In essence, these six key areas are identified as priority areas for attention, effort and contribution by all members. As annual policing plans at national and local levels emerge over the lifetime of this strategy, initiatives will be taken in terms of: (a) capability building (better skilled staff, new work processes, focussed allocation of resources – human, I.T. and financial, etc.) and, (b) results achievement (reduced incidents of crime, improved crime detection, reduced road fatalities, increased speeding detections, higher Garda visibility in public disorder hot-spots, reduction in citizen fear of crime or assault, etc.). In essence, operational management teams will be expected to align and integrate scarce resources with a view to ensuring that the key strategic goal related operational initiatives are developed, communicated, understood, engaged with and actively pursued by all members. All will pursue similar strategies, tactics and actions, with ongoing assessment and review acting as the learning and improvement mechanisms. Staff development

initiatives will be focused on ensuring that operational staff possess the integrated set of key skills/competencies which are essential to enable them to professionally pursue relevant operational policing strategies and actions in an effective and efficient manner. Local staff recognition and reward systems will be focused on individual and team achievements that demonstratively contribute to the successful implementation of the strategy.

Implementation of strategy is the duty, responsibility and privilege of every staff member. Clarity in relation to its intent, value and importance is the responsibility of our leaders. Strategies and implementation plans are necessary but not sufficient: honest, courageously decisive and competent leadership is the other half of the equation.



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Fixed Charge Processing System (FCPS)

A Change Management Perspective



Chief Superintendent
Louis Harkin

Chief Superintendent Louis Harkin

"Despite some individual successes, change remains difficult to pull off, and few companies manage the process as well as they would like"

(Beer and Nohria, 2000).

In this article, I will provide an outline of the new Fixed Charge Processing System (FCPS - an IT enabled change initiative). I will discuss some of the activities that helped put FCPS on the road to success from a change management perspective.


BACKGROUND

FCPS is the culmination of a number of initiatives aimed at reducing road deaths and injuries. These include An Garda Síochána's Corporate Strategy (2000-2004), An Garda Síochána's IT Strategy (1992) and the Government's Road Safety Strategy (1998-2002).

AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA'S CORPORATE STRATEGY

One of the key strategic goals for An Garda Síochána as set out in our Corporate Strategy 2000 – 2004 is, "contributing to improving road safety and the reduction of casualties". See figure 1 for the number of road deaths between 1996 and 2003.

FIGURE 1 – NUMBER OF ROAD DEATHS



While the number of deaths on our roads has increased since the beginning of this year, it should be remembered that the number of fatalities in 2003, at 337, is the lowest on record since 1963. This is an enormous achievement for An Garda Síochána.

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The enforcement of speed limits is a major element of the road safety strategy. However, as we entered the new millennium the Garda administrative system for processing speeding offences was proving inadequate to meet increasing needs. Consequently large numbers of Gardaí throughout the country had to resort to back office duties maintaining a paper-based system.

GARDA IT STRATEGY

The 1992 IT Strategy for An Garda Síochána included the development of an IT system for dealing with fines on the spot. However, this system was excluded from the initial PULSE contract due to funding restrictions. In 2002, there was renewed impetus for the implementation of the system, particularly in view of the Government's Road Safety Strategy and the Road Traffic Act 2002.

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In October 2002, the contract for a new computer system to cater for the processing of fixed charges was awarded to Fujitsu Services. Work commenced immediately on the system, which is now known as the Fixed Charge Processing System (FCPS).

GOVERNMENT ROAD SAFETY STRATEGY

A significant aspect of the Government's Road Safety Strategy (1999 – 2002) is the Road Traffic Act 2002. This Act extends the range of road traffic offences that are dealt with by way of a fixed charge and also introduced a penalty points scheme for some of them.

An Garda Síochána is responsible for the detection of road traffic offences and for the supply of information to the Department of Environment and Local Government. This information is required to track a driver's penalty point totals.

Penalty points apply to the offences of speeding (2 Points), seatbelts (2 points), driving without insurance (5 points) and careless driving (5 points). However only speeding offences and the non-wearing of seat belts are fixed charge offences.

Imposing a fixed charge rather than initiating a court prosecution frees up Gardaí to focus on other duties. If the fixed charge is not paid it is only then that a prosecution is initiated against the offending driver.

It is expected that the Minister for Transport will gradually introduce all offences listed in the Road Traffic Act 2002 as fixed charge and or penalty point offences.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Before embarking on the FCPS project, senior management in An Garda Síochána agreed the guiding principles for the design and implementation of the system. These include:

- A national office for processing offences.
- Reducing the administration for operational members.
- Automating as many processes as possible.
- Using Hand-held technology for capturing offence information.
- Contracting an external service provider(s) for payments handling.
- Contracting an external service provider for the printing and posting of fixed charge notices.
- Automating management information systems.

The primary objective is to increase An Garda Síochána's capacity to enforce the Road Traffic Acts. In order to ensure that this vision is achieved on schedule and to the standard required, it was critical that the project was governed appropriately.

GOVERNANCE OF FCPS

An Garda Síochána is using the PRINCE project management methodology for managing the FCPS project. The Programme Directorate consisting of the Head of IT Planning, Chief Superintendent, IT, Chief Superintendent Change Management, and the senior manager for Fujitsu Services, is in place to manage the day-to-day running of FCPS. This Directorate meet on a weekly basis and more frequently when required.

The progress of the project is reported to the Project Board, which is chaired by the Assistant Commissioner, National Support Services and comprises senior Garda management and representatives from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

A Programme Board under the direction of Deputy Commissioner, Strategic and Resource Management has the overall governance of all IT projects.

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Any new change initiative can generate resistance in people, thus making it difficult to implement organisational improvement. At a personal level, change can arouse considerable anxiety about abandoning the known and moving to an uncertain future (Cummings & Worley, 2001). That is why it is so important for the success of any new initiative that there is change management strategies put in place.

TOP DOWN CHANGE MANAGEMENT

The FCPS project is a good example of a 'top down' initiative, where Garda management set the strategic direction, for the project. The project essentially involves a fundamental and radical re-design of business processes to achieve improvements in performance and economies of scale. These economies of scale will be achieved from centralised administration and automated processes in a national office in Capel Street.

One of the biggest and most welcome change that FCPS will bring, is the introduction of outsourcing, such as An Post, for payments handling and TICo for the printing and posting of offence notices.

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When FCPS is fully implemented, Gardaí at local level will no longer be required to perform administrative functions such as sending out notices of offences, handling cash payments, applying for summonses or notifying the Department of Environment and Local Government of the number of penalty points to be attached to a driver record. Instead this will be managed via a national Fixed Charge Processing Office, which has electronic links, to the Courts, the Department of Environment and Local Government and to An Post.

In order that the system meets the needs of those expected to use it and to ensure that they accept the associated change, their participation in the project was crucial.

BOTTOM UP PARTICIPATION

One of the most effective ways for achieving change is to involve members directly in the planning and implementing of new initiatives. Participation can lead to high quality designs and can help to overcome resistance to implementing them. (Vroom and Yetton, 1973).

There was a high degree of 'bottom up' participation in FCPS, with large numbers of Gardaí and Civil Servants of all ranks and grades being deployed for short periods to work in user groups with change management and consultants. This was essential for ensuring that the design of the system reflects the needs of the organisation. Some of these personnel were also subsequently involved in testing the new system.

A major piece of work, carried out throughout the country, was the station preparation or site readiness for the new equipment. This involved members at local level in identifying suitable locations for computers and ensuring that any relevant infrastructure work was completed, the installation of network points and the purchasing of suitable furniture.

A large amount of planning and preparatory work was also required at the Garda Fixed Charge Processing Office, Capel Street, Dublin. This was formerly the Garda Parking Fines Office. New information systems had to be installed, additional Civil Servants recruited and trained in readiness for implementation.

Previously the Garda Parking Fines Office catered for the Dublin Metropolitan Region. It came under the direct responsibility of Chief Superintendent, DMR North Central. With the full introduction of FCPS imminent, there is a need to restructure the section. The National Fixed Charge Processing Office will come under the control of the Garda National Traffic Bureau (GNTB). GNTB report directly to Assistant Commissioner, National Support Services.

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COMMUNICATIONS

People resist change when they are uncertain about its consequences. Lack of adequate information fuels rumours and gossip and adds to the anxiety generally associated with change (Cummings and Worley, 2001). In order to gain buy in and acceptance of the changes associated with FCPS, a comprehensive communications strategy was developed. Change Management set out realistic expectations about the system and how Gardaí and Civil Servants would be impacted. The communication methods took the form of face-to-face briefings with hundreds of personnel countrywide and also included written materials in the form of newsletters and bulletins. All the Garda Staff Associations and the Civil and Public Service Union (C.P.S.U.) were consulted in advance of implementing the changes.

The public will also be impacted by FCPS, as Gardaí will no longer issue fixed charge notices to offending motorists at the time of an offence. Instead, the Garda will inform the motorist of the offence and that a fixed charge notice will issue through the post. Similarly the public will no longer be permitted to pay fixed charges at their local Garda Station. Instead they will pay the fixed charge at designated post offices.

In order to ensure that these changes are implemented smoothly an external communications strategy was developed for communicating the changes to the public. In each region a number of personnel (Inspector and Sergeant rank) have been appointed to liaise with the media. They will ensure that the changes are communicated through the local and national print and broadcast media

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Leadership or the lack of it is probably the single biggest contributor to success or failure within organisations (Kotter, 1995). It is the single most important factor in bringing about successful change. That is why there was such a strong focus on management development workshops for FCPS. These workshops were designed to ensure that managers were aware of the changes and what needed to be done at local level for their smooth implementation.

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Managers were given an in-depth understanding of the system, so that they were in a position to engage with and brief their staff on the changes in work practices. Managers in the pilot locations were also provided with a list of tools that were designed to assist in the implementation of FCPS at local level. These included checklists and scorecards to assess the status of station readiness for the implementation of FCPS. These tools will shortly be issued countrywide.

At local level managers must influence and persuade staff to use the system. Managers must create the vision and 'walk the talk' with supporting goals and objectives. Managers must sustain momentum for change by reinforcing the behaviour needed to implement the changes. For example ensuring that dual systems (hand held technology *and* paper based methods of data capture) are not continued. They must recognise and acknowledge good performance, challenge and offer support to staff that repeat mistakes when using the system.

DEVELOPING NEW COMPETENCIES AND SKILLS

Change cannot be implemented until members gain new competencies. The Garda College together with Fujitsu Services developed a comprehensive training package to address all necessary technical and procedural requirements. The package included training on the technical skills as well as the procedural knowledge required.

The training is delivered through an e-learning system. It is essentially conducted using computer-based exercises that are partially instructor led. Throughout each exercise members are given instructions and information, which will help them to use both the FCPS system and the hand held computers. The benefit of this method of training is that the majority of time is spent practicing at the users own pace. When members go back to their station they can seek help and support from the local trainer if required.

The training has been completed for Gardaí and Civil Servants involved in the pilot locations and will commence shortly for the remaining locations in the Dublin Metropolitan Region.

PROJECT STATUS – PILOT

FCPS (Phase 1) has been piloted in 14 locations (networked and non networked), before being implemented nationally. See figure 2 for the complete list of locations. The pilot has to be comprehensive in order to fully identify and resolve any issues prior to implementation. It is also designed to test:

- The use of the computer system and the hand held technology
- The Notepad
- The interface with external agencies such as the Courts Service, An Post, TICo and the Department of Environment and Local Government.
- The effectiveness of the training.
- The revised work processes and procedures

FIGURE 2 – LOCATIONS OF PILOT FOR FCPS

PILOT LOCATIONS	
OPERATIONAL	ADMINISTRATIVE
DMR Regional Traffic Division, Dublin Castle	Fixed Charge Processing Office (Capel St, Dublin and Traffic Office Anglesea St, Cork)
Blanchardstown Garda Station	Central Stores, Santry
Santry Garda Station	Garda National Traffic Bureau
Terenure Garda Station	Garda College
Drogheda Garda Station	IT Operations and Help Desk
Kells Garda Station	National Juvenile Office
Dunleer Garda Station	Third Party Print Providers - TICo

The Pilot of FCPS (phase 1) was successfully completed on August 30, 2004. The Project Board is now considering the results from the pilot. The pilot raised a number of issues and dependencies. When these are resolved, FCPS will be rolled out to the DMR and following that to the remainder of the country.

CONCLUSION

The key goal of FCPS is to free up Gardaí from back office duties, to enable them to focus on improving road safety and reducing deaths on our roads. We are now well on our way to achieving this through strategic and innovative thinking and commitment from all involved in the project to date. The winning strategy of FCPS involved a combination of:

- Good governance in terms of project management structures and methodologies.
- A partnership approach to system development.

- A radical re-design of business processes by centralising administration and data entry.
- Automation of as many processes as possible.
- Outsourcing non-value added activities to outside agencies.

However, organisational change is also about people. It involves bringing them from the known to the unknown. The future at the outset is uncertain and may adversely affect people's competencies, worth, and coping abilities. Organisation members generally do not support change unless compelling reasons convince them to do so (Cummings & Worley, 2001). Therefore success depends on motivating commitment to change. Change Management by adopting a top down *and* bottom up approach have sowed the seeds of success. Management must now provide the compelling rationale that will ensure others follow and the fruits are harvested.

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Ireland's EU Presidency – Operationalising the Presidency



Paul Hickey

Paul Hickey

INTRODUCTION

The Irish Presidency of the European Union may have lasted for six months – from January to June 2004 – but the preparation and planning for those six months took place over a much longer period. This article, which is written from the perspective of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, will focus on that process of planning and preparation and its contribution to the Presidency outcome. Inspector Orla McPartlin's article provides a Garda perspective on the Presidency.

REMIT AND CONTEXT

The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council is the Council most closely associated with the Department and its associated agencies. It is not, however, the only one. The Department's Presidency remit also extended to other Council formations including the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council in the context of progressing the equality agenda and the Competitiveness Council in the context of free movement issues. This article will focus on the JHA Council as the Council for which the Department had lead responsibility and the Council with which An Garda Síochána are most closely associated. The remit of the JHA Council extends to police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, immigration and asylum policy, Schengen related matters and customs cooperation.

Ireland's Presidency of the European Union came at a crucial time in the development of the Union. 2004 is a year of great significance for the Union with the accession of ten new Member States on 1 May 2004, the election of a new European Parliament, and the appointment of a new Commission. These were all key factors in shaping the broader context in which our Presidency was conducted.

2004 also has a special significance for the Union in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. That is because the Treaty of Amsterdam imposed a deadline of 1 May 2004 for the adoption of a range of specified matters directed to the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. 2004 also marks the end of the more ambitious five year programme agreed by the Tampere European Council which is also directed to that end. The Tampere Conclusions were further developed and elaborated on by subsequent European Councils in the period since 1999 and have also been built on, within the framework of the JHA

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Council, through the development of Action Plans and Work Programmes directed to specific aspects of those conclusions.

Responsibility for taking forward that programme rests with the JHA Council chaired for the duration of the Irish Presidency by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Mr Michael McDowell, T.D. The JHA Council is the pinnacle of a pyramid made up of working groups and EU bodies and agencies, dedicated to progressing the Tampere agenda. These include over twenty-five Council level working groups, including the senior level Article 36 Committee (CATS) and the Strategic Committee on Immigration Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), as well as bodies such as the Police Chiefs Task Force, Europol, Eurojust and CEPOL, the European Police College. Working groups reporting to the JHA Council also involved personnel from the Revenue Commissioners arising from its customs cooperation remit and the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government in the context of civil protection.

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PREPARING AND PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENCY

Planning for our EU Presidency had to take account of the scale of the challenge in servicing those Working Groups and Councils. Planning also had to focus on establishing the policy priorities for the Presidency against the background of the Treaty of Amsterdam imperatives and the requirement to take forward the broader Tampere agenda.

(A) INTERNAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION

That process got underway in the International Policy Division (IPD) of the Department in early 2002 and was quickly extended to the other Divisions and associated agencies. IPD remained responsible throughout the process for overall coordination and control of the Presidency. Preparing for the Presidency also involved creating structures within the Department, and between the Department and its agencies, to facilitate the necessary coordination as preparations for the Presidency were taken forward.

These included the establishment of a Central Presidency Planning Group (CPPG) within the Department in 2003 chaired by the International Policy Division and the establishment of Sectoral Presidency Planning Groups directed to specific policy areas. The Garda Sectoral Group, whose focus was the police cooperation agenda, was composed of members of the Department and An Garda Síochána. These groups made an important contribution to the administrative and policy planning processes.

In addition the Department participated in the relevant inter-departmental committees such as the Inter-Departmental Committee for Coordinating the Presidency and the Interdepartmental Administrative Planning Group as well as continuing to service the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on European Union Affairs, chaired by the Minister of State for European Affairs, Dick Roche T.D., and the Cabinet Committee on European Affairs chaired by the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, T.D.

The planning and preparation phase more generally involved a broad range of activities. Key issues which had to be settled and addressed as part of that process included:

- RAISING AWARENESS

During 2002 and 2003, IPD organised and/or participated in a number of Departmental seminars designed to raise awareness of the forthcoming Presidency and the demands it would create.

- BUDGETING

Budgetary provision to take account of the extra demands which would be placed on the Department had to be made and secured. These included the necessary provision for additional staff, travelling and Presidency associated events which would take place in Ireland. A Presidency budgetary provision of €3.02 million in 2003, and €4.12 million in 2004 was secured. IPD played an ongoing role in allocating these resources and monitoring expenditure.

- STAFFING

The Presidency budget made provision for additional staff for Presidency related duties. A total of forty-one additional temporary staff were assigned to Presidency duties from July 2003 onwards.

Those additional staff resources facilitated the establishment of a Presidency Logistics Unit within IPD with responsibility for running major Presidency events being hosted by the Department. The Presidency Logistics Unit worked closely with the Garda Liaison and Protection Section and Traffic Units for this purpose. The Department's staff in the Permanent Representation in Brussels were also significantly reinforced and additional staff were assigned to other Divisions in the Department where the Presidency workload was likely to be particularly heavy.

- CHAIRS AND DELEGATES

The nomination of Chairs and Delegates for the working groups was another important element in the planning process leading up to the Presidency. More than one hundred and twenty personnel from the Department and associated agencies were involved with the servicing of Council Working Parties. Members of An Garda Síochána were involved in chairing and/or representing Ireland in six of the Council Working Groups dealing with police cooperation, Schengen, and immigration matters. In addition, outside the framework of the Council itself, the Garda Commissioner, Noel Conroy and other senior officers chaired the Police Chiefs Task Force and the Management Boards of Europol and CEPOL.

- TRAINING

Training was arranged for those involved in the Presidency, including a number of dedicated courses provided by the Human Resources Development Service of the Department of Finance for persons chairing and representing Ireland at Working Group meetings. Those courses were attended by both the staff of the Department and members of An Garda Síochána.

- SCHEDULING MEETINGS

IPD also had responsibility for preparing and coordinating, in conjunction with the Permanent Representation, the Presidency calendar of meetings in the JHA sector. The scheduling of meetings had to take account of a number of factors – the overall Presidency demands on meeting rooms and interpretation teams, our policy priorities, the workload of the individual Working Groups, and the relationship of Working Groups to the Article 36 and Strategic Committee on Immigration Frontiers and Asylum Committees (SCIFA).

(B) POLICY PREPARATION

Policy preparation went hand in hand with the more practical planning associated with the Presidency. Much of any Presidency agenda is inherited. Policy priorities therefore had to be kept under review as finalisation of the Presidency programme ultimately depended on the progress made by the preceding Italian Presidency.

The policy planning process was informed at all stages by contacts with the institutions of the Union such as the Commission and Council Secretariat and with other Member States and the Accession States. Ministerial level meetings involving the Minister for Justice, Equality and

Law Reform were an important part of this structured engagement as were the contacts developed at official level in the framework of the working groups and by the Permanent Representation. Also feeding into the policy planning process was the work of the Central Presidency and Sectoral Planning Groups.

More generally, the overall policy framework was shaped by factors already adverted to in this article - the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere programme. That framework was further developed, in conjunction with succeeding Presidencies, by the preparation of a Multi Annual Strategic Programme of the Council covering the period 2004–2006³ and, in conjunction with the Netherlands Presidency, the 2004 Annual Operating Programme⁴.

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The Annual and Multi Annual programmes in turn provided the framework for the development of the Irish Presidency's own programme – Europeans Working Together⁵. Strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice was one of the four key objectives identified for the purpose of our Presidency. The areas on which we promised to focus our efforts to that end were

- the Treaty of Amsterdam imperatives which remained outstanding;
- taking forward work on the other related measures under the extended Tampere programme; and
- building on existing cooperation at EU level directed to the fight against drugs and organised crime and combating illegal immigration.

The programme elaborated on these core objectives by reference to the specific agenda pending in the immigration and asylum, police and judicial cooperation, customs cooperation and Schengen sectors. Working programmes were also subsequently developed for both the

3 Multiannual Strategic Programme of the Council 2004-2006: Doc. 15709/03, POLGEN 83, Brussels - 5 December 2003

4 Operational Programme of the Council for 2004: Doc. 16195/03, POLGEN 91, Brussels 19 December 2003

5 'European ... Working Together': Programme of the Irish Presidency of the European Union, January-June 2004. See pages 20-21 and 25-30. The Programme can be found on the Irish Presidency website at: http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/document_file.asp?id=1499

C E N T R E

Strategy and Strategy Maps

Strategy is one of the most commonly used terms in modern management. Whittington (2001) informs us that there are at least 41 books available on the Internet at Amazon.com related to strategy and strategic management. A strategy statement describes how an organisation can create sustained value for its stakeholders, customers and communities and many organisations support this with a strategy map to graphically illustrate to stakeholders the cause-effect relationships among the various components of their strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2004). Strategy Maps provide a useful mechanism for describing an organisation's strategy and also allow its objectives to be measured and evaluated. A strategy map is usually a one-page representation of the cause-effect linkages among the objectives of a strategic plan that may encompass its vision, targets, measures and initiatives.

The word strategy itself has a lengthy history and was traditionally used in the context of military warfare long before it became associated with the business world. Its origins can be traced to the

Greek word "strategos" which literally means the art of the general (Webster's Dictionary). The term was used in the context of planning military campaigns to describe the overall components of the plan of battle including troops, logistics, ordnance, cavalry, artillery etc. Much of modern strategy continues to utilise many of the principles that applied in ancient Greek times. Alexander The Great created a methodology of warfare that has been studied and replicated in strategic terms by diverse military leaders from Julius Caesar to Napoleon and more laterally Montgomery and Rommel and reportedly in modern times, by General's Norman Schwarzkopf and Tommy Franks (Bose, 2003). Business strategists such as Andrew Carnegie and J Pierpont Morgan were also influenced by his thinking and methods (Bose, 2003).

Strategy matters and may be even more important than leadership in the ultimate battle to sustain competitive advantage (Porter, 1980) in this ever more demanding world.

"the strategic aim of a business is to earn a return on capital, and if in any particular case the return in the long run is not satisfactory, the deficiency should be corrected or the activity abandoned" (Sloan, 1963:49 quoted in Whittington 2001).



Implementing Corporate Strategy



Fixed Charge Processing System (FCPS)



P O I N T

The strategy of Dell Computers is instructive, Dell build the computer their customers want at the time they want it, customise and ship it. They do not stock warehouses or retail shelves with pre-built models already out of fashion on the date of sale. This is what strategy is fundamentally about, delivering value to the customer, in this case a quality product when required.

While the context and environment for strategy within the public sector in many respects differs from that of private industry, many strategic imperatives common to private industry are now pervasive within the public sector. It is apparent nowadays that public sector organisations are being made more accountable for achieving value for money and return on investment similar to the private arena. What this means is that the importance of strategy, strategic thinking and strategy maps becomes apparent to all stakeholders within public organisations internal and external.

Strategy is central to how an organisation is managed, organised and how it delivers its service. Corporate Strategy is the concern of the corporate parent i.e. the levels of management above the business units (Johnson and Scholes, 2002) and is concerned with providing direction and leadership while setting objectives that sustain competitive advantage, inspire confidence and deliver value on

investment to all stakeholders.

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Peter Fitzgerald, Editor



Ireland's EU Presidency



*Repeat Victimisation
Photographs by Photography
Section, Garda H.Q.*

Article 36⁶ and SCIFA⁷ Committees and the Working Groups reporting to them on that basis.

Previous experience of the Presidency had shown that policy planning must also be capable of accommodating the unexpected. That, regrettably, was also to prove the case again with the horrendous Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 in which nearly two hundred persons were killed and over one thousand injured. Those bombings were the type of event which could not be anticipated but which required an immediate and determined response from the Union in which this Department and An Garda Síochána were centrally involved. The follow-up to the Madrid bombings was to increasingly move centre stage in the second half of the Irish Presidency of the JHA Council.

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DELIVERING THE PRESIDENCY

The planning and preparation phase ended on 1 January 2004 when Ireland assumed responsibility for the Presidency of the Council. The agenda was a full and complex one involving a range of legislative and non-legislative issues.

(A) PRESIDENCY FACTS AND FIGURES

The JHA Presidency was ultimately to involve six meetings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, including the extraordinary meeting of the Council on 19 March 2004 convened in response to the Madrid bomb attacks. The work of the JHA Council was prepared by more than 135 working group meetings involving approximately 165 meeting days. A further 40 meetings at the level of JHA Counsellors attached to the Permanent Representations of the Member States in Brussels also facilitated the work of the Council.

6 The "Article 36 Committee" (CATS) is a co-ordinating body, whose name derives from the corresponding article of the Treaty for European Union. That Article provides that the Committee shall consist of senior officials (in the Justice and Home Affairs area) and that in addition to its co-ordinating role it shall give opinions for the attention of the Council, either at the Council's request or on its own initiative. It shall also contribute to the preparation of the Council's discussions in the areas of police co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. The Committee's co-ordinating role involves organising the work of several Working Groups under its remit. It met monthly during the Irish Presidency. All meetings are held in the Council of the European Union in Brussels, except for a meeting held every semester, usually in the Member State holding the Presidency.

7 Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA): SCIFA is a core high-level EU working group that meets monthly. Its functions include: (i) consideration of matters/issues which cannot be resolved at the various working parties, in some cases it refers matters back to working parties for further examination by the particular group (ii) dealing with issues directly referred to it (iii) preparation of work for COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives). SCIFA was set up by COREPER, it is the link between the working parties and COREPER. Its main aim is to sort out the political and technical aspects of documents submitted. All meetings are held in the Council of the European Union in Brussels, except for a meeting held every semester, usually in the Member State holding the Presidency.

(B) OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENCY*Legislative Achievements*

Key legislative achievements of the Irish Presidency in the JHA sector included the adoption or achievement of political agreement on the following measures deriving from the Amsterdam Treaty requirements and Tampere programme :

- The Asylum Qualifications Directive;
- The Asylum Procedures Directive;
- The Victims of Crime Directive;
- The Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of Confiscation Orders; and
- The Regulation creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims.

Other legislative achievements included the agreement achieved on the Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, the Decision establishing the European Refugee Fund, the Regulation on the establishment of the European Border Management Agency, and the Regulation concerning the introduction of new functions for the Schengen Information System, including the fight against terrorism.

Madrid and its Aftermath

Terrorism, in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, moved to the forefront of the JHA Council agenda. The extraordinary JHA convened by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as President of the JHA Council, had a single item agenda – the fight against terrorism. The meeting of the Council, which was also attended by the Garda Commissioner in his capacity as Chairman of the Chiefs of Police Task Force, focused its work on a comprehensive and far-reaching Draft Declaration on Combating Terrorism, prepared by the Irish Presidency.

The Declaration, which was subsequently adopted by the European Council at its meeting on 25 March 2004 just two weeks after the Madrid atrocity, represents an important political restatement of the Union's priorities and a framework for a programme for future action at the level of the Union in combating terrorism.

Significant progress was also made between March and June in giving the Declaration effect. This required a coordinated effort involving the relevant Council Working Groups, the Chiefs of Police Task Force, and Europol among others. Key achievements in this respect included :

- JHA Council Conclusions on the follow-up to the Declaration on Combating Terrorism;
- Agreement on a revised EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism;
- The re-establishment of the Counter Terrorism Task Force in Europol and agreement on proposals for the establishment of an intelligence capacity on all aspects of the terrorist threat within the Council Secretariat;
- Adoption of the Chiefs of Police Task Force's Report on the Madrid bombing and their proposals for reinforcing their operational capacity; and
- The creation of the post of Counter Terrorism Coordinator within the Council Secretariat.

Police cooperation and crime

There have been other important outcomes of the Irish Presidency of the JHA Council in the context of police cooperation and crime, consistent with our focus on practical operational cooperation.

The Dublin Conference on the EU Drugs Strategy / The Way Forward led to the adoption of Council Conclusions on the follow-up to the Conference and a mandate to the incoming Netherlands Presidency from the European Council to prepare a new Drugs Strategy for the period 2005-2012. The outcome of the November 2003 Dublin Conference on Organised Crime was reviewed by the Informal JHA Council in January and led to the adoption of a Council Resolution on a model protocol for the establishment in Member States of partnerships between the public and private sectors to reduce harm from organised crime.

Other agreed measures included the finalisation of the handbook for cooperation in combating terrorism at the Olympic Games and other comparable events and the adoption of an associated Council Recommendation as well as Council Conclusions on police cooperation to combat football-related violence in advance of the recent European Championships.

Agreement was also achieved on Europol's Work Programme and Budget for 2005. The Europol / Eurojust Agreement was signed following JHA Council approval. Likewise agreement has been recorded on the European Police College's (CEPOL) Work Programme for 2005 at the July JHA Council meeting. Council Conclusions were adopted earlier on

CEPOL's Three Year Report and adoption of a Council Decision conferring legal personality on CEPOL, which had been tabled by Ireland arising from that report, is now imminent.

Schengen

Council Conclusions on the location, management and financing and Council conclusions on the functions of the new second generation Schengen Information System were adopted.

NON-JHA ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENCY

Reference has already been made to the fact that the Department's Presidency commitments extended to servicing the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council and the Competitiveness Council in the context of the equality and free movement agendas. This involved chairing and servicing a number of working groups within that framework of those Councils. Key achievements in those areas included agreement on the Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and family members to move and reside freely within the territory of Member States, the Decision on the Second Daphne 2 Programme as well as agreement on the establishment of a European Gender Institute endorsed by the European Council in June.

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CONCLUSION

The Irish Presidency took place at a critical juncture in the development of the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. The importance of that task was underlined by the tragic events in Madrid in March in respect of which it fell to the Presidency to coordinate the Union's response.

What has been achieved against that background is, I believe, considerable. Those achievements are themselves the result of the work, the professionalism and commitment shown by the large number of Gardaí and Department officials involved in the Presidency at all levels. They are therefore something in which all those involved in the Presidency can take pride.

The baton has now passed to the Netherlands Presidency and to them falls the task of developing the successor to the Tampere programme. That, and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on which agreement was also reached under the Irish Presidency, will in the coming years provide the framework for the further development of police cooperation and the development of the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice.



Inspector
Orla McPartlin

Ireland's EU Presidency and An Garda Síochána

Inspector Orla McPartlin

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INTRODUCTION

Ireland has now held the Presidency of the European Union on six occasions. During the recent Presidency which ran from 1st January to 30th June 2004, An Garda Síochána had a major task of policing all of the events and meetings that go with the Presidency as well as the addition to the Union of ten new member states on May 1st. These tasks would not have been successfully accomplished were it not for the extensive planning and preparation that took place in advance of the Presidency. In addition to the challenges presented by the requirement to police a huge number of events throughout Ireland An Garda Síochána also had to prepare for the Presidency from a policy perspective as representatives from the organisation represent Ireland at a multitude of Council Working Groups in the Justice and Home Affairs area or Third Pillar area, as it is commonly known. The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area has grown enormously since 1996 when Ireland last held the Presidency of the European Union and consequently the volume of work associated with it.

PREPARATION

Strategic and operational preparation for the Presidency of the European Union was a formidable task. Preparations began in 2002 with the expansion of the International Coordination Unit and the recruitment of extra staff to assist in the preparations for the Presidency period. This office was the central coordination office for all policy matters relating to the Presidency. A Presidency working group was established under the chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald with representatives from the relevant areas within the organisation. This group met on a regular basis from November 2002 until the end of the Presidency in June 2004. The remit of the group was two fold:

1. Policy issues - priority issues for the Gardai vis-à-vis those of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Government; Working groups and who will represent the Gardai and chair them during the Presidency
2. Security in relation to the Presidency meetings - equipment, funding, purchasing, personnel.

Liaison and Protection Section worked closely with Government Departments in planning the policing of the many meetings and events, which took place on nearly every day of the six months of the Presidency.

An EU Presidency Coordination Office was established to carry out the work in relation to this and to coordinate the security issues surrounding events. However, this article will concentrate on the issues arising for representatives of An Garda Síochána in their role as chairpersons or delegates at Council Working Groups in Brussels during the Irish Presidency.

Members of An Garda Síochána attend a number of Council Working Groups in Brussels as delegates and in some cases along with officials from Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. During 2003 a review took place of delegates to the various working groups. In some cases the number of personnel attending was increased to take account of the extra workload, which the Presidency would bring. Training courses were provided for those people who were chairing groups or attending as a delegate through the Civil Service Training Centre. The International Coordination Unit coordinated this training for all Garda personnel.

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The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform established Sectoral Groups so as to ensure a good flow of information in groups and areas of common interest between the Department and An Garda Síochána; identification of policy and priorities; coherence in policy and having structures in place to achieve this. This group met regularly for a number of months prior to the Presidency and continued to meet throughout the Presidency to ensure that any issues arising at the Working Groups were addressed.

COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS

The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform Mr. Michael McDowell indicated that he wanted to see a very practical Presidency in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. With this in mind officials from the Department and the Garda representatives at the various working groups worked closely together in the months preceding the Presidency in placing particular issues on the agenda for the working groups during the Irish Presidency. There were also predetermined agenda items, which had to be progressed in the working groups during the Presidency. The table below sets out the main working groups, which are attended by Garda representatives. There are a number of other groups at which members of An Garda Síochána are represented and which meet less regularly than those groups listed below.

TABLE 1 COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS

These groups sit on a continuous basis but during the Presidency were chaired by an Irish representative. In addition an Irish delegation attended these meetings and therefore for the duration of the Presidency the number of personnel involved in servicing these groups increased substantially.

COUNCIL WORKING GROUP	CHAIRPERSON DURING IRISH PRESIDENCY
Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime	Mr. Fergus O'Callaghan -JELR
Police Cooperation Working Party	Mr. Henry Mitchell - JELR
CEPOL	Assistant Commissioner Nacie Rice
External Borders Practitioners	Detective Chief Superintendent
Common Unit (CUEPB)	Martin Donnellan
CIREFI	Mr. Willie O'Dwyer - JELR
Frontiers	Mr. Peter Jones - JELR
Frontiers (False Documents)	Detective Superintendent Gerry Cadden
Migration & Expulsion Working Party	Mr. Noel Dowling - JELR
Visa Working Party	Mr. Billy Byrne - JELR
Terrorism Working Group	Detective Chief Superintendent Martin Callinan
Sis Sirene Working Group	Mr. Fergus O'Callaghan - JELR
Sis Tech Working Group	Superintendent Fintan. Fanning
Europol Management Board	Mr. Jimmy Martin - JELR

The Presidency is responsible for progressing various dossiers and introducing dossiers which the Presidency wishes to progress during its term of office. The aim of the Presidency is to obtain agreement among the working group and pass the dossier on through the Article 36¹ Committee to the Council of Ministers for agreement. In the case of European legislation the European Parliament has to give its approval and during the Irish Presidency the parliament only sat until the beginning of April as European elections were being held during Ireland's Presidency.

¹ The "Article 36 Committee" (CATS) is a co-ordinating body, whose name derives from the corresponding article of the Treaty for European Union. That Article provides that the Committee shall consist of senior officials (in the Justice and Home Affairs area) and that in addition to its co-ordinating role it shall give opinions for the attention of the Council, either at the Council's request or on its own initiative. It shall also contribute to the preparation of the Council's discussions in the areas of police co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. The Committee's co-ordinating role involves organising the work of several Working Groups under its remit. It met monthly during the Irish Presidency. All meetings are held in the Council of the European Union in Brussels, except for a meeting held every semester, usually in the Member State holding the Presidency.

As can be seen from the table Garda representatives chaired a number of the groups during the Presidency. This is an onerous task and involves meeting with the Commission and Council Secretariat prior to meetings to ensure that the agenda complies with protocols. The chairing of the groups is a challenging role, particularly as the membership of the Union increased during Ireland's Presidency from fifteen States to twenty five.

Since the theme of the Presidency in the JHA area was to be practical cooperation many of the dossiers progressed during the Presidency were concerned with projects carried out by An Garda Síochána. During 2003 when applying for funding under the AGIS² programme An Garda Síochána concentrated on issues that were identified by the Department for the Presidency programme. At the Police Cooperation Working Party the recommendations resulting from two AGIS projects were presented to the working group and were agreed by the group and forwarded through the Article 36 Committee to the Council of Ministers. The first project which dealt with cocaine use in urban areas was entitled "Building a knowledge-sharing based strategy to prevent and reduce drug related crime and other social problems, particularly in relation to the increasing phenomenon of the misuse of cocaine in urban areas" The second project which followed on from previous work in this area by An Garda Síochána dealt with Joint Investigation Teams and was entitled " Joint Investigation Teams - an evaluation of enabling legislation and identification of obstacles to co-operation between law enforcement services in the area of combating organised crime". In addition to introducing new dossiers at working groups the Presidency has to carry forward existing agenda items from previous Presidencies. Work progressed on cooperation between law enforcement at major sporting events; with the European Football Championships and the Olympic Games taking place during 2004 in member states this was an important issue.

In the various working groups on Immigration issues progress was made during the Irish Presidency and particularly in the fight against illegal immigration. The Terrorism Working Group under the Irish Presidency produced a handbook on Terrorism for use by law enforcement agencies during the Olympic Games.

As a result of the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11 2004 the Irish Presidency had to respond immediately and a Declaration on

² AGIS – named after a king of ancient Sparta, AGIS is a framework programme to help police, the judiciary and professionals from the EU member states and candidate countries co-operate in criminal matters and in the fight against crime.

Combating Terrorism was adopted at a meeting of the European Council at the end of March. This declaration impacted on the work of some of the groups and in particular on the Terrorism Working Group, the Chiefs of Police Task Force and the Counter Terrorism Group, the latter two groups meetings were hosted by An Garda Síochána in Ireland.

The European Council mandated the European Chiefs of Police Task Force, in the context of measures to reinforce operational cooperation and the role of the Task Force in coordinating operational measures in response to and prevention of terrorist acts, to undertake two key tasks:

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- review how its operational capacity can be reinforced and to focus on proactive intelligence;
- drawing up, with the assistance of experts from intelligence services and Europol, a report on the terrorist attacks on Madrid.

A sub committee was established by the chairman of the Task Force and was approved by the members at an extraordinary meeting of the Task Force in Brussels in May. The Irish Presidency also presented proposals to the group on how its operational capacity could be reinforced. This proposal is now being progressed by the Dutch Presidency and should be concluded by year end.

MEETINGS IN IRELAND

As well as chairing and attending as delegates at Council Working Group meetings in Brussels during the Presidency An Garda Síochána also hosted a number of meetings of police groups during the six months. The Commissioner, Mr. Noel Conroy hosted the meeting of the Chiefs of Police Task Force and indeed as a result of the Madrid bombing hosted an extraordinary meeting of the group in Brussels. This involved significant challenges for An Garda Síochána as agreement of the twenty five Chiefs of Police had to be achieved by the Irish Presidency. The Counter Terrorism Group met on three occasions in Ireland also.

Nine meetings of CEPOL (European Police College) were hosted in Ireland during the Presidency with the Governing Board and various other committees of CEPOL meeting to discuss issues and progress police training throughout the EU.

An Garda Síochána also hosted a meeting of the Heads of Sirene (Schengen Information System) in Ireland. All of these meetings were successful and consensus was reached on a number of issues on the day.

TABLE 2 MEETINGS HOSTED BY AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA DURING IRELAND'S PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

GROUP	DATE	LOCATION
European Chiefs of Police Task Force	22/23 March 2004	Dublin
European Chiefs of Police Task Force (Extraordinary Meeting)	10 May 2004	Brussels
Heads of Sirene ³ - Informal meeting	28/30 May 2004	Naas
CEPOL - Finance & Budget	13/14 Jan 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Management of Learning Committee	28/29 Jan 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - External Relations	29/30 Jan 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Governing Board Meeting	24/25 Feb 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Finance & Budget	23/24 March 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Finance & Budget	20/21 April 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Research & Science	10 May 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Governing Board Meeting	11/12 May 2004	Dublin
CEPOL - Coordination Group on Strategy	21/22 June 2004	Dublin
CTG ⁴ -	4/5 March 2004	Dublin
CTG	22 March 2004	Dublin
CTG	10/11 June 2004	Dublin

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CONCLUSION

This article has dealt solely with the policy issues associated with the Presidency of the EU. It has not touched upon the logistical issues that An Garda Síochána had to deal with in respect of policing all of the meetings held in Ireland during the Presidency and particularly the May 1st events with the ten new Member States joining the Union.

It was a challenging six months and all of those who were directly involved in the Council Working Groups or at meetings will be satisfied that despite the challenges posed during the six months, Ireland and An Garda Síochána hosted a successful Presidency and once again demonstrated their ability to all of Europe.

³ Schengen Information System - Sirene is the name of the national Schengen office in each member state

⁴ Counter Terrorism Group



Dr. Kiran Sarma

Crime after crime: Repeat victimisation and policing in Ireland

Dr. Kiran Sarma

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INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1980s police forces across Europe, North America and Australia have come to realise that one of the most important tasks of strategic crime management is coming to grips with the phenomenon of repeat victimisation (RV). In essence the term repeat victimisation refers to the tendency for crime to occur in hot spots where a small number of prolific criminals are active, and where their attention is directed at a relatively small number of individuals or properties who tend to be victimised repeatedly. The importance of addressing repeat victimisation for police management is that in directing police resources towards these hot spots, efforts are channeled into those areas of the community where offenders are most active and victims are most vulnerable. In practice this involves identification of repeat victims and providing them with a specialised response that includes specific crime prevention advice. Research conducted in the UK suggests that such an approach can bring about dramatic reductions in overall levels of crime reported to the police. In this case the Garda Commissioner, Mr. Noel Conroy, through the Annual Policing Plan, has directed that the Garda Research Unit examine the extent and nature of RV in Ireland and the potential for using PULSE to identify repeat victims.

PSYCHOLOGY AND REPEAT VICTIMISATION

RV is the product of a number of psychological mechanisms that underpin both offender motivations and victim behaviour. Simply put, offenders tend to be drawn towards those within their active environments who are most easily victimised and who are perceived to be the source of some valuable gain. The flip side of this coin is that such victims tend to have a demographic profile or lifestyle characteristics, including a lack of awareness of basic crime prevention strategies, which render them vulnerable to victimisation.

The offender psychology underpinning repeat victimisation is best represented by two theories of offender decision-making – Deterrence Theory and Rational Choice Theory. Deterrence Theory postulates that offenders decide whom and what to victimise based on the extent and nature of negative outcomes that they associate with each target (see for example Willmer, 1970; Jensen, 1975; Gibbs, 1975; Wilson, 1996).

More specifically, it is believed that offenders make such risk assessments based on the probability of being apprehended (*certainty of punishment*), *severity of punishment* expected if they are and the time-lapse expected between committal of offence and imposing of punishment (*celerity of punishment*). The most obvious illustration of Deterrence Theory at work is the Fixed Charge Processing System (FCPS) that runs in tandem with unmanned fixed speed detection systems. For drivers, the system involves certain capture and severe and fast punishment and tends to be hugely influential as a deterrent. Outside fixed camera environs, interestingly, certainty of punishment is much less marked, and thus the impact of the FCPS is less visible.

In terms of repeat victimisation, Deterrence Theory states that offenders will be drawn towards those victims who are active in environments with which the offender is familiar, are most vulnerable or least well protected, least likely to report victimisation, and are least likely to be aware they were victimised. In practice a very small proportion of the population will not present any risk or deterrent cues and will therefore be chosen victims repeatedly by the same or different offenders.

A second theory of offender decision making that helps understand the psychological dynamic underpinning repeat victimisation is Rational Choice. Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is similar to Deterrence Theory but rather than just focusing on the negative aspects of any given target, it also addresses the potential gains that it offers the offender. Simply put, RCT predicts that an offender presented with a variety of different targets will select that target that presents the lowest risk and the highest gains (see Ainsworth, 2000; Akers, 1999; Robinson & Robinson, 1997).

Taylor and Nee (1988) conducted an often-cited study that illustrated that offenders think about targets in a very rational way, and make choices based on risk/gain attributions. The researchers asked a cohort of prisoners convicted of house burglaries, to move through a simulated environment that had been created using a series of slides. The environment contained a series of detached and terraced houses and subjects were provided with a navigational device that allowed them progress around the virtual space and inspect the various premises present. They were encouraged to articulate their thoughts on each target as they did so, and then make a judgement as to which they would target and those they would not. The research illustrated the veracity of RCT, with offenders choosing to target the premises that presented the best balance of gain cues and least chance of capture or discovery.

One criticism often levelled at RCT is that it tells us nothing new about offender decision-making. The reality is that this is largely true. What RCT does provide, however, is a simple framework against which systematic crime prevention can be attempted. For instance, it is the central psychological theory underpinning terrorism-prevention, where potential targets are graded based on the gains (propagandistic, symbolic, military, financial etc) and risks (capture, failure etc) each pose for the terrorist. Based on a weighting matrix, then, a list of potential targets can be ranked from highest risk to lowest and resources allocated accordingly.

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In terms of repeat victimisation, RCT suggests that a small number of victims are repeatedly victimised because offenders see them as being low risk and high gain in contrast to other potential targets in their operational environment. This rational selection of targets means that offenders are naturally drawn to the same target on multiple occasions. The task for the crime prevention officer, in such a case, is to adjust the perceptual cues presented by the target so that its associated risks are higher and gains lower and is thus deselected by the offender in favour of a softer and more valuable target.

Finally, in addition to looking at repeat victimisation as being the product of offender decision making processes, it has been linked to the wider relationship between the victim, offender and 'guardians' such as the police. This perspective, widely referred to as Routine Activities Theory, acknowledges that those who live in high-crime environments (with motivated offenders), fail to take steps to ensure their personal/home security, repeatedly engage in high risk behaviours or attract the attention of offenders through the display of high-value possessions, are naturally going to be chosen for victimisation by either the same offender on multiple occasions, or multiple offenders over a period of time. The probability of being victimised is further increased in the absence of some form of capable guardian – such as the police or a household member capable of deterring offenders (Akers, 1999).

The usefulness of Routine Activities Theory in understanding victimisation in general, and repeat victimisation in particular, has been affirmed in a number of studies. Sherman et al (1989), for instance, examined clusters of crime reported in Minneapolis and concluded that crime was occurring in just 3 percent of the city's communities and that these communities tended to be characterised by proximity between victims and offenders (i.e. shared space) and an absence of guardians.

In reality, of course, repeat victimisation arises from an interplay of both offender decision making and victim behaviour and as such is best

conceptualised using an interplay of all three theories.

WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF REPEAT VICTIMISATION

International research has consistently shown that as much as 40 percent of all crime is experienced by less than five percent of the population (Farrell and Pease, 1993) and accounts for a considerable proportion of all domestic burglaries, racial incidents, domestic violence, child sexual and physical abuse, car crime, property crime, public disorder, retail crime and credit card fraud (Shaw and Pease, 2000; Forrester et al 1988; Sampson and Phillips, 1992; Hanmer and Stanko, 1985; Mayhew, Aye Maung and Mirrlees-Black, 1993; Watson, 2000; Farrell, Phillips and Pease, 1995; Shaw and Pease, 2000).

A recent examination of RV in Scotland (Shaw and Pease, 2000) found that approximately 3 to 4 percent of households experience between 35 and 40 percent of all property crime and that on average each victim experienced 1.72 incidents in a 12-month period. Just .3 percent of the population experienced 9 percent of all motor theft and .5 percent of victims, 20 percent of all thefts from vehicles. Examining trends from surveys conducted in 1982, 1988, 1992 and 1996, the researchers found that RV was a growing problem with 1 percent of the population experiencing 17 percent of all personal crimes in 1982 and 40 percent of all personal crimes in 1996.

An overview of the extent of repeat victimisation in Ireland was provided by the Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2002, which employed a sample of 10,000 respondents, 1290 (12.5%) of whom reported that they or a member of their household had been a crime victim in the 12 months preceding the surveys administration (see Sarma, 2003). Each victim (i.e. 'household' victim) experienced 1.44 incidents, which is largely in line with findings from research conducted abroad. Of households victimised, 70 percent experienced just one incident, 16 percent were victimised twice and the remainder were three (6%) four (3%) or more (4%) times.

Of all households burgled, 14 percent reported experiencing multiple incidents with 10 percent victimised twice and a further 4 percent on three occasions or more. Together these repeat victims (.46% of the total sample) suffered 30 percent of all burglaries reported in the survey. Results were even more notable for burglaries of business premises with 28 percent of victims targeted more than once and accounting for 52 percent of all incidents reported.

Similar trends were evident for vehicle crimes. Twenty-one percent of those who reported theft of their car or vehicle stated that this had occurred more than once and 22 percent of those who suffered criminal damage had multiple experiences. Repeat victimisation was also evident for criminal damage to property, personal theft and physical assault (see Table 1).¹

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF REPEAT VICTIMISATION DATA FROM THE GARDA PUBLIC ATTITUDES SURVEY.

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	Prevalence ²	Incidence	Concentration	Of all crimes reported	
				Repeats	
	n.	n.	n	%	%
All victims of C rimes	1290	1853	1.44	30.4	-
Burglary of Home or out buildings	344	422	1.19	18.5	29.5
Burglary of Business premises	56	83	1.43	32.5	5.0
Theft of Vehicle	132	154	1.12	14.3	11.7
Theft from Vehicle	118	141	1.11	16.3	10.8
Theft of Bicycle	36	47	1.18	23.4	3.4
Criminal Damage to vehicle	229	332	1.39	31.0	20.0
Criminal Damage to Home/other property	85	126	1.42	32.5	7.6
Robbery involving force/threat of force	51	54	0.95	5.6	5.0
Theft from person without force	107	138	1.20	22.5	10.0
Theft from home other than Burglary	27	30	0.86	10.0	3.0
Consumer Fraud	27	28	1.04	3.6	2.3
Physical Assault	150	167	1.08	10.2	13.2
Sexual Assault	6	6	1.00	0.0	0.6
Domestic Violence	12	29	2.23	58.6	1.1
Other	43	96	1.60	55.2	5.1

Taken from Sarma, K. (2003). Repeat Victimisation in Ireland, *Irish Journal of Psychology*, 24(3-4), pp. 87-117.

¹ These and other results are examined in some detail in Sarma, K. (2003). Repeat victimisation in Ireland, *Irish Journal of Psychology*, 24, pp. 87-117.

² Prevalence of victimisation is the total number of respondents who stated that they had such an experience. The incidence of victimisation is the total number of victimisations recorded. The concentration of victimisation is the number of victimisations per victims (incidence/prevalence).

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ADDRESS RV?

Pilot initiatives aimed at reducing repeat victimisation have reported considerable success. Hanmer, Griffiths and Jerwood (1999), for example, worked with police in Leeds in addressing repeat incidents of domestic violence. When first reported, police implemented a Level 1 response which included formally warning the offender and inclusion of the victim in a policing protection and monitoring decision. On receiving notification of a repeat incident, police issued a warning to the offender, created a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) file and organised for a crime prevention officer to call to the victims home to offer advice. Finally, subsequent incidents led to formal contact with the CPS, increased surveillance of the offender, visits by a domestic violence specialist to the victim's home and installation of a panic alarm. Using this three tiered intervention system that allowed for more assertive and energetic responses with each additional victimisation, the researchers recorded decreases in overall victimisation and repeat victimisation. Moreover, they reported an increase in time interval between initial and subsequent reports, an enhanced ability to identify chronic offenders, improved community-police relationships, the promotion of the police service, the engendering of victim-support networks and streamlining of both police and inter-agency responses.

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Chenery, Holt and Pease (1997) examined the effects of crime prevention strategies in minimising repeat burglary and vehicle crime in Huddersfield, the largest division of the West Yorkshire Police Force. Police officers attended training sessions of approximately 2 hours duration at which they received information on repeat victimisation and the procedure to be followed for the duration of the research.

Police officers attending the scene of an incident enquired as to the number of past victimisations (if any) experienced by the victim and determined the appropriate response based on the information supplied. As with the aforementioned study, police response could occur on three levels. A Bronze-level response was implemented for victims with no experience of past victimisation. For burglaries, for instance, victims were provided with an Ultra Violet Pen, discount vouchers for security equipment and crime prevention advice. For repeat victims, a Silver or Gold response was implemented. A Silver response, in addition to all facets included in the Bronze response, involved a visit from a Crime Prevention specialist, installation of a monitored alarm, bi-weekly visits under the Police Watch Scheme and loan of security equipment. A Gold response included all aspects of the Bronze and Silver ones, installation of

high-tech equipment (covert cameras and alarms) and daily visits under the Police Watch Scheme. A similar graded response was implemented for vehicle crimes. Over the duration of the project, domestic burglary declined by 30 percent and theft from cars by 20 percent. No evidence of crime displacement emerged and victim satisfaction levels were higher than enjoyed by other sections of the police force.

These studies illustrate the potential value of crime prevention programs that are designed specifically to address repeat victimisation and it stands to reason that similar programmes, dealing with a wider range of crime-types, should lead to noticeable reductions in crime counts.

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The central problem with this assertion is that is exceedingly difficult to move from the kinds of controlled pilot initiatives implemented in Leeds, to the widespread rollout of such schemes. On one level, and a core problem faced by police management, is that the kind of resources required are rarely at their disposal, involving large dedicated units of highly trained individuals with access to millions of euro worth of equipment for target hardening.

On a more fundamental level, however, we must also question our ability to identify repeat victims. The reality is that many crimes go un-reported to the police, a problem that is exacerbated when dealing with repeat victimisation. Farrell and Pease (1993) provide an excellent conceptual illustration of the situation in the context of domestic burglaries.

A burglary has roughly a 70% chance of featuring in police statistics. This means that the chance that they have both [in the case of a repeat event] been recorded is 0.49 or 49% (that is 0.7×0.7). This means that 49% of household that have been burgled twice will appear twice in police records. 9% will appear never to have been burgled, and 42% ($(0.7 \times 0.3) + (0.3 \times 0.7)$) will appear to have been burgled once... (Farrell and Pease, 1993, pp. 16-17).

Both barriers to responding to repeat victimisation are present in an Irish context. Based on lessons learned from abroad, it would simply be impossible to offer specific crime prevention advice to all repeat victims, across crime categories, using existing resources and would require a huge investment in the Crime Prevention Officer (CPO) role involving increased man-power, training and access to crime prevention devices.

While PULSE will help identify repeat victims, it must be acknowledged that, as with all police systems, it will under represent the true extent of victimisation and as such many of those in need of crime prevention advice will simply not be ‘captured’ in the data.

So what can be done? First, despite the limitations of police records, PULSE is capable of identifying repeat victims. Currently the system cannot perform this task through the interactive interface, but Information Analysis Section, Garda Headquarters, can generate lists of probable repeat victims through the use of sophisticated computer codes/syntax. Alternatively, the option of building an automated RV identification option into the existing PULSE architecture could be explored.

Once a list of repeat victims has been compiled, Crime Prevention Officers or other designated members of the Gardaí can then trawl through the list of repeat victims and prioritise those most likely to benefit from crime prevention advice – a task that inevitably involves balancing victim’s needs with access to resources.

An alternative to this system, and one that may offer valuable short-term goals, is to empower victims to approach the Gardaí if they consider themselves at risk of further victimisation or if they were victims of a crime in the past that they did not report to the authorities. One way this could be attained is through automated post-victimisation letters that can be generated through PULSE (the initial contact letter or crime investigation up-date letter). Contact details of Crime Prevention Officers, information on simple crime prevention measures and pleas to approach the Gardaí if the incident is a repeat or if further victimisation is feared/expected could be included with these documents. The forte of this approach is that all victims are treated as being vulnerable to repeat incidents and thus ensures that basic preventative steps can be initiated at the earliest possible stage, and by victims themselves.

A third way of approaching repeat victimisation is to think of ‘the community’ as being a potential victim. Most academic literature to date considers repeat victimisation as a phenomenon affecting individuals and objects. For police forces, however, identifying communities where the concentration of victimisation is high (i.e. crime ‘hot-spots’) automatically brings them into contact with repeat victims and chronic offenders. For police management the most effective way of identifying these hot spots is through Geographical Information Systems (GIS) that

allow the geo-coding of incidents and result in pictorial representations of crime. In conjunction with accurate recording of location by members responding to incidents, this software would provide managers with a spatial overview of where crime is occurring in their areas, both across and within crime types. Once hot spots are identified, police resources can be reallocated to those areas and residents targeted with educational material detailing preventative measures.

42 Ideally, of course, all three approaches to responding to repeat victimisation should be employed with managers tasking resources to crime hot-spots and CPOs visiting repeat victims identified through PULSE and self-referrals. The entire response could be enhanced through effective reciprocal referral systems with victim support groups – a holistic strategy that represents the best approach to dealing with repeat victimisation and that has not, to date, been employed in any policing context.

Research currently being undertaken by the Garda Research Unit is exploratory in nature and has been designed with a view to informing later policy decisions in the area. The Garda Public Attitudes Survey, the results of which were outlined earlier, illustrated that repeat victimisation is a prevalent feature of the crime environment in Ireland and one that needs to be addressed by the Gardai. Subsequent to this research, we have undertaken a pilot project in Galway West Garda Division. Using PULSE records for all burglaries and assaults in the Division, we are examining the system's usefulness in identifying repeat victims and considering who best to respond to such victims when identified.

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