

C E N T R E

The Emerging Accountability Framework

It is acknowledged that accountability is a 'central component of democratic governance of policing' (Jones, 2003:605). The three distinct elements of police accountability comprise judicial review of the legality of police actions in terms of compliance with legal or procedural rules; accountability in determining resource allocation when faced with competing legitimate police duties; and, performance management of police activities to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. The Garda Síochána Act 2005 presents a framework which, inter alia, places existing practices (strategy and planning) on a statutory basis and introduces new entities to enhance the accountability of the policing service in Ireland (Garda Síochána Inspectorate and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, for example).

The first two articles in this edition of *Communique* feature just two elements of a wider internal change programme to create a systems-based approach to ensuring an effective, efficient, open and transparent Garda Service for people in Ireland. The tangible evidence of progress includes the appointment of a Deputy Garda Commissioner with responsibility for coordinating and driving the transformation effort in the Garda organisation. The remit incorporates

strategy development, the management of change, and setting and maintaining professional standards.

Other tangible progress indicators include the introduction of enhanced corporate governance measures and a focus on professional training and education to the highest standards. The Garda Síochána Act, 2005, appointed the Garda Commissioner as Accounting Officer for the organisation. He is supported in this role by the Garda Síochána Audit Committee to ensure best value is achieved in the delivery of Garda services. The Garda Commissioner is subject to a number of additional accountability measures which mandate the production of an annual report, and the submission of a three-year review report to the Minister of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. A focus on continuous improvement in the areas of management, operations, and administration is maintained by the activities of the Garda Professional Standards Unit. Its accountability is enhanced by the Commissioner's annual report of their activities to the Minister.

Significant and sustained corporate commitment to training is realised through primary level degree



A Time for Change



The Role of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission and the Garda Síochána

P O I N T

Framework of the Garda Síochána

training in policing studies for entrants to the Garda organisation and in police management for mid-management level officers. In September 2006 the Garda Executive Leadership Programme was launched to provide development opportunities for officers preparing for Commissioner-level roles. The quality of this training enhances the Garda capability to meet our accountability requirements and serves as the engine to implement and sustain the desired level of change in the Garda organisation.

In addition, to vocational and developmental training interventions, considerable effort is devoted to enhancing the quality of how our duties to the public are discharged. A new Code of Ethics is being devised and the Garda Commissioner's Human Rights Action Plan is being progressed under the supervision of a strategic advisory committee which comprises not just senior members of the Garda Síochána but perhaps in the context of accountability, representatives of important organisations such as Amnesty International (Ireland), the Equality Authority, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Irish Human Rights Commission.

Whereas many of the developments are the product of legislation or recommendations of reports of

Tribunals of Inquiry, the success of their implementation rests with the officers and membership of the Garda Síochána. The challenge for Garda leaders is to initiate and sustain the journey to enhanced professionalism based on excellent and accountable internal governance models. The developments and innovations under way in the Garda organisation are evidence of our commitment towards realising our goal of developing the Garda Síochána into a world-class organisation which ensures that we have 'excellent people delivering policing excellence' on behalf of all the people in Ireland.

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Gangland Murders and Drug Related Violence in Ireland



Embedding the Diversity Agenda into Management Culture

effective response to a specified crime problem, a thorough understanding of the factors that contribute to said crime is necessary; ignoring or overlooking these factors can only diminish the efficiency of a response. Truly understanding the problem by taking into account all causal factors will assist in framing local “analysis questions, determine good effectiveness measures, recognise key intervention points, and select appropriate responses” (Braga, 04, p 3). Assessing and identifying the ‘target category’ of behaviour to be addressed is crucial to the implementation of an efficient response (Kennedy, 1998, p 4). In turn, in order to properly identify and assess the behaviour, specificity is critical. Fully assessing a local problem can be assisted by clearly understanding all players, including the victims, the offenders, the gangs, groups and alliances, and the factors associated with individual crimes, such as locations, times and dates.

Serious criminal offenders are well known to the police and other criminal justice agencies. This knowledge assists in building a detailed portfolio on individuals and their respective gangs and alliances, which in turn assists in understanding the problem at hand. Braga (2004) notes that research confirms that there is a high degree of overlap between victim and offending populations, and that understanding these relationships can assist in comprehending the reasons behind many incidents. The knowledge and understanding of the problem in question, must be evidence based and not driven by misconceptions or preconceived ideas.

For over a decade, a relatively new approach to violent crime has had proven success in addressing issues of gang and drug related violence, as well as issues related to drug sale and supply (Kennedy, 2006). Boston was the location of the first and most well known of this approach, where in 1996 an effective strategy was designed in response to an increase in gang related violence² (Kennedy, 2006). This strategy, which has been referred to as the ‘Boston Miracle’, due to its effectiveness, has been replicated to differing degrees and with various levels of success in other jurisdictions.

The strategy relies heavily on partnership and direct communications between legitimate organisations, including law enforcement, social services, community figures/groups and violent groups and individuals. This partnership relies on the sentiment that, all involved parties will no longer tolerate the specified crime; it articulates the community’s new shared norms of denouncing violence and its desire to offer services and alternatives to persons concerned. Such approaches are neither classic enforcement nor classic prevention. They have been underpinned with a ‘problem oriented policing approach’, which offers an alternative

2 This also included drug crews and other sets, even if the label ‘gang’ was not strictly applicable.

perspective from which to view and possibly address many current-policing concerns. Problem oriented policing can assist in better understanding problems at hand and help to frame strategic responses to identified problems. An approach such as this includes problem identification, analysis, response, evaluation and adjustment of the response to the unique issue and circumstances at hand (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001).

One of the key elements of these strategies is often referred to as ‘Pulling Levers’, which is a focused deterrence strategy that attempts to ensure that offenders believe that their actions will trigger severe consequences. Traditional approaches to policing have been unable to achieve a strong deterrent effect, with many of them based solely on increased sanctions. This is slightly out of tune with current research, which suggests that, the certainty and swiftness of sanctions is more effective than the severity (Kennedy, 1996). Successful strategies within the United States, which relied on this comprehensive approach to sanctions, have yielded the following results: reduced crime, reduced exercise of state power, reduced incarceration, and strengthened relationships between law enforcement and communities. In addition, they have helped offenders and have made strides in addressing racial conflicts; surprisingly however, they have generally required little or no additional resources (Kennedy, 2006).

Where such strategies have been implemented, with low levels of actual enforcement and enthusiastic support of affected communities, rapid decreases in serious crime have been observed. In Boston the reduction in youth homicide was nearly 63%, with an overall city-wide reduction of 50%; a recent version of the strategy implemented with respect to gun offenders in Chicago reduced homicide in target neighbourhoods by 37%. A similar strategy aimed at addressing open-air drug markets proved equally effective at shutting down these local markets (Kennedy, 2006).

Although these strategies incorporate relatively low levels of enforcement, they do necessitate high levels of focused activity; setting and maintaining clear standards, as opposed to large numbers of arrests and crackdowns, achieves this requirement. Other beneficial effects associated with these strategies include; communities usually welcome them, complaints against law enforcement typically fall, communities and families regain a voice and are able to express it in a safe setting; they are free to broadcast their intolerance to the violence and crime in their area. In addition, a strategy such as this offers many gang members an “honourable exit” from such activity (Kennedy, 2006). As the gangs lose their power in the communities, the communities become safer and any previous appeal of gang membership is greatly diminished.

These strategies have been particularly successful with small local gangs, Chicago style gangs, Structured gangs, such as the west coast Norteno/Surreno gangs and Asian gangs. However, despite the wide success experienced by such strategies, some attempts have experienced difficulties. In Boston, for example, they have let effective interventions deteriorate, which highlights the need for institutionalisation and sustainability of responses. Boston has pledged its commitment to re-implementing Operation Ceasefire, in response to rising homicide rates. Although there has been wide success experienced with this, and the utility of the approach is widely accepted, academic debate still continues about how successful such strategies actually are in the long term. More research is therefore required in other jurisdictions. Currently, the United States are examining the possibility of developing this strategy into a national framework, as result of the successes experienced (Kennedy, 2007).

CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AN EFFICIENT STRATEGY

The following, as outlined by Braga (2004) provides an outline of factors that should be incorporated into the design of an effective strategy designed to respond to a specific crime or problem. The key to developing a strong foundation is to tailor the strategy to local concerns about a specific ‘target category’ of behaviour, which has been previously identified and undergone reliable analysis. Factors which are associated with an efficient strategy that have proven to be effective include:

1. Choosing a relatively specific crime problem to be addressed, such as “gang violence” or “disruptive drug activity”;
2. Identifying the high-rate offender networks at the heart of the problem;
3. Implementing a clearly effective “demonstration” operation against one network that can subsequently be “marketed to other networks. This could involve, for example, a special law enforcement operation to entirely eliminate, or otherwise sanction, a selected network.
4. Direct communication to other networks that the target offence – for example, gun violence – will bring similar enforcement attention to them. A carefully crafted message – for example, that the next gang in town that kills someone will be dismantled – can restrict the law enforcement workload to manageable levels and, when repeated after each such operation, effectively deter all networks in a jurisdiction.
5. Adding offers of social service assistance, and of community standards against the target offence, to the direct communication to offenders.

- i. **Enlisting Community Service**

Communities cannot be expected to automatically support police operations, as they often perceive them (whether rightly or wrongly) as indiscriminate. Therefore, it is important to engage in conversation with communities about legitimate and illegitimate means of crime control.
- ii. **Convening an Interagency Working Group**

Traditionally, agencies and even units within agencies have worked largely independent of one another; therefore there is a need to draw together these valuable resources into a working group who have decision-making power, in order to enable a 360-degree view of the issues at hand. Such a group should include community groups (state or voluntary), sports clubs, social services, probation services, police, etc.
- iii. **Placing Responsibility on the Working Group**

This ensures the working group, as a whole remains focused on the primary goal of reducing the specified crime. Communities must understand that the police alone cannot deal with the issue of crime; therefore, the responsibility to address it lies with many.
- iv. **Involving Researchers**

As this is not, by necessity, a controlled experiment, detailed evaluation and measurement is critical to success. Measuring allows evaluators to determine to what degree one has achieved the identified goals, and alternatively how responses can be modified if the strategy is not producing the desired results. Academic researchers can assist not only in this but also in providing reliable data to help in understanding the problem, in testing different perspectives, in advising interventions and in maintaining a focused performance. Researchers' greatest assistance is often in structuring an analysis of the problem, for example identifying offenders' networks and their dynamics – very practical issues.
- v. **Developing an Effective Communication Strategy**

Communication within the working group is critical; genuine partnership is paramount between agencies and individuals. In conjunction with enforcement, the desired message must be communicated to the targeted groups; this message must be explicit and direct, to ensure that the targeted individuals/gangs understand that violence will no longer be tolerated and every possible lever will be pulled if it occurs. This message needs to be reiterated uniformly on the street by all agencies, showing that they all are working together with a unified goal.

vi. Targeted Intervention

The individual, groups and alliances select themselves for intervention by engaging in violent crime. If offenders heed the warnings and desist, they will not be targeted, however, if they continue to engage, they and others around them will be targeted with swift and certain response.

vii. Sending the Initial Message

Police and probation services need to react with an increased presence, in order to show that they have the capacity and backing to act if and when violent crime occurs; this reiterates the message of intolerance. Other agencies need to be reinforcing this message through their services and support. This message can be delivered on the street, on fliers, through community meetings, etc; again, regardless of deliver method used, they need to be direct and explicit.

viii. Pulling all Available Enforcement Levers

The working group should identify a variety of enforcement actions, ranging from conducting probation and parole checks, implementing community release programmes, enforcement of disorder laws, imprisonment, etc. This helps to use the illegal activity of the targeted population against themselves.

ix. Continuing Communication

It is critical to continually deliver the message to the targeted population, demonstrating both cause and effect to all concerned. The message can be reinforced and reiterated by enlisting direct community support, training key partners to deal with people respectfully, increasing gun seizures (which also assists in protecting at-risk populations), and increasing contact with offenders, etc.

x. Providing Social Services and Opportunities

Efficient delivery of the message and swift responses to infractions are irrelevant if the offenders concerned have no access to alternatives. Therefore, social services, educational authorities, employment and training agencies, etc. must come on board and be in a position to assist those who refrain from crime.

EXAMPLES OF STRATEGIES

BOSTON GUN PROJECT'S OPERATION CEASEFIRE

As briefly mentioned above, the Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing initiative. It incorporated the involvement of multiple agencies and the community. The Boston Gun Project applied the principles of problem oriented policing to this public safety issue. The project, funded by the National Institute of Justice, aimed to address a serious, large-scale crime problem in Boston, namely homicide victimisation among youths (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001).

The Project included the following –

- An interagency assembly/work group of largely line-level criminal justice and other practitioners.
- Applying quantitative and qualitative research techniques to assess the nature of and dynamics behind youth violence specifically in Boston.
- Developing an intervention, this was designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the youth homicide rate.
- Implementation and adapting the intervention.
- Evaluating the intervention's impact.

The Boston Gun Project working group began meeting in January 1995; by early 1996, what is now known as Operation Ceasefire was fully implemented (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001). Operation Ceasefire consisted of two main elements; the first was to target law enforcement's targeting of illicit firearm trafficking and the second was to attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence. The second element became known as the 'Pulling Levers' strategy and focused on deterring violent behaviour of chronic gang offenders.

This was carried out by –

- Targeting gangs engaged in violent behaviour.
- Reaching out directly to members of the targeted gangs.
- Delivering an explicit message that violence would not be tolerated.
- Backing up that message by 'pulling every lever' legally available (i.e. applying appropriate sanctions from a varied menu of possible law enforcement actions) when violence occurred (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001, p 2).

At the same time, agencies such as social services, probation and parole officers, and later, church and other community groups offered the offending population youth services and other types of necessary support. Throughout the intervention process the message was reiterated consistently, "in formal meetings with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, through meetings with inmates of secure juvenile facilities, and through gang outreach workers" (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001, p 3). The clear, consistent message was a signal to the gang members that violent behaviour would not be tolerated. A shooting by any gang member would result in each member of the gang being targeted for a wide range of enforcement: drugs, warrants, probation and parole violations, "quality of life" offences, special handling of cases by prosecutors, etc. While normal crime was dealt with through the traditional criminal justice system, any violent crime was dealt with by the project's focused enforcement actions (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001).

The results showed that Operation Ceasefire could be attributed with a 63% decrease in youth homicides per month, a 32% decrease in 'shots fired calls' per month, a 25% decrease in gun assaults per month, and a 44% decrease in the number of youth gun assaults per month in the highest risk district (Kennedy, Braga & Phiel, 2001, p 3). It must be acknowledged, however, that these reductions were similar to those experienced in other cities without Operation Ceasefire (Walker, 2005). However, the results associated with Operation Ceasefire were calculated when controlling for trends and seasonal variations.

PROPOSED CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY IN MANCHESTER (U.K.)

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The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRUC) within the U.K. Home Office carried out an analysis and strategy development for a project, aimed at reducing shootings in South Manchester. The research sought to apply problem-oriented policing principles to shootings and other serious violent crimes associated with gangs (Bullock & Tilley, 2002). The strategy, broadly modelled on the Boston Gun Project, comprised of a number of preventative and enforcement based activities. While some of these elements were taken from the Boston Model, others, in keeping with a problem oriented policing approach, were specifically tailored for Manchester.

For the purpose of designing the strategy, the research was mainly gathered from police sources. Data relating to shooting incidents and individuals involved in shooting and/or gangs was examined. As stated above, the strategy incorporated many elements of the Boston Model. They included coordination of leverage over gangs through, for example, multi-agency crackdowns, enhancement of strong community relations and engagement with offenders, to name a few (Bullock & Tilley, 2002, p v). Three other elements not included in the Boston model were also incorporated into the strategy to address specific conditions in Manchester. They were:

- Development of Inter-gang mediation services, to head off and defuse tensions that risk leading to serious incidents of violence, including shootings.
- Protection for victims and repeat victims.
- Sensitisation of agencies to the implications of their actions for gangs and the risk to their members.

(Bullock & Tilley, 2002, p, v).

Bullock and Tilley (2002) noted that although Manchester gangs differ both from one another and, more generally, from American gangs, they appear to be sufficiently structured to be open to respond positively to such strategies. They proposed to implement this strategy to run

simultaneously with existing policing methods. Unfortunately the Home Office have not published any further documents in relation to the implementation of this strategy.

However, a similar strategy is currently underway in Manchester which focuses on crime and disorder in the city. This too was based on a problem oriented policing approach, but did not have a targeted crime, as it focused on wider issues. This approach is known as the Manchester's Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) and was implemented in 1998. It is a union of several key agencies in Manchester, such as the Manchester City Council, Greater Manchester Police, National Health Service, Fire Service, National Probation Service, Prison Service, Crown Prosecution Service, the Voluntary Sector, Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive, Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Government Office for the North West. In 2003–04 considerable reductions were achieved in the number of robberies, vehicle crimes, business crimes, drug related crimes and incidents of domestic violence. The data for 2004–05 indicated that there was a significant reduction in the number of burglaries. This strategy has a ten-year plan, and although over half way through the partnership acknowledge there is a lot more to be done. Until this plan is complete and a thorough evaluation is undergone, the true success of this strategy cannot be fully understood (www.makingmanchestersafer.com).

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CONCLUSION

The Irish Government and the Garda Síochána, through its Corporate Strategy (2007-2009) have made the issue of gangland murders and drug related criminal activity and violence a key priority for 2007. Strategies such as those outlined above offer an effective approach worthy of further examination to address this growing issue. These strategies have proven to have a rapid and sustainable reduction of serious crime in areas of the United States and the United Kingdom. The learning effect is three fold. First, the offenders learn that the criminal acts committed will draw law enforcement attention to everyone in the group, so the peer pressure that encouraged violence is reversed. Second, the community learn more about the police and their policing methods, (e.g. that they are not draconian). Third, law enforcement learns about the community and how it is willing to support well-thought out enforcement strategies against violence and related crime.

This approach is not a traditional policing approach to crime, and as such, is more widely focused than solely crime control. Kennedy (1998) suggested that this type of strategy may, “where applicable, substantially alter the balance of power between the authorities and offenders” (p 3); as

they empower communities, improve community and police relations, reduce serious crime, make offenders see the direct result of their actions, allow for low enforcement level, and allow law enforcement to react with an iron fist when serious crime does occur. This is not a soft approach to dealing with offenders involved in serious and violent crime; rather it is a more focused and proactive crime prevention strategy.

This type of strategy acknowledges the need for offenders to be arrested and prosecuted for their crimes; however, responses are more effective when there is a thorough understanding of those involved and of the incidents they are involved in. In addition, a higher probability of success exists when a strategy is supported by social intervention opportunity provision, and community mobilization (Braga, 2004). This is not an anti gang strategy, or a targeted prosecution strategy; rather “it [is] an attempt to deter and control the particular problem” (Kennedy, 1998, p 4). Members of the targeted population self-select themselves for inclusion, ensuring the strategy is not discriminate and encouraging continued community support. It must be mentioned that this type of strategy does not take the place of existing approaches; rather it should work in conjunction with them.

This author strongly feels that these strategies offer the Garda Síochána and the Irish Government a new alternative from which to develop an effective strategic approach to deal with the issue of gangland murders and drug related criminal activity and violence. With gun related murders on the increase in Ireland and gang related violence at an unprecedented high, the “Pulling Levers” approach may offer Ireland the deterrence tools necessary to create an effective, fresh approach to address this critical issue at last.

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Catherine Curran

C O **Embedding** I U E **Diversity Agenda into Management Culture**

Catherine Curran

The changes in recruitment policy of the Garda Síochána are resulting in it becoming a more multi-cultural organisation than ever before. This offers great benefits in terms of widening the pool of available talent and offering a wider choice from which to select the best.

But the change will also bring its own challenges. Managing diversity will become a major issue right throughout the organisation. It will apply during the initial training of new recruits, their integration into Garda operations, and their relationship with the public.

The development and implementation of a diversity management strategy is a key challenge for every organisation in today's working environment.

Diversity is not alone about gender, nationality and ethnicity. Neither is it about adhering to equality legislation.

Managing diversity is about taking a long term, strategic approach to creating a respectful working environment and a meritocracy, a system that ensures that hard work is rewarded, under-performance is challenged and that the only thing that counts is your contribution, not your physical appearance, gender, age or any other subjective characteristic or label. That is the type of working environment most people want to be part of.

A diversity management strategy is therefore not about nice-to-have, it is essential. The early focus on diversity was on gender as the number of women joining the workforce increased. Now the focus has turned to nationality and ethnicity.

Around 8% of Ireland's workforce is made up of non-nationals. The strong third-level educational attainment of immigrants is also driving the diversity agenda. Over 54% of immigrants have third level qualifications compared to approximately 27% of the native population¹.

But aside from the increasing number of non-nationals in the workforce, there are other factors that are making the inclusion of diversity in management practice a priority for many organisations. There is increasing diversity in terms of family status, ability, disability, age and personal attributes such as social confidence, ambition and integrity.

1 ESRI Working Paper. "The Labour Market Characteristics and Labour Market Impact of Immigrants in Ireland"

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MAKING DIVERSITY A CORE ISSUE

To be successful a diversity initiative needs to be undertaken with a top-down approach; strong leadership support is critical.

A diversity strategy must be embedded in the organisation's overall aims, vision and values. Diversity initiatives, plans, and action points should be communicated throughout the organisation. The strategy should also have an obvious promoter and driver. And finally, effective management of diversity issues should be openly rewarded and reviewed on an on-going basis.

Diversity issues should be an integral part of all managerial training and development programmes, including specific training on the importance of diversity. This is to ensure that the strategy becomes central to the way the organisation works. It is also important to have a diversity element in current training programmes. Diversity training is important for everyone in an organisation to ensure that all management and staff are aware of potential biases and stereotyping, and that they know what is required in relation to treating others with dignity and respect.

In addition to its inclusion in training programmes, diversity should be included in the competencies against which individuals are assessed. Diversity initiatives, plans, timetables and action points need to be communicated to everyone in an organisation.

Such an approach, which is based on Pearn Kandola's² strategic implementation model, helps to ensure that the diversity agenda becomes a pillar of an organisation's culture rather than simply remain another HR issue.

THE MOSAIC MODEL AND A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION

Based on research conducted in the mid-nineties with over 200 organisations³ Pearn Kandola produced two models which they have successfully used in the private and public sector for supporting the management of diversity.

The first is the MOSAIC model, a vision of the diversity oriented organisation. This provides a framework against which to audit and benchmark organisations.

MOSAIC stands for:

- Mission and Values
- Objective and Fair Processes

2 Pearn Kandola was founded in 1984. It is a specialist Occupational Psychology practice and the largest group of non test publishing psychologists in the UK and Ireland. Pearn Kandola currently employ over fifty staff, thirty of whom are qualified psychologists, based from offices in Oxford and Dublin.

3 Kandola, R. & Fullerton, J. (1998). Diversity in Action: Managing the MOSAIC. <<London>>: CIPD

- Skilled Workforce: Aware and Fair
- Active Flexibility
- Inclusive Focus
- Culture that Empowers

The second model is the strategic implementation model. This is the only empirically validated model for the strategic implementation of diversity in organisations. The model comprises eight factors, all of which are positively related to the successful implementation of managing diversity. Using this model as a basis for the construction of the action plan means that it will be more likely to be implemented and have long-term strategic effect on the areas for action.

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VALIDATED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK



The case for creating clear diversity strategies is irrefutable. Apart from being morally the right thing to do and ensuring compliance with equality legislation there are strong organisational justifications. The effective implementation of diversity strategies can help bring about improvement in performance and innovation and retain key staff.

Ultimately diversity is value driven. It is about recognising, valuing, harnessing and managing differences so that both individual and organisational goals are met.

CASE STUDY

THE UK EXPERIENCE

In the UK, police forces have been working hard to address the diversity

issue since the publication of the McPherson report in 1999⁴. The report is seen by many as a defining moment in British race relations. In Hertfordshire the police force established 'Welcoming Diversity' as one of its core values. To achieve this goal senior management believed that it was necessary to establish exactly what that meant for all members of the force.

A project was established by the HR team with the objective of delivering diversity training that was fresh, challenging and pertinent to the force. The first step in the project involved detailed discussions at senior level management to determine what its diversity statement actually meant. These discussions explored what diversity meant in the context of the organisation and the differences between equal opportunities and diversity.

The experience of staff and the community was then established through focus groups and questionnaires to establish what the diversity issues were from their perspectives.

The discussions and research identified three groups with different training needs. First, there was a basic generic training need for all 3,200 people working in the force. This examined the issues of stereotypes. Real life case studies are used and while the legislative requirements related to diversity are also part of this training the emphasis is on debate and challenging attitudes. "It is not about filling people with more knowledge. Police staff already have to cram their brains full of information," said one of the HR development team⁵.

The second group with specific diversity needs was those officers with a high level of direct contact with the public. The training here identified areas of the community they believed were not being served or reached properly. The third group was those with line management responsibility. For them the issues were managing a diverse workforce and dealing with the impact of diversity covering areas showing how best to respond to complaints of harassment and bullying.

Pearn Kandola helped deliver the training. Participants were encouraged to encapsulate their learning through a creative medium. As a result a number of posters have emerged which identify the critical factors of the project. Its success has been seen to result from five key actions:

- senior level commitment and visibility,
- consolidating learning through exercises such as design posters,
- assessing the project as it progressed and being prepared to make changes,
- getting input from many areas - management, the workforce and the community.

⁴ The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Report of an inquiry by Sir William McPherson. February 1999.

⁵ Personnel Today June 2004

- the involvement of independent, expert evaluation from the beginning of the project.

Another factor behind the project's success is that a lot of work on leadership, redefining values, competencies and the performance management framework was also in progress at the same time. The treatment of people was the core, which linked all of these issues together.